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This dissertation comprises four empirical essays with the objective of understanding how to 
improve the delivery of credit to the poor in India by studying caste discrimination in credit, 
women’s empowerment, and impact of business training and repayment cycle on loan volumes, 
investment and incomes. The study uses primary data collected by myself from a village in the 
Indian state of Haryana from the clients of three microfinance institutions (MFIs), cooperative 
credit society and professional money lenders between 2015 and 2017 over three field visits; 
and from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) data of 2005 and 2011-12.  
 
In the first chapter, from the IHDS data, I examine whether the borrowers’ caste differences 
explain their differences in credit volumes. Using the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition method, 
along with the Heckman procedure and the instrumental variable (IV) procedure to correct for 
selection and simultaneity bias, I find large credit differentials between upper castes and lower 
castes. I also show the evidence of caste discrimination (against the lower castes) and its 
increase between 2005 and 2012. I corroborate discrimination from the qualitative information 
collected in my field surveys.  
 
Using the village survey data, my second chapter examines the impact of women’s 
empowerment on their creditworthiness, measured in terms of total amount of loans (taken 
over time). An empowerment index is constructed from the borrowers’ responses to questions 
regarding economic, social, interpersonal and political consciousness. I find that more 
empowered women secure greater loans. However, empowerment is likely to suffer from 
endogeneity, which is address by adopting the Instrumental Variable (IV) approach and using 
the sex of the borrower’s first child as an instrument for empowerment. The IV estimates show 
a positive impact of empowerment on the volume of loans. My explanation is that empowered 
women may have a higher ability to utilise loans for their businesses due to greater mobility, 
purchasing capacity, and economic independence. I study the robustness of this finding using 
the IHDS data.  
 
In the third chapter, I evaluate the impact of a business training programme on women 
microfinance clients using the same village survey data and interviews. The treatment group is 
the borrowers from one MFI that received business training (by an exogenous rule), while the 
control group had no training. Using difference-in-difference, I find that training did increase 
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their incomes albeit with a reduction in their investment. The ‘treated’ women realised that 
expanding business without necessary knowledge and skills was risky, and hence cut back on 
investment. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I explore if flexibility in repayment would be beneficial for clients as 
opposed to traditional weekly repayments using the same primary data and in-depth interviews. 
I find that the flexible and monthly repayment increased the level of investment as compared 
to the weekly schedule, but it did not raise income. The monthly repaying clients also had a 
higher loan amount and greater savings compared to the weekly paying clients. 
 
In sum, the study covers some key issues of the poor borrowers, and it highlights the need for 
removing caste barriers, eliminating son preferences, training women entrepreneurs, and 
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3000 Years of Discrimination and Counting: How Caste Still 





The caste system has dominated the social, political and economic lives of Indian people for 
over three thousand years. Since independence, the Indian government has introduced a flood 
of quotas, schemes and affirmative action to tackle caste discrimination. Can seventy years of 
government policy reverse three thousand years of oppression? Taking a close look at the 
country's credit system reveals that a new, more subtle, and less overt form of discrimination 
appears to be emerging, and becoming more widespread. This paper examines whether caste-
based differences influence the amount of credit sanctioned to borrowers in India utilising data 
from the India Human Development Survey collected in 2005 and 2011-12. Using the Blinder–
Oaxaca decomposition method, along with the Heckman procedure and the instrumental 
variable approach to correct for selection and simultaneity bias, I find substantial credit 
differentials between the general caste and other lower castes. I also show the evidence of caste 
discrimination against the lower castes. The results of this research have been complemented 
by qualitative data gathered from interviewing lower caste borrowers in North India to 














Discrimination based on caste is a well-established phenomenon in India. Not that long 
ago, lower caste people were treated as untouchable, were consistently denied access to public 
services, and were subject to exploitation, abuse, mistreatment and prejudice. Nowadays, the 
scale and visibility have changed, but discrimination can still be seen in the form of relatively 
subtle constraints and restrictions in different areas: education, housing, finance, and 
employment. Although caste equality has been enshrined in the Indian constitution since 1950, 
caste-based divisions have continued to dominate - in the economy (Deshpande, 2000; Kijima, 
2006), in marriage (Ahuja and Ostermann, 2016), in employment (Agrawal, 2014; Thorat and 
Attewell, 2007), in access to energy (Saxena and Bhattacharya, 2018), in education (Desai and 
Kulkarni, 2008) and in general social interaction. These caste divisions are sometimes 
reinforced through economic boycotts and physical violence (Narula, 1999; Thorat, 2005). 
Despite various efforts by the government such as reservation policies in educational 
institutions, and employment in the government and public sector, caste still remains an 
important indicator of socioeconomic disadvantage (Kumar, 2016). Given the pervasive 
presence of discrimination, it would be surprising if it did not have a significant influence on 
credit outcomes. 
 
Credit is one of the most critical constraints in economic development for the lower castes 
(Thorat, 2009). Variations in access to credit constitute a major source of income inequality 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). Previous research has shown that a lack of access to credit 
constraints entrepreneurship (Banerjee, Breza, Duflo and Kinnan, 2012), poverty reduction 
(Chowdhury, Ghosh and Wright, 2005), agricultural investment, and income growth (Kaboski 
and Townsend, 2012), farm production (Kochar, 1997), and spending on education (Doan, 
Gibson, and Holmes, 2004). These constraints are even higher for lower caste groups who 
remain socially excluded from the mainstream and lack access to assets, public facilities and 
opportunities to improve their plight (Thorat and Neuman, 2012).  
 
I use the definition of discrimination proposed by Becker (1971) which states that 
discrimination occurs when some individuals complete a market transaction at a higher cost or 
under more stringent terms than others who share the same characteristics. In credit markets, 
this translates into differences in loan outcome (approvals, amount, and interest rate) which are 
based on differences in caste, race, or nationality between groups with otherwise similar human 
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and physical capital. Becker introduced the first model of discrimination which explains 
discrimination by ‘taste for discrimination’. When applied to credit markets, this model implies 
that lenders may discriminate against minority borrowers to avoid interacting with them, 
regardless of the borrower’s ability to repay, and that they are willing to suffer a financial 
penalty to do so. Another theory of discrimination, known as ‘statistical discrimination’ was 
pioneered by Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972). The premise of this model - when applied to 
lending - is that the lenders have limited information about the circumstances of some 
borrowers - particularly their ability to repay. This gives lenders an incentive to use easily 
observable characteristics such as caste to assume the expected creditworthiness of borrowers 
provided that these characteristics are correlated with creditworthiness. 
 
The reasons for credit differentials between castes may originate on both the supply and 
demand sides of the credit market. On the supply side, some lenders may treat a loan 
application differently based on whether it comes from a higher caste or a lower caste, 
notwithstanding similar economic, household, and personal characteristics of the borrower - 
simply because of preferences or cultural beliefs about castes. Other lenders may discriminate 
against lower caste borrowers due to an expectation that lower caste clients lack the business 
acumen to use a loan investment wisely. On the demand side, lower caste borrowers may 
demonstrate traits such as a cultural reluctance to display entrepreneurship or initiative; a lack 
of background in negotiation, or a cautious attitude to risk-taking - all of which could affect a 
loan application. It could also be that a self-fulfilling prophecy was at work: the borrowers 
themselves anticipated prejudice, felt that the lender would be unfair to them (high-interest 
rates and unfair collateral requirements), and hence, did not seek large loans. 
 
The qualitative interviews with lower caste borrowers in Northern India demonstrate that 
modern-day discrimination is rarely in the overt form of denying all loans to the lower castes. 
More subtle means are used: for example, giving a smaller loan amount, demanding higher 
collateral, granting inadequate extensions on late repayment, imposing higher interest rates, or 
denying marginal applications. The qualitative enquiries find evidence of petty discrimination 
to discourage borrowers: long waiting times for opening bank accounts, lack of help with the 
completion of paperwork, and intimidating inter-personal contact between higher caste lenders 
and lower-caste borrowers. 
 
One lower caste entrepreneur expressed his views on business lending from banks: 
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“….bank lending is not for the poor lower caste businesses. The banks never give us an 
adequate loan. And it takes many weeks just to start the loan process - they give priority to the 
higher castes.” 
 
Another lower caste borrowers added about his experience in the informal credit market: 
“….the loan terms are unfair to us. We get less loan for the same amount and quality of land 
for collateral compared to upper caste. Lenders always treat it like they are doing us a favour 
even though we pay such a high-interest rate” 
 
The issue of caste discrimination in credit has largely been ignored in social science 
research in India. We, therefore, have limited insight on the extent and nature of caste 
discrimination in credit associated with group identity. This is one of the first studies to analyse 
the discrimination against lower castes in India in the credit framework using qualitative and 
decomposition methods.  
 
Using nationally representative data from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) 
collected in 2005 and 2011-12 and qualitative interviews with lower caste borrowers, this paper 
examines and compares loan amount differentials between castes in the Indian credit sector 
over two periods. Using Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, I demonstrate to what extent these 
differences can be ‘explained’ due to the differences in observable characteristics of the 
individuals and how much is ‘unexplained’ - which represents an indication of discrimination. 
I further decompose the 'explained' component to identify the contribution of each specific 
characteristic in generating the credit differences. In addition, I use the quantile decomposition 
technique to analyse the caste gap across the entire credit distribution. Furthermore, I compare 
the credit outcomes – loan application, approval rate and credit amount sanctioned – in lending 
from banks, money lenders and social network.  
 
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that there are genuine statistical differences 
between castes which affect loan outcomes, regardless of discrimination. There are particular 
differences in observable characteristics between the general caste (GC) and lower castes - 
Other Backward Castes (OBC); Schedule Castes (SC); and Schedule Tribes (ST).  The former 
is more urban, better educated, more likely to be self-employed or in regular salaried jobs, have 
higher income and consumption levels. These disparities inevitably get reflected in the amount 
of credit sanctioned - such that lower castes on average perform significantly poorly compared 
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to general castes. The differences, however, in the credit amount between the general caste and 
other lower castes in India are not only because of lower quality attributes of lower caste (in 
terms of education, income, assets etc) but also because these groups may be facing 
discrimination in the credit sector. 
 
The findings show three main results. First, there are significant differences in loan 
amount between the general caste and other lower castes; second, the credit differentials have 
increased between 2005 and 2011-12; and third, the unexplained component of the total 
difference (an indication of discrimination) has also increased over the period in question. In 
other words, the situation of lower castes in the credit market is getting worse.   
 
Another contribution of this paper is highlighting the sticky floor1 phenomenon in the 
credit gaps between the general caste and other lower castes in India. Using the quantile 
regression-based decomposition method, I find that the credit gap between the general caste 
and other lower castes, and the share of unexplained component of the gap, is higher at lower 
and middle deciles suggesting a sticky floor effect. There are large credit differentials between 
castes in lending from the bank, money lenders and social networks and the differences are 
higher in rural areas than urban areas. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 draws on literature to give the background 
of the Indian caste system. Section 3 presents data and uses descriptive evidence to highlight 
caste differences in India. Section 4 sets out the methodology for the paper. Section 5 presents 
the results from the selection equation, loan amount equation, decomposition of credit 
differentials. Section 6 discusses and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background of the caste system in India 
The Indian Constitution identifies three main categories of people for preferential 
policies that reserve seats in legislatures, public sector enterprises, government jobs, and 
educational institutions. These are OBC; SC also known as Dalits; and ST also known as 
                                                 
1Sticky floor refers to the scenario where the gap is higher at the bottom of the distribution and the lower caste at 
the bottom are at a great disadvantage. In this particular case, it refers to the phenomenon of social rigidity in 
which a certain group of lower castes fail to or are unable to take advantage of readily available options for 




Adivasis. GC (also known as forward class) is a term used in India to classify communities 
who do not qualify for any affirmative action schemes operated by the Indian government. By 
default, 'general caste’ equates to the higher caste in more traditional categorisations. 
In India, caste is associated with socio-economic status with a close relationship with 
occupation and employment (Thorat and Attewell, 2007), income and expenditure (Deshpande, 
2000), and capital (Kijima, 2006) - all which are of course helpful in accessing new lines of 
credit. General caste groups have usually better economic outcomes than lower castes. There 
is a great hierarchy among the OBC and generally, many OBC groups are closer to GC than to 
SC or ST in terms of standard of living, income, education and other characteristics. The SC, 
ST and OBC comprise about 19.5 percent, 8.6 percent, and 41 percent, respectively, of India's 
population (National Sample Survey Office, 2011). But seven decades after Independence, 
33.6 percent of SC, 44.8 percent of ST and 20.7 percent of OBC live below poverty line. 
 
Table 1:  Caste distribution according to population, poverty, expenditure and literacy 















General Castes 25 12.5 1281 2467 79% 
Scheduled Castes 19.5 33.6 929 1444 58% 
Scheduled Tribes 8.6 44.8 873 1797 50% 
Other Backward 
Classes 
41.1 20.7 1036 1679 69% 
Source: National Sample Survey Office, 2011. 1 Dollar = Rs 70 in May 2019 
Dalits are the most oppressed and marginalised group in India.  While Dalits make up 
around 20% of the total population of India, their control over resources of the country is less 
than 5% (National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) report, 2009). Approximately 
three-quarters of the Dalit workforce are landless or nearly landless agricultural labourers 
(Census of India, 2011). According to an NCHDR report, the social conditions of Dalits are so 
deplorable that more than half of the Dalit children are malnourished and less than 10% of 
Dalit households can afford electricity, safe drinking water, and toilets.  
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The condition of ST households is no better than their SC counterparts. Even though ST 
did not face exclusion in the form of untouchability, unlike SC, they have even poorer outcomes 
in terms of health, education, jobs, and employment. Despite the reservation system, the share 
of SC and ST in government job is 16.99% and 8.55 % respectively (Census, 2011). On the 
whole, lower castes especially SC and ST perform badly in every development metric - 
including credit. 
3. Data and sample characteristics 
The data used in the paper comes from two rounds of the India Human Development Survey 
(IHDS) - a nationally representative survey of 42,152 households in 2011-12 and 41,554 
households in 2005 collected from 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighbourhoods across India. 
The survey covers a range of questions relating to economic activity, income and consumption 
expenditure, assets, social capital, education, health, marriage, and fertility. Realising that 
quantitative secondary data is insufficient to capture most of the social reality of discrimination, 
this study also makes use of qualitative data using semi-structured interviews and informal 
discussions with several borrowers in three villages2 in North India to understand the way caste 
discrimination exists in the credit sector. 16 men (3 from OBC, 12 from SC, and 1 from ST) 
and 8 (6 from SC and 2 from ST) women from lower caste communities were randomly 
selected for the interviews3. The interviews followed a semi-structured approach, giving 
participants the flexibility to discuss issues important to them. Informal discussions were held 
with political activists and representative of Dalit communities, four junior employees of two 
rural commercial banks4 (3 GC and 1 OBC) and six local money lenders (belonging to general 
caste) operating in the region.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive of the variables of the four caste groups used in the 
analysis. The proportion of caste groups used in IHDS 2011-12 is similar to National Sample 
Survey Office (2006) where GC are 30 percent, OBC are 41.1, ST are 8.6 percent, SC are 19.5 
                                                 
2 The qualitative work was done in the months of  January and February in 2018. The villages demographic are 
representative of the states in the North India, however, it’s difficult to say that it represents nationwide trends 
since India is such a diverse country. However, qualitative analysis are very much in line with the quantitative 
analysis. 
3 All the clients approached agreed to be interviewed for this study. The interviews were done with women at their 
houses in the presence of a local social worker who helped with translation and conversations. Consent was taken 
in verbal form.  
4 Punjab National Bank and State Bank of India. 
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percent. The primary dependent variable is the log of loan amount5.  GC has the highest amount 
of loan undertaken, followed by OBC, SC and ST. However, only 46 percent of the GC 
participated in the credit market compared to 60 percent of the OBC, 44 percent of the ST and 
56 percent of the SC in 2011-12. Similar trends can be seen in 2005. 
 
The general caste has better outcomes in terms of loan amount, income, consumption, and 
education compared to the other castes. Income, consumption and loan amount increased by 
more than double for all the castes between 2005 and 2012. Caste-based stratification translates 
into low human capital for lower caste individuals. In 2005, the average number of education 
years completed by  ST (head of the households) in the sample were 3.63 years, 3.99 years for 
SC, 5.22 years for OBC, followed by 7.30 years for the GC. Generally, the differences at lower 
levels of education (primary) are less pronounced across social groups but start to diverge 
widely by middle school and higher. For instance, only 3.5 percent of the SC heads of 
household have achieved a graduate or post-graduate education compared to 14 percent of GC 
individuals. 
 
Although the GC are less likely to live in rural areas, they are more likely to own land 
for agricultural purposes. In 2011-12, 56 percent of GC lived in the rural area, and 46 percent 
owns land for agricultural purposes. Whereas 65 percent of OBC, 86 percent of ST and 70 
percent of SC population live in the rural area, however, 46 of OBC, 59 percent of ST, and 35 
percent of SC own land for agricultural purposes. The amount of land owned by SC/ST has 
increased, while decreased for OBC and GC over this time. The general castes are more likely 
to live in dwellings that are designed to be solid and include cemented flooring and strong roof 
(also known as pukka houses). 
 
                                                 
5 Government policies have invariably seek to tackle the discrimination problem in the credit market by focusing 
on the access to credit. The assumption is that - having gained access to credit market - the processes and controls 
within that system will work to ensure equal treatment. This study does not focus on access, instead, it measures 
how equitably the credit system treats different groups after they have gained access.. The key measure is therefore 
the amount of credit - the size of the loan actually granted - to those who make applications. 
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 GC  OBC  ST  SC  GC  OBC  ST  SC  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Loan amount (Rs) 64435 718730 52949 184840 24611 117216 28483 79241 24356 214400 18751 92206 7390 36548 10971 46609 
Log of Loan 10.72 1.49 10.39 1.41 9.6 1.66 9.94 1.34 10.03 1.48 9.56 1.4 8.67 1.6 9.14 1.38 
Dummy if loan taken 0.46 0.5 0.6 0.49 0.44 0.5 0.56 0.5 0.33 0.47 0.47 0.5 0.34 0.47 0.44 0.5 
Number of loans taken 1.23 2.42 1.87 2.89 1.57 3.05 1.66 2.74 0.97 2.29 1.45 2.72 1 2.39 1.42 2.76 
Yearly income (Rs) 178140 292287 114354 181464 92999 135742 99492 167256 75374 113964 47282 63617 39268 79403 38676 42127 
Yearly consumption (Rs) 148807 149001 114919 114844 83398 85722 94903 84609 68797 61416 49866 46009 32724 33295 43027 40272 
Proportion have female head 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 1.1 0.29 1.1 0.29 1.1 0.3 1.1 0.3 
Age of the head 51.88 13.61 49.53 13.53 47.92 13.17 47.83 13.43 48.51 13.68 47.08 13.38 45.53 13.02 45.46 13.18 
Education years of the head 7.46 5.07 5.46 4.71 3.91 4.54 4.39 4.55 7.3 5.06 5.22 4.68 3.63 4.45 3.99 4.46 
Size of the Household 4.82 2.33 4.92 2.44 4.77 2.16 4.83 2.17 5.12 2.46 5.28 2.6 5.06 2.4 5.19 2.33 
Amount of land in acres 11.99 59.93 11.6 48.16 16.52 65.04 4.78 27.81 22.31 322.91 12.97 218.14 15.54 77.84 3.42 22.07 
Dummy if own land  0.46 0.5 0.46 0.5 0.59 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.4 0.49 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.5 0.33 0.47 
Live in urban area 0.44 0.5 0.35 0.48 0.14 0.35 0.3 0.46 0.47 0.5 0.34 0.47 0.15 0.35 0.29 0.45 
House Quality6 0.76 0.43 0.67 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.56 0.5 0.71 0.45 0.58 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.47 0.5 
 Have a ration card7 0.87 0.33 0.86 0.35 0.81 0.39 0.87 0.34 0.85 0.36 0.8 0.4 0.78 0.41 0.86 0.35 
Proportion in the sample 28.57  41.10  8.78  21.74  32.48  39.19  8.28  20.05    
                                                 
 
 
6 A binary variable distinguishing between dwellings that are designed to be solid and include cemented flooring and strong roof compare to houses without a strong floor or 
roof. (Good = 1, Bad = 0) 
 
 
7 Ration card is an identification document issued by state governments in India. It categorises household according to their poverty level and allow the holder of below and 
extreme poverty households to obtain food and other commodities at a subsidised price. 
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The proportion of those taking a loan has also increased for all the groups. GC has taken the 
lowest number of loans in the last five years; however, their loan amount is twice as big as SC. 
However, SC/ST have significantly improved their credit outcomes between 2005 and 2011-
12. Figure 1 below plots the kernel density distribution of log loan for all the castes. The 
distribution of log loan of GC lies to the right of all the other lower castes. 
 
  
Figure 1: The kernel density distribution of log of amount of loan by various caste groups in 2011-2012 and 2005. 
 
There is a clear distinction in the occupational structure of various castes (see Table 11 
in the Appendix). The major source of income for GC and OBC continued to be cultivation, 
non-agricultural wage labour and salaried employment. Since a large proportion of ST own 
land, a very significant portion of this caste group derives their income from agricultural 
activities. The hierarchical nature of the caste system combined with low endowments of 
human and physical capital implies that major portion of SC’s income continues to come from 
selling their labour and a very small portion derives from cultivation.  
 
The purpose of loans taken varies according to the caste group (see Table 12 in the 
Appendix). In 2011, around 36.5 percent of the general caste loans are for productive purposes 
such as buying land, agricultural, business, and education and the rest for non-productive 
purposes such as marriage, consumption, educational, medical expenses etc. Around a third of 
the loans by ST and OBC are for productive purposes which are in line with GC. SC mostly 
comprising of wage labour has only 21 percent of loans for productive purposes and mostly 




Compared to 2005, the patterns within the group are more or less the same. Loan for the 
non-productive purposes has increased for all the caste groups. Since consumption loans do 
not generate any financial return and are deemed risky, increase in such loans for GCs and 
OBC shows that lenders favour these castes over SC and ST. Loans for productive purposes 
such as agriculture and business decreased for all lower castes but the decline in the SC was 
the sharpest where it reduced to half. 
 
Different castes tend to get their loans from different sources (see Table 13 in the 
Appendix). The major source of finance for general castes comes from formal lenders such as 
banks, while social networks and money lenders also play a significant role. OBC have 
increased their share of lending from banks while reducing their reliance on money lenders 
between 2005 and 2011-12. SC and ST are majorly dependent on informal sources for their 
finance, however, these groups have greatly reduced their dependence on money lenders 
between 2005 and 2011-12. 
 
With the development of formal finance in India in the last decade, all the caste groups have 
increased their reliance on formal sources such as banks, NGOs and credit groups in 2011-12. 
With further development in financial services in India specially in microfinance and rural 
banking, we may see a current trend of a diminishing role for money lenders in Indian society. 
The data also show an increase in the share of loans from relatives and friends for all the caste 
groups. Overall, we see a significant convergence of education, income, consumption, loan 
amount of SC/STs toward non-SC/ST levels (also noted by Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul, 
2012). 
 
The survey done in 2011-2012 also has information on the breakdown of loan approval 
and rejection of households from banks, money lenders, and social network (see Table 14 in 
the Appendix). There is no clear pattern, however, general castes are more likely to borrow 
from banks, whereas other castes are more likely to borrow from informal sources such as 
money lenders and friends.  
    
4. Methodology 
This paper presents estimates of the mean caste loan amount gap in the Indian credit sector and 
the extent to which this differential can be explained by differences in observable 
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characteristics or ‘endowments’ of clients across caste groups. The amount of credit the 
borrower has arises from the following equation: 
 
                                         𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑗
 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗
 𝛽𝑗
 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 
                                                       (1) 
 
Where 𝑙𝑛𝑌  is the natural logarithm of loan amount of ith individual in jth social group ranging 
from GC, SC, ST and OBC.  𝑋𝑖𝑗
  is a vector of observed characters, and βj
  is a coefficient vector 
to be estimated for each caste type, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗
  is assumed to be a normally distributed error term 
with mean zero and positive variance. 
 
The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition is employed to decompose the credit amount gap in 
outcomes between various castes8. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) developed a regression-
based decomposition to divide the gap in an outcome of interest between two groups into an 
‘explained’ and an ‘unexplained’ portion. The ‘explained’ portion of the gap is the actual 
difference between the mean values of two castes which could be explained by differences in 
endowments and personal attributes. The ‘unexplained’ portion of the gap arises from group 
differences in the effects of the independent variables (Sen, 2014). This is also known as 
discrimination function or unexplained residual – a part that cannot be accounted for by 
differences in characteristics. While the unexplained component is often used as a measure for 
discrimination, it is very likely that the residual also includes the effects of unobservable or 
unmeasurable characteristics (Deshpande and Sharma, 2014). All decomposition analyses are 
subject to this caveat given that it is generally very difficult to control for all the borrower’s 
characteristics that may affect creditworthiness9.  
The difference in the credit amount arise from following equation: 
              𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = [(𝑋𝑔
 ̅̅ ̅ −  ?̅?𝑙
 )?̂? 
∗] + [(?̂?𝑔   
 −  ?̂?    
∗ )?̅?𝑔
 + ( ?̂?    
∗ − ?̂?𝑙
 )?̅?𝑙
 ]                (2) 
                                     EXPLAINED                    UNEXPLAINED 
                                                 
8 Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition has been used to measure differences between castes in health outcomes 
(Maity, 2018), labour market (Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul, 2012), poverty (Borooah, 2005), school enrolment 
(Borooah and Iyer, 2005), access to energy (Saxena and Bhattacharya, 2018) in Indian context.  
9 It is also possible that pre-market discrimination affects the development of characteristics, and thus, the 
explained component could also constitute the effects of past discrimination. Considering this, the estimates of 
the unexplained components should not be taken as precise measurement of discrimination but as rough estimates 
of its scale (Deshpande and Sharma, 2014). 
 
 22 
Where 𝑙𝑛𝑌  is the natural logarithm of loan amount, g and l subscripts stand for general 
caste and lower castes (SC, ST and OBC) respectively.  𝑋𝑔
  is a vector of observed characters 
for general caste, 𝑋𝑙
  is a vector of observed characters for various lower castes, and 𝛽𝑔 
 
 is a 
coefficient vector to be estimated for general caste, βl
  is a coefficient vector to be estimated 
for lower caste and β̂    
∗ is the estimate of the non-discriminatory credit coefficient and can be 
written as: 
?̂?    
∗ = 𝐷?̂?𝑔   
 + (1 − 𝐷)?̂?𝑙
  
The non-discriminatory credit coefficient β̂ 
∗, can be estimated using the coefficients from 
the higher caste where (D=1) or the lower caste as the reference coefficients (D=0). However, 
there is no particular reason to assume that the coefficients of any of the groups are non-
discriminating (Jann, 2008). It has been claimed that the undervaluation of one group comes 
along with an overvaluation of the other (Cotton, 1988). Considering this, I use the method 
proposed by Neumark (1988) using the coefficients from a pooled regression over both groups 
as an estimate for β̂  .  
∗  
 
Selectivity and simultaneity bias 
Another methodological problem faced in analysing the caste gap is the existence of 
endogeneity which can be caused by self-selection and simultaneity bias. Selection bias could 
occur when individuals with similar characteristics (education or consumption level) have 
different levels of entrepreneurship, perseverance and ability, which may lead to different 
probabilities of their participating in the credit market. The self-selection is corrected by using 
the Heckman two-step procedure in the analysis. 
Using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the observed earnings differential can be further 
decomposed into: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + [𝛾𝑗𝜆?̅? − 𝛾𝑖𝜆?̅?]  = [(𝑋𝑔
 ̅̅ ̅ −  ?̅?𝑙
 )?̂? 
∗] + [(?̂?𝑔   
 − ?̂?    
∗ )?̅?𝑔
 + ( ?̂?    
∗ − ?̂?𝑙
 )?̅?𝑙
 ]         (3) 
                                                EXPLAINED                     UNEXPLAINED             
where γ is the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (λ).  
Simultaneity bias could be caused by the presence of endogenous variable such as 
consumption expenditure which may cause reverse causality. To remove the simultaneity bias, 
we require an instrument for consumption expenditure – an exogenous variable that is 
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correlated with consumption expenditure but is not otherwise associated with the loan amount. 
In this case, the daily calorific requirement of the household satisfies the requirement for use 
as instrumental variables10. The instrument affects the loan amount through its effect on 
consumption expenditure only.  
 
Specification checks 
Identification can be achieved by including at least one independent variable that appears 
in the selection equation but not in the outcome equation - we need a variable that affects the 
selection, but not the outcome (Sartori, 2003). In the specification, there are a number of 
additional identifying restrictions that are described below.  
 
A ration card is an important document for identification in India as well as a proxy for 
having other legal documents, is pre-requisite for being able to participate in the credit market, 
however, it does not affect the loan amount. No lender will start the loan application process 
without proper documentation. The information regarding the source of loan and purpose of 
the loan is only available for people who have taken loan, so it appears in the credit amount 




I begin the analysis by estimating a model of the probability of participating in the credit 
market using a probit model11. The dependent variable is 1 if the client has taken a loan or 0 
otherwise. The estimates of the probit regressions are used to construct the Inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR) for the purpose of correcting the credit amount equation for selection bias as reported 
in the later section.  
                                                 
10 We also test for the relevance of the instrument in the first-stage regression. Staiger and Stock (1997) 
proposed a rule of thumb declaring the instruments weak when the first stage F statistic is less than 10. The F-
statistic from the first-stage is sufficiently large in every instance, suggesting that the IV is powerful. Another 
approach, by Stock and Yogo (2005) is to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments when the Cragg and 
Donald (1993) F-statistic exceeds a given threshold. In this case, we reject the null hypotheses of the weak 
instrument since Cragg-Donald F statistic exceeds the threshold of 16.38 at 10%. By these criteria, we have a 
good instrument in total daily calorific requirement of the household.  
 
11 I failed to reject the null hypothesis for Wald test of exogeneity using instrument variable, therefore, a regular 
probit regression may be appropriate.  
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To facilitate the understanding of the effects of coefficients, I present the marginal effects12 of 
the regressors on the probability of participation in the credit market by each caste in Tables 3 
and 4. The coefficients from the probit model are shown in Tables 15 and 16 in the Appendix. 
Table 3: The marginal effect of participation in the credit market by various castes in 2005.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.105*** 0.144*** 0.189*** 0.160*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.013) 
AGE 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007* 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
AGESQ -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
LAND 0.001 0.009* -0.004 0.038*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) 
SEX  -0.052*** -0.061*** 0.001 -0.045** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.033) (0.021) 
SIZE OF HH 0.002 -0.000 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
URBAN RURAL -0.097*** -0.101*** -0.154*** -0.048*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.034) (0.016) 
HOUSE QUALITY -0.038*** -0.045*** 0.046* -0.013 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.026) (0.015) 
RATIONCARD 0.013 0.025** -0.017 0.027 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.018) 
     
                                                 
12 Marginal effects are sensitive to two quantities: the variance of the dependent variable conditional on the 
independent variables and the scale parameter defined as the standard deviation of the underlying latent 
outcome conditional on the independent variables Controlling for confounding variables could change both 
these quantities in offsetting directions. Therefore, an additional care is needed while selecting the variables. 
margins command in STATA is used to measure the marginal effect of one unit increase in independent 




STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13,332 16,213 3,270 8,304 
Delta standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 1 if the client has 
taken a loan or 0 otherwise. All predictors at their mean value. The independent variables are: log of consumption, 
age, sex of the head of the household, size of the household, number of education years completed by the head, 
log of amount of land, dummy whether the household has a ration card, dummy for quality of the house 
(good/bad), dummy whether household is in urban area, and various dummies for occupation and the state where 
the household is located.  
 
Table 4: The marginal effect of participation in the credit market by various castes in 2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.114*** 0.129*** 0.097*** 0.141*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.012) 
AGE 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
AGESQ -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.005* -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
LAND 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.002 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
SEX  -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.104*** -0.035** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.029) (0.017) 
SIZE OF HH 0.003 0.002 0.012** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
URBAN RURAL -0.093*** -0.108*** -0.048 -0.067*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.035) (0.015) 
HOUSE QUALITY -0.037*** -0.034*** 0.004 -0.037*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.026) (0.014) 
RATIONCARD 0.038** 0.043*** 0.046* 0.034* 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.026) (0.018) 





YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 11,680 16,763 3,590 8,807 
Delta standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Same as Table 3 
 
The results from both time periods show similar results. One percent increase in 
consumption increases the probability of taking a loan by 0.1 percent for GC, 0.14 percent for 
OBC, 0.18 percent for ST and 0.16 percent for SC in 2005 and 0.11 percent for GC, 0.13 
percent for OBC, 0.10 percent for ST and 0.14 percent for SC in 2011-2012. The coefficients 
of age shows a positive relationship with the probability of taking a loan. The results show that 
gender exerts an influence on taking a loan. Being a female significantly decreases the 
probability of taking a loan. This is particularly strong in the ST in 2011-2012 where it reduces 
the probability of taking a loan by 10 percent. The number education years completed by the 
head of the households shows a negative relationship with the likelihood of participating in the 
credit market (except for SC in 2011-12). This implies that highly educated heads are more 
likely to work in salaried positions and may not require loans.  The size of the household does 
not seem to matter which could be seen in the insignificant coefficient of the size of household 
for all castes, except for  SC where it increases the probability of participation by merely 0.01 
percent. The amount of land marginally increases the probability of participation in credit 
markets for  GC, OBC and SC in 2011 and OBC and SC in 2005. Households living in strong 
and permanent dwelling are less likely to participate in the credit markets. Having a ration card 
which is an important document for identification and an indicator of having other legal 
document increases the probability of participation by 4 to 5 percent in 2011-12; however, it 
does not have any effect on 2005 except for OBC. Households living in rural areas are more 
likely to participate in the credit market reflecting the cyclical nature of an agricultural 
economy and the relatively long delay between investment and income. To account for the 
differences between the sources of income and location, I also controlled for occupation and 
states dummies. 
 
Loan amount equation 
I now proceed to estimate regressions for each caste type corrected for selection and 




Table 5: Selection corrected loan amount equation estimates for 2005  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.653*** 0.702*** 0.570** 0.679*** 
 (0.052) (0.038) (0.271) (0.123) 
AGE 0.026*** 0.004 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) 
AGESQ -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION  0.024*** 0.025*** 0.019 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.014) (0.006) 
LAND UNIT 0.034** 0.041*** 0.051 0.074** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.035) (0.033) 
SEX  -0.064 0.181*** 0.088 -0.015 
 (0.072) (0.053) (0.127) (0.070) 
URBAN 0.056 0.092** 0.187 0.172*** 
 (0.051) (0.036) (0.194) (0.056) 
HOUSE QUALITY 0.152*** 0.173*** 0.332*** 0.177*** 
 (0.042) (0.032) (0.087) (0.045) 
MILLS 0.415** -0.281* -0.108 0.252 
 (0.207) (0.160) (0.428) (0.413) 
Constant 2.450*** 1.888*** 1.761 1.496 
 (0.618) (0.378) (2.974) (1.376) 
     
LOAN PURPOSE YES YES YES YES 
LOAN SOURCE YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
3302.13 6502.25 478.31 228.523 
Observations 4,444 7,633 1,156 3,661 
 
 28 
R-squared 0.523 0.462 0.628 0.503 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of 
amount of loan. The independent variables are age, age square, number of education years completed, unit of land 
owned, predicted values of the first stage regression replacing the original value of log of consumption, and 
various dummies for loan source, its purpose and the state where the household is located. The test of equality 
rejects the equality of coefficients across equations. 
 
 
Table 6: Selection corrected loan amount equation estimates for 2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.760*** 0.715*** 0.682*** 0.700*** 
 (0.052) (0.036) (0.131) (0.053) 
AGE 0.017** 0.022*** 0.023 0.037*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) 
AGESQ -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION  0.019*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
LAND UNIT 0.013 0.030*** -0.007 0.027 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.023) (0.017) 
SEX  0.060 0.087** -0.006 0.045 
 (0.055) (0.040) (0.096) (0.053) 
URBAN 0.058 0.044 0.204** 0.014 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.101) (0.040) 
HOUSE QUALITY 0.151*** 0.193*** 0.299*** 0.165*** 
 (0.040) (0.028) (0.077) (0.035) 
MILLS 0.029 -0.033 0.183 0.190 
 (0.176) (0.125) (0.189) (0.205) 
Constant -0.085 1.698*** 1.944 1.587*** 
 (0.493) (0.354) (1.190) (0.502) 
LOAN SOURCE 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 






YES YES YES YES 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
4106.26 7426.15 887.66 2366.63 
Observations 5,316 10,012 1,571 4,952 
R-squared 0.447 0.47 0.630 0.473 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Same as Table 6 
 
As expected, consumption is a very significant predictor of the loan amount and a single 
percentage increase in consumption increases the loan amount by 0.76 percent for GC, 0.71 
percent for OBC, 0.68 percent for ST and 0.71 percent for SC in 2011-12 and 0.65 for GC, 
0.70 percent for OBC, 0.57 percent for ST and 0.69 percent for SC in 2005. Education has a 
positive relationship with the loan amount. An additional year of education significantly 
increases the amount of loan taken by all the castes except for SC in 2011-12. Loan amount 
has a quadratic relationship with age such that loan amount increases with age and start to 
decline thereafter. The amount of land owned increases the loan amount for all the caste except 
for ST in 2005. However, land does not seem to matter in 2011 except for the OBC where a 
percent increase in land increases the loan by only 3 percent. Land is an important asset, 
however, it has a limited effect on loan amount which could be due to the following reasons. 
First, in the absence of land titles, and poorly administered land records, small and marginal 
farmers, who account for more than half of the total land holding, may not be able to use it as  
collateral (Reserve Bank of India, 2015). Second, since average loan size is small, land may be 
worth more than the loan amount required. Third, it’s a non-liquid and immovable asset so it’s 
not very suitable for collateral. However, the quality of borrower’s house is a better predictor 
of loan amount and significantly increases the loan amount. The sex of the head of the 
household does not seem to matter much in determining the loan amount except for the OBC 
households where it increases the loan amount by 17 percent in 2011-12 and 9 percent in 2005. 




Decomposing the differences in participation in the credit market: 
To disentangle the role of observable and unobservable factors on the participation level in the 
credit market among various castes, I extend the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to nonlinear 
methods using Fairlie’s (2005) approach. Table 7 below decompose the probability of 
participation in the credit market into explained and unexplained part using the estimates from 
the selection equation  
 
Table 7: Decomposition of probability of participation in the credit market in 2005 & 2011-12 
 2005 2011-12 
VARIABLES GC VS 
OBC 
GC VS ST GC VS SC GC VS 
OBC 
GC VS ST GC VS SC 
       
GC 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.458*** 0.458*** 0.458*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Others 0.469*** 0.337*** 0.440*** 0.600*** 0.440*** 0.565*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
Difference -0.139*** -0.007 -0.109*** -0.142*** 0.018* -0.107*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Explained -0.132*** -0.040*** -0.066*** -0.109*** -0.031*** -0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
Unexplained -0.007 0.033*** -0.044*** -0.032*** 0.048*** -0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) 
Observations 29,714 16,877 21,765 28,444 15,270 20,491 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
For the data collected in 2005, I find that all the lower castes have a higher probability 
of participating in the credit market compared to the general caste. In 2011-12, I find that the 
SC and OBC have a higher probability of participation in the credit market compared to GC 
whereas GC has a small advantage over ST. A substantial proportion of the credit gap between 
GC and SC and GC and ST remains unexplained. On average, lower castes are more likely to 






Figure 2: Decomposition of the probability of participation in the credit market. The figure is based on Table 7 
comparing caste inequalities between various castes in 2005 and 2011-12. 
 
 
Decomposing credit differential with the selection effect 
Tables 8 and 9 present the decomposition of the log credit amount differentials between 
the general caste and all other castes into explained and unexplained component.  

























VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs OBC     GC vs ST GC vs ST  GC vs SC  SC vs GC 
       
GC 10.025*** 9.641*** 10.025*** 9.641*** 10.025*** 9.641*** 
 (0.022) (0.199) (0.022) (0.199) (0.022) (0.199) 
Others 9.555*** 9.764*** 8.667*** 8.757*** 9.140*** 8.953*** 
 (0.016) (0.125) (0.047) (0.395) (0.023) (0.326) 
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 (0.027) (0.235) (0.052) (0.442) (0.032) (0.382) 
Explained 0.436*** 0.448*** 1.065*** 1.085*** 0.712*** 0.779*** 
 (0.021) (0.032) (0.047) (0.049) (0.026) (0.030) 
Unexplained 0.034 -0.571** 0.293*** -0.200 0.173*** -0.091 
 (0.023) (0.233) (0.045) (0.444) (0.027) (0.381) 
       
Observations 12,076 12,076 5,600 5,600 8,105 8,105 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows decomposition of log of 
loan into explained and unexplained portion. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show results from equation 2. Columns 2, 4 and 
6 show results from equation 3 and are corrected for selection and endogeneity. 
 

























VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs OBC     GC vs ST GC vs ST  GC vs SC  SC vs GC 
       
GC 10.724*** 10.689*** 10.724*** 10.689*** 10.724*** 10.689*** 
 (0.014) (0.144) (0.020) (0.144) (0.020) (0.144) 
Others 10.386*** 10.391*** 9.592*** 9.459*** 9.945*** 9.817*** 
 (0.009) (0.079) (0.042) (0.147) (0.019) (0.137) 
Difference 0.339*** 0.298* 1.132*** 1.230*** 0.779*** 0.872*** 
 (0.017) (0.165) (0.047) (0.206) (0.028) (0.199) 
Explained 0.260*** 0.277*** 0.895*** 0.933*** 0.526*** 0.590*** 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.046) (0.045) (0.023) (0.025) 
Unexplained 0.079*** 0.021 0.237*** 0.297 0.253*** 0.282 
 (0.002) (0.164) (0.045) (0.203) (0.025) (0.198) 
       
Observations 15,328 15,328 6,887 6,887 10,268 10,268 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the decomposition of log 
of loan into explained and unexplained portion. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show results from equation 2. Columns 2, 4 
and 6 show results from equation 3 and are corrected for selection and endogeneity. 
 
Consistent with earlier results, I find that GC is in a more favourable position in the 
Indian credit sector. The observed credit differentials show that the GC has 47 percent 
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advantage over OBC, 135.8 percent over ST, and 88.5 percent over SC in 2005 and 33.9 percent 
advantage over OBC, 113.2 percent over ST, and 77.9 percent over SC in 2011-12 (see 
observed credit differentials in Columns 1, 3 and 4 in Tables 8 and 9). Largely these differences 
can be explained by the endowments and personal characteristics, and a very small portion 
remains unexplained.  
 
 
Figure 3: Credit differential between the general caste and other lower castes for 2005 and 2011-12. The figure is 
based on columns 2, 4 and 6 of Tables 8 and 9 comparing caste inequalities between various castes in 2005 and 
2011-12 
 
However, these results should be treated with caution due to self-selection in the credit 
market. The adjusted credit differentials in Tables 8 and 9 show that decomposition results are 
sensitive to the selection effect. The credit differentials are underestimated in 2011 (except for 
OBC) and overestimated in 2005 without the correction for selectivity. The adjusted credit 
differential decreases to -12.3 percent for OBC, 88.5 percent for ST, and 68.8 percent for SC 
in 2005 and marginally decreases to 29.8 percent for OBC, increases to 123.0 percent for ST, 
and 87.2 percent for SC in 2011-12. The credit differentials are largely explained by the 
differences in endowments and personal characteristics. The negative unexplained differences 
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caste borrowers got a better return for their personal characteristics. However, this effect is 
reversed in 2011-12. Compared to 2005, the credit differentials and the share of unexplained 
portion have increased between the general caste and other lower castes. 
The credit differentials calculated without correcting for selection are underestimated in 
2011-12. This increase after adjusting for selection is primarily due to a rise in the unexplained 
residual effect, which represents, for example, societal and cultural conditions such as 
discriminating structures and practices on the credit market affecting loan outcomes for lower 
caste individuals. This means that an individual from a lower caste with a similar probability 
of participation as an individual from a general caste is predicted to get less loan than the 
general caste borrower 
Even though lower castes have a higher probability of participation in the credit markets 
compared to general caste, the credit amount differential between them is very high. Moreover, 
negative discrimination in 2005 was reversed in 2011-12. Now I will discuss the factors that 
will explain these sharp differences. Table 10 below shows the variable decomposition of credit 
differential. 
Table 10: Decomposition of the log of credit amount differential for a selection corrected 
equation in 2005 and 2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





CONSUMPTION 0.214*** 0.580*** 0.351*** 0.175*** 0.524*** 0.313*** 
 (0.012) (0.031) (0.019) (0.010) (0.028) (0.016) 
AGE 0.016** 0.070*** 0.078*** 0.043*** 0.026 0.090*** 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.021) (0.012) (0.024) (0.025) 
AGE SQ -0.010 -0.052** -0.063*** -0.037*** -0.022 -0.081*** 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.020) (0.012) (0.024) (0.025) 
EDUCATION  0.049*** 0.095*** 0.069*** 0.033*** 0.064*** 0.042*** 
(0.005) (0.016) (0.010) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) 
LAND UNIT 0.005*** -0.001 0.012* 0.003** 0.000 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
URBANRURAL 0.007*** 0.023** 0.015*** 0.004** 0.022** 0.004 
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 (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) 
SEX -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOUSE QUALITY 0.020*** 0.071*** 0.032*** 0.015*** 0.066*** 0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.016) (0.007) (0.002) (0.013) (0.005) 
PURPOSE OF LOAN 0.034*** 0.063*** 0.047*** 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) 
SOURCE OF LOAN 0.072*** 0.125*** 0.111*** 0.062*** 0.128*** 0.160*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) 
OCCUPATION 0.044*** 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.033*** 0.026** 0.095*** 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) 
STATES -0.003 0.036 0.034** -0.073*** 0.065*** -0.071*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.011) 
Observations 12,076 5,600 8,105 15,507 6,949 10,379 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table decomposes the explained 
component from the equation 3 to identify the contribution of each specific characteristic in generating credit 
differences. 
 
In 2005, consumption expenditure is responsible for around half of the explained share 
of the total difference between GC and OBC. The differences in source of the loan, purpose of 
the loan and occupations contribute to 33 percent; and differences in age and education years 
is responsible for the rest of the explained portion. Similarly, around half of the explained 
portion of the credit differences between GC and ST in 2005 arise from the differences in 
consumption expenditure; source of the loan, purpose of the loan and occupations explain 24 
percent; and differences in years of education, age and quality of the house explain the rest. In 
the case of credit differences between GC and SC in 2005, differences in consumption explain 
around 45 percent; differences in the source of the loan, purpose of the loan and occupations 
explain 32 percent, and differences in years of education, age and house quality explain 23 
percent.   
In 2011, 58 percent of the explained portion of the total credit differences between GC 
and OBC is due to the differences in the level of consumption; differences in source of the 
loan, purpose of the loan and occupations contribute to 33 percent; and differences in age, 
house quality and education years explain the rest. Similarly, about half of the credit 
differentials between GC and ST in 2011 is due to differences in the level of consumption. The 
differences in the source of the loan, purpose of the loan and occupations contribute to 25 
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percent; and differences in age, house quality and education years are responsible for the rest 
of the explained portion. In the case of credit differences between GC and SC in 2011, 
differences in consumption explain around 53 percent; differences in source of the loan, 
purpose of the loan and occupations explain 40 percent, and differences in years of education, 
age and house quality explain the rest.  
Differences in states explain a very negligible portion of the credit gap (see online 
Appendix). Further investigating the variations in states, I find that states with a higher 
population of ST (such as Orrisa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka) increase the 
credit differences. While the states with higher population of OBC (such as Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Rajasthan) and SC (Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, 
Tamil Nadu, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh) decreases the credit differences between castes. 
Overall, the characteristics disparity between the general castes and lower castes are 
largely due to differences in consumption, years of education, age, house quality, source of the 
loan, purpose of the loan, and occupations. 
 
Quantile decomposition 
In this section, I apply a quantile regression-based decomposition method proposed by Firpo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) to evaluate caste-based differences in the Indian credit sector13. 
Their methodology relies on an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition which 
introduces a two-stage procedure; first, carry out the decomposition based on unconditional 
quantile regressions (UQR) techniques using a reweighting approach dividing the 
distributional changes into structure effect and a composition effect; second, the two 
components are further divided into the contribution of each explanatory variable using 
recentred influence function (RIF) regressions14.  
 
 Figures 4 and 5 (based on Tables 24 and 25 in the Appendix) report the quantile 
regression decompositions obtained for five quantiles (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th). For 2011, 
the quantile decomposition suggests that credit gaps between GC and lower castes are higher 
                                                 
13 I used the Stata program rifreg to estimate the unconditional quantiles. The programme can be downloaded 
from here: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html. 
14 The Firpo et al. method allows us to decompose the caste gap into the contribution of each individual variable. 
However due to the space constraint, I haven’t shown this in the paper. 
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at lower (10th and 25th) and middle (50th) deciles compared to upper deciles (75th and 90th). The 
share of the unexplained component of the gap is also higher at the lower and middle end of 
the credit distribution compared to higher deciles, demonstrating the evidence of a ‘sticky 
floor’. This suggests that borrowers from the lower castes may be facing greater discrimination 
at the lower end of credit distribution. However, this effect reverses in the higher deciles where 
borrowers from lower castes experience negative discrimination – credit market favours lower 
castes. 
 
The recent rise of Dalit millionaires, often known as the creamy layer, has sparked a 
debate regarding the reduction of quotas for lower castes. However, this does not appear 
representative of the broader swathes of the SC and ST population which live in poverty. The 
success of Dalit capitalism depends on the integration of lower castes in the credit market. The 
result suggests that the credit market only favours lower caste borrowers at the higher end of 
the distribution. After correcting for selection, we see the caste differences reduced at upper 
quantiles implying that lower caste borrowers at higher quantiles who self-selected in the credit 
market got a better return for their characteristics.  
 
These lower caste borrowers at the upper end of the distribution are more likely to possess 
higher levels of entrepreneurial ability, perseverance and drive which improve their 
creditworthiness. They are also aware of their rights and might be in a better position to take 
action against perceived discrimination. Lenders aware of these possibilities may not be able 
to discriminate at the upper end of credit distribution. Moreover, the credit market at the higher 
end would be far more structured and rigidly defined, making it harder to discriminate across 
caste. 
 
Similar trends can be seen in 2005. The gaps are generally higher at the lower end of the 
credit distribution. For ST, the unexplained portion is positive at the lower quantile and 
negative at the middle and upper quantiles. For SC, the unexplained portion is negative at the 
lowest quantile. For OBC, the unexplained portion is negative at all quantiles except the 25th. 
The unexplained gaps are generally larger at the lower end of quantile suggesting that sticky 
floor effect prevails. 
 
It is generally very difficult to disentangle taste-based discrimination and statistical 
discrimination. Both kinds of discrimination can easily coexist in the credit market. The 
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quantile decomposition shows significant variations in the unexplained component across the 
distribution – negative in the lower quantiles and positive in the upper quantiles. This suggests 
that a statistical discrimination effect prevails. If the discrimination was largely due to taste, it 
would have been constant across the entire credit distribution.  
 
A possible reason for the sticky floor effect could be due to the statistical discrimination 
practised in the credit market. In India, division of labour according to the caste system has 
frequently prevented individuals from starting businesses (Iyer, Khanna, Varshney, 2013) and 
hence, the lack of business experience at the lower end of credit distribution hurts their credit 
prospects. Even when Dalits become entrepreneurs, their businesses could suffer due to 
discrimination present in most domestic markets and the lack of suitable social and business 
networks. Because of this, lower castes are perceived as less creditworthy and riskier to lend 
to than upper castes. As a lower caste borrower moves up the economic ladder, lenders are less 
like to discriminate against them and; even favour them. 
 
 
Figure 4: Quantile decomposition of log of loan amount for 2011-12. The figure plots the result from quantile 
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Figure 5: Quantile decomposition of log of loan amount 2005. The figure plots the result from quantile regression 
decompositions obtained at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile. 
 
Decomposing credit outcomes differences by lenders: 
Since we have data regarding loan applications and approvals from various sources in the IHDS 
(II) 2011-12 survey data, we are able to decompose the caste differences in the probability of 
loan application and approval from banks, moneylenders, and social networks. The 
decomposition analysis reveals that GC has a lower probability to apply but a higher approval 
rate on their loan application in lending from banks compared to OBC (Panel A, Table 17 in 
the Appendix). However, GC has a higher probability of applying and approval rate in lending 
from the bank compared to SC and ST (Panel A, Table 17 in the Appendix). Contrary to that, 
all lower castes have a higher probability of applying and approval in lending from money 
lenders (Panel B, Table 17 in the Appendix). In lending from social networks, OBC and SC 
have a higher probability of applying but lower probability of approval compared to GC, 
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In the following subsection, I  will decompose the credit amount differences between castes 
in lending from banks, moneylenders and social networks.  
Banks: Banks are one of the major sources of credit for Indian borrowers. 27 percent and 32 
percent of all the borrowers in the sample in 2005 and 2011, respectively, took their loan from 
banks (see Table 13 in the Appendix). With the development of the banking system in India in 
the last decade, all the caste groups have increased their lending from banks. Figure 6 (based 
on Table 18 in the Appendix) shows that there are large credit differentials between the general 
caste and lower castes. However, the credit differentials between GC and OBC, and GC and 
ST have decreased over the period considered. Whereas the credit differentials between GC 
and SC and the share of the unexplained portion of the total differences have increased from 
2005. Hence, Dalit community’s financial performance in terms of formal credit from banks 
has deteriorated over the years.  
 
Figure 6: Adjusted credit differentials between castes in 2005 and 2011-12 in credit taken from banks.  
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“…they (the bank) keep sending back our documents for the loan. While the loan officer 
collects the documents for the Jaats (upper caste) from their houses, we are not even allowed 
to sit on the chairs in the bank or offered any help to fill the complicated forms. While they 
photocopy the documents of upper castes in the bank, we are asked to get the photocopies from 
outside” 
One female Dalit interviewee said: 
“….even though my documents were complete, I was asked to sweep the bank floor in return 
for opening a bank account. This was despite the bank having a cleaning staff. This is 
degrading…” 
 
Some of the credit differences between castes in banking lending could also arise from 
repayment enforceability of the financial contract (as shown by Rubin and Kuran, 2018). 
Successive Indian governments have passed reforms to ensure a substantial flow of credit to 
SC/ST for self-employment at concessional interest rates through priority lending and other 
special banking schemes. In some cases, loans to SC and ST entrepreneurs are given interest-
free15 and waiving the loan all together is in the process16. Reserve Bank of India (RBI) updated 
its guidelines on credit facilities to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in 2016 giving extra 
support to these communities in the formal banking sector17. However, this may also have 
made the lower caste borrower riskier to lend to and less profitable. In this setting where 
lending is biased in favour of SC/ST, banks may resort to minimising the risk by giving less 
amount of loans to these communities, imposing an intended cost on them. Hence, these large 
credit differences may be echoing inherent conflict between allowing the banking system to be 
driven by market forces and expecting greater inclusion from the system.  
                                                 
15 Under Chief Minister Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Entrepreneur Scheme, Bihar government will 
provide interest free loans to eligible entrepreneurs from scheduled caste and scheduled tribes category.  
16 In the state of Karnataka, the state president has requested to the state government to waive education loans of 
the SC/ST students. 
17 Under new recommendations, banks are responsible for increasing awareness about new credit facilities among 
SC/ST borrowers and helping the borrowers in filling out forms and completing other formalities. Loan proposals 
from these communities are encouraged to be considered with utmost sympathy and understanding. To ensure 
these policies are followed, a special department has been set up for monitoring the flow of credit to SC/ST 
beneficiaries. Under the same guidelines, the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India has launched 
Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana-National Rural Livelihood Mission (DAY-NRLM), which would seek to ensure 
adequate coverage of vulnerable sections of the society such that 50% of these beneficiaries are SC/ST. Under 
Differential Rate of Interest Scheme, banks will provide finance up to Rs 15,000 at a concessionary rate of interest 
of 4 percent per annum to the lower castes for engaging in productive and gainful activities. 
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In the absence of credit history or information regarding borrowers’ creditworthiness, the 
unexplained gap is more likely to be due to statistical discrimination18. In such cases, banks 
may be holding lower caste loan applications to higher standards of creditworthiness than upper 
castes. For example, lower caste borrowers are more likely to come from poor areas with a 
higher risk of default leading a bank loan officer to grade their loan application strictly. When 
a substantial part of statistical discrimination is influenced by profit maximising actors, market 
forces are less likely to eliminate it.  
Our qualitative enquiries suggest that bank loan officers (largely belonging to general caste as 
observed by Fisman, Paravisini, and Rig, 2017) provide more assistance to higher caste 
borrowers in loan applications engaging in a subtle form of statistical discrimination, referred 
to as the “thick file” phenomenon19. This means that the loan application file of a marginal 
higher caste borrower us more likely to be thicker with extra documents than those of a 
marginal lower caste borrower. The idea here is that upper caste loan officers may have less 
cultural affinities with and less knowledge of lower caste applicants. They are more likely to 
be strict with lower caste applications, relying on the group characteristics rather than investing 
resources in gathering more information on the creditworthiness of lower caste borrowers. In 
such a situation, extra documentation providing mitigating information could positively affect 
the credit outcome of marginal upper caste applications. Although this phenomenon has some 
credibility, further investigation is needed to documents its relevance and occurrence. 
Money lenders: Although the share of money lenders has reduced significantly over this time, 
they still play a major role in financing lower caste borrowers (see Table 13 in the Appendix). 
However, Figure 7 (based on Table 19 in the Appendix) shows that the credit differentials 
between the general caste and other lower castes have increased since 2005, and a large part of 
this gap is unexplained. Since money lenders provide credit to people in regions where formal 
finance has not reached; or to borrowers who are not creditworthy for banks and MFIs, the 
increase in the credit differentials and unexplained component is worrying . 
                                                 
18 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)  show that more information regarding minority applicants’ skills does not 
always reduce discrimination in the labour market. 




Figure 7: Adjusted credit differentials between castes in 2005 and 2011-12 in credit taken from money lenders 
 
The qualitative interviews confirm the discriminatory attitude practiced by informal money 
lenders towards lower castes.  
One respondent said: 
“… my local money lender always says that people from my caste cannot be trusted, even 
though I have never defaulted on a loan in my life. The conditions they set are always 
discriminatory. Upper caste lenders think that if they give loans to lower castes, we might 
become rich and less dependent on them.” 
 
One Dalit entrepreneur said:  
“The bayaj (interest rate) varies depending on your caste. Dalits are also expected to offer 
collateral (security) far in excess of the loan amount, and far in excess of other castes”.   
 
These informal money lenders, generally belonging to upper castes, have historically been the 
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discrimination is frequently overt and extreme. The informal lender I interviewed didn’t 
dispute the fact that they discriminate, and based their arguments on old-fashioned prejudice.  
 
One money lender feared loss of face in dealing with lower castes:  
“…….if a Dalit dared to default on my loan, people would laugh at me ” 
 
Another questioned the whole idea of Dalit entrepreneurs:  
“…if they all have businesses, who will work in our fields or clean our toilets?” 
 
In informal lending, money lenders can force repayments through panchayats (village councils 
usually consist of upper caste men whose verdicts are largely partial to the money lenders) or 
by keeping the collateral given as a security for the credit. Logically, the credit differentials 
between general and other lower castes and the unexplained portion of these differentials 
should be lower since lower castes are less risky, however, this is not the case here. Money 
lenders are sometimes the last resort of credit for poor and lower caste households. The 
qualitative enquiries suggest the informal lenders practice an extreme form of discrimination 
against lower caste and are reluctant to fund lower caste entrepreneurs. Hence, low risk of 
giving credit to lower caste reduces the credit differences, while discrimination practised by 
moneylenders increases it. The results suggest that the latter effect prevails. 
The qualitative enquiries also suggest that taste-based discrimination is more likely to be 
present in lending from money lenders. In the case of better information regarding the 
borrower's creditworthiness, as usually in informal lending, the unexplained or discriminatory 
component in the total gap is more likely to be due to taste-based discrimination. Berkovec et 
al (1994) suggest that taste-based discrimination is likely to be higher when the lenders have 
higher market power. 
 
Social networks such as friends and relatives: Credit in the informal sector is highly 
segmented, and is based around people of the same caste, religion and kinship (Gupta and Mitra 
2002). Hence, poor and lower castes are significantly disadvantaged due to a lack of networks, 
income, land, and education in obtaining loans from friends and relatives. The proportion of 
those taking loans from friends and relatives has marginally changed over the years. Figure 8 
(based on Table 20 in the Appendix) shows that the credit differentials in lending from social 
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Figure 8: Adjusted credit differentials between castes by credit taken from friends and relatives 
However, these changes in credit differentials above are not easy to explain without significant 
additional research. The individual results from each year are perhaps easier to interpret: if 
lower caste borrowers seek credit from lower caste friends, while general caste borrowers seek 
credit from general caste friends, then it is logical that there would be a wide differential in the 
availability and ease of credit – in this scenario, the general caste ‘lenders’ simply have more 
credit available to give. It is, though, difficult to explain why this differential has changed so 
dramatically over the time period unless the overall level of wealth within the pool of lower 
caste lenders has increased at a greater rate than that of their general caste equivalents – and 
there is little evidence to suggest that this is the case.  This could also be due to the lower caste 
abandoning formal channels of finance because of the poor treatment and discouragement, 
thereby increasing their reliance on their own caste.  
 
In terms of this study, however, the reasons for the change are not directly relevant. What is 
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to share the same caste, and it is also the only category which shows improvement in the credit 
differentials between the general caste and all three lower castes. Clearly, this represents a 
positive development, but it also indicates that caste-based discrimination may be a significant 
factor in driving the credit differentials in other types of lending. In other words, caste-based 
differences may be decreasing, but only if lower caste borrowers are borrowing from lower 
caste lenders.  
Decomposing credit differences by residence: 
 Figure 9 (based on Tables 21 and 22 in the Appendix) presents the caste differences in the 
credit amount by place of residence – urban and rural areas. There are stark differences between 
credit differentials in rural and urban areas. As caste phenomena are usually strong in rural 
areas, the credit differences between the general caste and other lower castes are larger than in 
urban areas. Compared to 2005, the caste difference between GC and OBC, and GC and ST 
has increased for urban area, while the caste differences between GC and ST and GC and SC 
has increased in rural area. The unexplained portion of the total difference has also increased 
in most cases.  
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A greater proportion of the lower castes live in rural areas, and hence, an increase in the 
credit differentials and the unexplained or discriminatory component over the years in rural 
areas is a matter of concern. Successive Indian governments have failed to improve the village 
banking infrastructure in India. Even though 70 percent of India’s population lives in rural 
areas, they only have 37 percent of the total number of bank branches of the country (Reserve 
Bank of India, 2015). Thus, a significant proportion of rural households, especially lower 
castes, are still outside the formal fold of the banking system.  
 
Gender and Religion 
Column 1 of Table 23 in the Appendix shows the credit difference between the general caste 
and Muslims, the second biggest religious group in India. I find the  GC has an advantage of  
52.8 percent in 2005 and 58.3 percent in 2011-12 over Muslims. In both periods, the 
unexplained component is negative suggesting that Muslim borrowers, after self-selecting, got 
a better return for their characteristics in the credit market. 
 
I also decomposed the credit differences between men and women ( as head of the households) 
and find that women-led households have a small advantage over men (see Column 2 of Table 
23 in the Appendix). There are variations in credit differences between men and women with 
respect to caste (Table 23 in the Appendix). The credit differences between men and women 
as a head from GC and SC are negative and, ST and OBC are positive. Hence, the women-led 
households from SC and GC groups have a higher advantage in the credit market compared to 




In this section, I check the robustness of the results using a pooled model combining the data 
from IHDS 2005 and IHDS 2011-12 (see Table 26). The results are similar to the main analysis. 
GC has a 50 percent advantage over OBC and a higher portion of this difference remains 
unexplained. The difference of 153 percent between GC and ST and 84 percent between GC 







7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The study of discrimination in economics is motivated both by the moral case for equality 
and the consequent loss of efficiency in the market. Advances in research methods and designs 
have produced a significant interest in the field which has generated new insights into the nature 
of discrimination. Guryan and Charles (2013) argue that a deeper understanding of the sources 
and causes of discrimination is needed in order to formulate policies to reduce its incidence 
and effects; however, in order to do this, it is first necessary to identify the nature and scale of 
discrimination clearly. That is the focus of our study.  
The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that – based on the credit amount 
sanctioned - caste is still a worryingly potent determinant of lending outcomes in India. There 
are substantial credit differences between the general caste and other lower castes. This credit 
gap has actually increased over the time period considered in this study. It is also alarming that 
the share of unexplained (or discriminatory) component of the credit gap between the castes 
has increased so significantly and so consistently. Hence, it can be argued that the disparities 
between the loans granted to general castes and other lower castes in India are not only because 
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groups may be facing extensive and persistent discrimination in the credit sector. I also find 
that the probability of participating in the credit market is generally higher for lower caste 
households. However, caste differences affecting the amount of credit granted is still a cause 
of apprehension, and in some cases, the situation appears to be growing worse, not better. 
 
Using a quantile regression-based decomposition method, I find that the credit gap and 
share of the unexplained component of this gap is higher at the lower and middle end of the 
credit distribution compared to higher deciles, demonstrating the evidence of a ‘sticky floor’. 
This suggests that borrowers from the lower castes may be facing greater discrimination at the 
lower end of credit distribution. However, this effect reverses in the higher deciles where 
borrowers from lower castes experience negative discrimination – the credit market favours 
lower castes.  
 
It’s also important to note that there are large credit differentials between the general 
caste and lower castes in almost every instance in question: this includes rural and urban areas, 
credit taken from banks, money lenders and social network. In many instances, the credit 
differentials have actually increased over the time period considered in this research. A 
substantial portion of the credit gaps between the general caste and lower castes remains 
unexplained.  
 
In attempting to explain the results, I recognise that the unexplained portion may include 
unmeasurable or unobservable characteristics, for instance, drive, determination or other 
attitudes which are likely to affect the credit outcomes and thus, it does not necessarily mean 
explicit discrimination against lower castes. It is worth noting that the analysis seeks to measure 
the effects of a social variable named ‘caste’ which is itself composed of a number of ill-defined 
and unquantifiable elements. For instance, lower castes may possess higher levels of 
unmeasured characteristics like perseverance and determination which improve their 
creditworthiness but display more traits such as humility and lowered expectations which limit 
their credit requests. Hence, the issue of the unexplained components including the effects of 
unobservable or unmeasurable characteristics is a standard limitation in the decomposition 
analysis. 
 
Altogether, the evidence is consistent that lower caste individuals are disadvantaged in 
the credit sector. Recognising this, the Indian government has launched various programmes 
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to improve the provision of financial services to the lower castes. However, the government 
can only play a direct role in the formal sector. Since banks and other government programmes 
have become the major source of finance for borrowers in India, a broader intervention from 
the government is much needed. Furthermore, the differences  in credit amount sanctioned and 
loan approval rates between the general caste and other lower castes in lending from banks are 
high. Schemes to promote the economic empowerment of lower castes through finance have 
been implemented on a large scale since the 1990s, but if we take anything from the results in 
this research, they have not been very effective.  
 
A large endowments difference between social groups indicates that there is a need to 
promote educational and training opportunities for the lower castes. The government should 
also ensure that the disadvantaged sections of society get full participation in schooling, 
employment, health programmes to reduce pre-market discrimination. Policy-makers need to 
adopt a broader range of strategies to tackle the deep-seated and multi-faceted challenge of 
systemic discrimination. Initiatives need to include the improvement of financial literacy across 
lower castes, encouragement of positive discrimination, improving the functioning and 
competitiveness of the financial sector, active monitoring of caste bias, and more focused social 
research into the causes and nature of caste discrimination. 
 
8. Appendix: Tables 
Table 11: Primary income generating occupational activities of various caste by percentage 
 
2011-12 2005 
Occupational activities GC OBC ST SC GC OBC ST SC 
Cultivation 25.89 26.52 36.48 13.63 23.24 26.97 35 12.84 
Allied agriculture 0.77 1.27 0.85 0.63 1.02 0.98 0.44 0.76 
Agricultural wage labour 4.06 8.99 15.48 18.08 5.76 12.61 22 24.76 
Non-agricultural wage labour 12.51 23.38 22.87 33.82 10.81 17.7 17 28.45 
Artisan/Independent 1.58 1.91 0.8 1.35 5.26 8.01 2 4.9 
Petty shop/Small business 13.72 12.87 4.39 6.87 5.68 5.03 2.44 2.54 
Organized Trade/Business 2.4 1.32 0.41 0.4 9.02 5.58 2.06 2.92 
Salaried employment 26.67 15.81 14.69 18.45 28.56 16.25 15 17.38 
Other Professions 1.04 0.45 0.22 0.39 1.41 0.98 0.44 0.64 
Pension/Rent/Dividend 8.23 4.28 2.72 3.7 6.05 3.25 2.27 2.51 





Table 12: Purpose of the loan in 2011-2012 and 2005 
Purpose GC OBC ST SC Purpose GC OBC ST SC 
 2011-12  2005 
House 15.56 14.24 12.96 16.46 House 19 15.21 14.16 14.16 
Land* 1.97 1.53 1.45 1.05 Land* 1.21 0.94 0.52 0.52 
Marriage 13.92 17.07 18.68 19.76 Marriage 13.05 15.58 12.78 12.78 
Agriculture* 18.38 18.21 23.14 9.8 Agri/business* 35.13 32.88 33.33 33.33 
Business* 10.25 7.77 4.47 5.35 Consumption 8.38 12.29 18.05 18.05 
Consumption 13.16 13.8 16.6 15.65 Car/appliance 2.76 1.1 0.78 0.78 
Car/Jeep 3.34 1.22 1.01 0.95 Education* 2.88 2.44 1.81 1.81 
Two-wheeler 1.23 1.02 0.44 0.97 Medical 10.89 13.83 12.09 12.09 
Truck/Bus* 0.56 0.3 0.38 0.1 Other 6.69 5.73 6.48 6.48 
Educational* 5.61 4.91 3.77 4.69 
     
Medical Exp 12.21 15.71 13.77 19.76 
     
Others 3.82 4.22 3.33 5.45 
     
* Loans for productive purposes 
 
 
Table 13: Source of the loan in 2011-12 and 2005 
Source GC OBC ST SC GC OBC ST SC 
 2011-12 2005 
Employer 2.36 2.06 2.45 3.64 2.00 1.65 1.81 1.91 
Money Lender 10.22 20.19 20.57 24.81 19.47 33.58 32.9 42.17 
Friend 10.91 10.3 11.19 11.71 8.86 9.13 13.21 10.32 
Relative 19.85 21.45 23.77 21.23 18.39 19.19 19.78 17.41 
Bank* 43.81 32.31 26.42 22.9 37.36 26.28 21.07 19.62 
NGO* 0.91 0.78 1.45 1.39 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.14 
Credit Group* 3.28 2.29 2.39 3.12 2.61 2.06 3.97 1.83 
Govt. Program* 1.02 0.48 0.38 0.64 1.44 0.8 1.64 1.12 
Self-help group* 3.45 6.04 6.92 7.83 9.76 7.15 5.35 5.49 
Kisan Credit* 2.06 2.53 2.58 0.85     
Prov Funds* 0.3 0.19 0.13 0.02     
Suppliers* 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.4     
Others 1.58 1.16 1.45 1.47     





Table 14: Application for loans from various sources 
  
All GC OBC SC ST 
Banks Didn't apply 75 75 72 81 82 
 
Rejected 3 3 3 3 4 
 
Got it 22 22 25 16 15 
Money Lenders Didn't apply 81.5 89 77.5 78 84 
 
Rejected 3.5 3.5 4 3 3 
 
Got it 15 8 18.5 19 13 
 Relative and friends Didn't apply 70.5 76.5 66.5 70 71.5 
 
Rejected 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 4 
 
Got it 26 20 29.5 26.5 24.5 






Table 15: Probit model for 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.302*** 0.363*** 0.536*** 0.408*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.058) (0.032) 
AGE 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.020* 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) 
AGE SQ -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
LAND OWN 0.003 0.022* -0.012 0.097*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.025) (0.021) 
SEX HEAD -0.150*** -0.154*** 0.002 -0.115** 
 (0.044) (0.038) (0.093) (0.053) 
SIZE OF HH 0.006 -0.001 -0.018 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) 
URBAN -0.281*** -0.254*** -0.438*** -0.122*** 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.096) (0.042) 
HOUSE QUALITY -0.110*** -0.114*** 0.130* -0.033 
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.073) (0.038) 
RATION CARD 0.038 0.064** -0.050 0.070 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.065) (0.046) 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
Constant -3.669*** -3.098*** -5.341*** -3.465*** 
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 (0.523) (0.289) (0.679) (0.517) 
     
Observations 13,332 16,213 3,270 8,304 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 1 if the client 
has taken a loan or 0 otherwise. The independent variables are: log of consumption, age, sex of the head of the 
household, size of the household, number of education years completed by the head, log of amount of land, 
dummy whether the household has a ration card, dummy for quality of the house (good/bad), dummy whether 
household is in urban area, and various dummies for occupation and the state where the household is located. 
 
 
Table 16: Probit Model for 2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.288*** 0.338*** 0.247*** 0.358*** 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.051) (0.030) 
AGE 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.051*** 0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) 
AGE SQ -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION -0.022*** -0.022*** 0.012* -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
LAND OWN 0.054*** 0.033*** 0.006 0.044*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.017) 
SEX HEAD -0.124*** -0.149*** -0.266*** -0.089** 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.074) (0.044) 
SIZE OF HH 0.006 0.006 0.031** 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) 
URBAN -0.235*** -0.282*** -0.123 -0.170*** 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.089) (0.039) 
HOUSE QUALITY -0.095*** -0.089*** 0.010 -0.095*** 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.066) (0.035) 
RATION CARD 0.095** 0.112*** 0.119* 0.087* 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.067) (0.045) 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
 Constant -3.748*** -3.342*** -2.935*** -4.134*** 
 (0.869) (0.281) (0.641) (0.519) 
     
Observations 11,680 16,763 3,590 8,807 





Table 17: Decomposition of loan application and loan approval rates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GC vs 
OBC 
GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs 
OBC 
GC vs ST GC vs SC 
 Loan application rate Loan approval rate 
Panel A: Banks       
GC 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Others 0.274*** 0.187*** 0.192*** 0.937*** 0.909*** 0.898*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) 
Difference -0.017*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.026*** 0.054*** 0.065*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) 
Explained -0.015*** 0.044*** 0.069*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.050*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
Unexplained -0.002 0.026** -0.003 0.006 0.024* 0.015 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) 
Observations 27,988 15,050 20,240 7,256 3,431 4,421 
Panel B: Money 
Lenders 
      
GC 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.806*** 0.806*** 0.806*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Others 0.223*** 0.164*** 0.221*** 0.878*** 0.894*** 0.900*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) 
Difference -0.111*** -0.052*** -0.109*** -0.072*** -0.088*** -0.095*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) 
Explained -0.088*** -0.036*** -0.063*** -0.048*** -0.107*** -0.066*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.010) 
Unexplained -0.023*** -0.016* -0.047*** -0.024* 0.019 -0.029* 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) 
Observations 27,988 15,050 20,240 4,655 1,670 2,991 
Panel B: Social 
Networks 
      
GC 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Others 0.336*** 0.287*** 0.302*** 0.922*** 0.940*** 0.925*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
Difference -0.102*** -0.053*** -0.068*** 0.004 -0.014 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Explained -0.073*** -0.061*** -0.056*** 0.002 -0.022*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
Unexplained -0.029*** 0.008 -0.012* 0.002 0.008 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
Observations 27,988 15,050 20,240 7,883 3,457 5,070 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 1 if applied for 
a loan at a bank, from money lender or in social network, 0 otherwise (Columns 1-3). The independent variable 
is 1 if approved by bank, money lender or in social network (Columns 4-6). The dependent variables are same 





Table 18: Adjusted differences between castes by banks 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 10.996*** 10.996*** 10.996*** 11.643*** 11.643*** 11.643*** 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) 
Others 10.455*** 9.916*** 10.359*** 11.230*** 10.823*** 10.962*** 
 (0.257) (0.326) (0.196) (0.091) (0.238) (0.670) 
Difference 0.541* 1.080*** 0.637*** 0.413*** 0.820*** 0.681 
 (0.294) (0.356) (0.242) (0.129) (0.254) (0.676) 
Explained 0.353*** 1.014*** 0.572*** 0.264*** 0.746*** 0.430*** 
 (0.034) (0.097) (0.056) (0.027) (0.066) (0.039) 
Unexplained 0.187 0.066 0.065 0.149 0.075 0.251 
 (0.293) (0.356) (0.247) (0.128) (0.254) (0.677) 
       
Observations 3,658 1,893 2,369 5,536 2,721 3,455 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 
decomposition results corrected for selection and endogeneity for sample of borrowers from banks. 
 
Table  19: Credit differences between castes by money lenders 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 9.319*** 9.319*** 9.319*** 10.396*** 10.396*** 10.396*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Others 9.250*** 8.595*** 8.921*** 10.312*** 9.567*** 9.944*** 
 (0.025) (0.068) (0.032) (0.029) (0.080) (0.036) 
Difference 0.069 0.724*** 0.398*** 0.084 0.829*** 0.452*** 
 (0.050) (0.081) (0.054) (0.063) (0.097) (0.067) 
Explained 0.081** 0.556*** 0.312*** 0.027 0.447*** 0.162*** 
 (0.041) (0.076) (0.047) (0.056) (0.094) (0.058) 
Unexplained -0.013 0.168** 0.086* 0.056 0.382*** 0.290*** 
 (0.046) (0.080) (0.049) (0.066) (0.089) (0.066) 
       
Observations 3,428 1,244 2,405 2,574 870 1,773 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 








Table 20: Credit differences in social networks 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 9.326*** 9.326*** 9.326*** 9.920*** 9.920*** 9.920*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Others 9.063*** 7.856*** 8.644*** 9.836*** 8.739*** 9.489*** 
 (0.028) (0.075) (0.042) (0.024) (0.068) (0.033) 
Difference 0.263*** 1.469*** 0.681*** 0.084** 1.181*** 0.431*** 
 (0.047) (0.084) (0.056) (0.042) (0.076) (0.047) 
Explained 0.252*** 0.933*** 0.490*** 0.039 0.793*** 0.227*** 
 (0.038) (0.082) (0.054) (0.032) (0.078) (0.037) 
Unexplained 0.011 0.536*** 0.191*** 0.044 0.388*** 0.203*** 
 (0.042) (0.082) (0.056) (0.038) (0.076) (0.043) 
       
Observations 3,374 1,594 2,225 4,835 2,182 3,269 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 
decomposition results corrected for selection and endogeneity for sample of borrowers from social 
networks. 
 
Table 21: Adjusted credit differential between castes in urban areas. 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 8.843*** 8.843*** 8.843*** 10.763*** 10.763*** 10.763*** 
 (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
Others 9.421*** 8.690*** 9.209*** 10.338*** 10.511*** 11.280*** 
 (0.246) (0.857) (0.420) (0.086) (0.303) (0.484) 
Difference -0.578 0.153 -0.366 0.425*** 0.252 -0.518 
 (0.557) (0.992) (0.653) (0.129) (0.318) (0.494) 
Explained 0.416*** 0.298** 0.688*** 0.098** 0.074 0.401*** 
 (0.057) (0.135) (0.054) (0.038) (0.110) (0.045) 
Unexplained -0.995* -0.145 -1.054 0.327*** 0.178 -0.919* 
 (0.554) (0.986) (0.650) (0.126) (0.306) (0.494) 
       
Observations 3,815 1,754 2,534 4,875 2,082 3,212 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 





Table 22: Adjusted credit differential between castes in rural areas. 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 9.690*** 9.690*** 9.690*** 10.760*** 10.760*** 10.760*** 
 (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Others 9.580*** 8.414*** 9.162*** 10.364*** 9.217*** 9.711*** 
 (0.096) (0.182) (0.147) (0.113) (0.150) (0.098) 
Difference 0.110 1.276*** 0.528** 0.396** 1.543*** 1.048*** 
 (0.211) (0.261) (0.239) (0.188) (0.213) (0.180) 
Explained 0.403*** 0.961*** 0.699*** 0.320*** 0.882*** 0.586*** 
 (0.030) (0.050) (0.033) (0.025) (0.045) (0.027) 
Unexplained -0.294 0.315 -0.171 0.076 0.661*** 0.462*** 
 (0.211) (0.261) (0.239) (0.187) (0.211) (0.178) 
       
Observations 8,262 3,845 5,571 10,466 4,803 7,064 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 
decomposition results corrected for selection and endogeneity for sample of rural area only. 
 
Table 23: Decomposition of credit differences by gender and religion  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








ST MEN vs 
WOMEN 
SC MEN vs 
WOMEN 
Panel A: 2005       
GC 9.220*** 9.140*** 8.664*** 9.844*** 7.994*** 8.525*** 
 (0.476) (0.214) (0.505) (0.278) (0.664) (0.385) 
Others 8.692*** 9.204*** 10.094*** 8.109*** 7.937*** 10.083*** 
 (0.622) (0.769) (1.321) (1.240) (0.937) (1.186) 
Difference 0.528 -0.064 -1.431 1.735 0.058 -1.557 
 (0.783) (0.798) (1.414) (1.271) (1.148) (1.247) 
Explained 0.651*** 0.256*** 0.218*** 0.322*** 0.138 0.153* 
 (0.061) (0.039) (0.074) (0.061) (0.209) (0.079) 
Unexplained -0.123 -0.320 -1.649 1.413 -0.080 -1.711 
 (0.816) (0.784) (1.405) (1.251) (1.216) (1.234) 
Observations 5,289 16,896 4,444 7,633 1,158 3,661 
Panel B: 2011       
GC 11.151*** 10.442*** 10.947*** 10.649*** 9.153*** 10.048*** 
 (0.310) (0.128) (0.281) (0.159) (0.435) (0.284) 
Others 10.567*** 10.489*** 11.022*** 10.048*** 8.447*** 10.900*** 
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 (0.406) (0.397) (1.093) (0.388) (1.043) (0.809) 
Difference 0.583 -0.047 -0.075 0.601 0.706 -0.852 
 (0.510) (0.417) (1.128) (0.419) (1.130) (0.858) 
Explained 0.610*** 0.254*** 0.281*** 0.269*** 0.243 0.147** 
 (0.043) (0.028) (0.063) (0.038) (0.150) (0.059) 
Unexplained -0.027 -0.302 -0.357 0.332 0.463 -0.999 
 (0.510) (0.409) (1.103) (0.417) (1.094) (0.846) 
Observations 6,787 21,870 5,322 10,019 1,573 4,956 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 24: Quantile decomposition of log of loan amount for 2011-12 
VARIABLE GC VS OBC GC VS ST GC VS SC 
Percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
GC 9.549*** 10.107*** 11.193*** 11.202*** 11.851*** 9.549*** 10.107*** 11.193*** 11.202*** 11.851*** 9.549*** 10.107*** 11.193*** 11.202*** 11.851*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.238) (0.229) (0.193) (0.298) (0.326) (0.238) (0.229) (0.193) (0.297) (0.326) 
Others 9.035*** 9.451*** 10.531*** 11.296*** 12.329*** 8.154*** 8.897*** 9.462*** 10.758*** 11.090*** 8.469*** 9.231*** 10.183*** 10.985*** 11.203*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.265) (0.223) (0.213) (0.276) (0.395) (0.163) (0.140) (0.170) (0.207) (0.332) 
Difference 0.515*** 0.656*** 0.662*** -0.094*** -0.478*** 1.395*** 1.209*** 1.732*** 0.444 0.761 1.080*** 0.875*** 1.011*** 0.217 0.648 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.356) (0.320) (0.288) (0.406) (0.512) (0.288) (0.268) (0.257) (0.362) (0.465) 
Explained 0.152*** 0.192*** 0.275*** 0.371*** 0.369*** 0.746*** 0.839*** 0.925*** 1.124*** 0.919*** 0.419*** 0.505*** 0.531*** 0.638*** 0.736*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.073) (0.064) (0.052) (0.067) (0.087) (0.034) (0.032) (0.028) (0.035) (0.043) 
Unexplained 0.363*** 0.464*** 0.387*** -0.465*** -0.847*** 0.649* 0.370 0.807*** -0.680* -0.158 0.661** 0.371 0.479* -0.421 -0.088 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.358) (0.320) (0.288) (0.402) (0.521) (0.285) (0.264) (0.256) (0.356) (0.464) 
                
Observation 15,353 15,353 15,353 15,353 15,353 6,902 6,902 6,902 6,902 6,902 10,290 10,290 10,290 10,290 10,290 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the result from quantile regression decompositions of log of loan amount obtained at 10%, 
















Table 25: Quantile decomposition of log of loan amount for 2005 
VARIABLE GC VS OBC GC VS ST GC VS SC 
Percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
GC 8.704*** 9.567*** 9.925*** 10.498*** 9.842*** 8.704*** 9.567*** 9.925*** 10.498*** 9.842*** 8.704*** 9.567*** 9.925*** 10.498*** 9.842*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.290) (0.209) (0.243) (0.331) (0.549) (0.290) (0.209) (0.243) (0.331) (0.549) 
Others 8.474*** 9.142*** 9.956*** 10.585*** 11.147*** 6.436*** 8.623*** 9.555*** 9.482*** 10.355*** 7.988*** 8.383*** 9.053*** 9.620*** 9.669*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.650) (0.495) (0.422) (0.668) (1.011) (0.496) (0.424) (0.382) (0.471) (0.704) 
Difference 0.230*** 0.426*** -0.031 -0.086*** -1.306*** 2.268*** 0.944* 0.370 1.016 -0.513 0.715 1.184** 0.871* 0.879 0.173 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.712) (0.538) (0.487) (0.746) (1.150) (0.574) (0.473) (0.452) (0.576) (0.893) 
Explained 0.484*** 0.334*** 0.527*** 0.498*** 0.428*** 0.991*** 0.899*** 0.994*** 1.207*** 1.280*** 0.633*** 0.597*** 0.686*** 0.777*** 0.825*** 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.081) (0.056) (0.050) (0.064) (0.096) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.052) 
Unexplained -0.253*** 0.091*** -0.558*** -0.584*** -1.734*** 1.277* 0.046 -0.625 -0.191 -1.793 0.083 0.587 0.185 0.102 -0.652 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.711) (0.539) (0.488) (0.753) (1.153) (0.575) (0.473) (0.452) (0.574) (0.890) 
                
Observation 12,081 12,081 12,081 12,081 12,081 5,602 5,602 5,602 5,602 5,602 8,108 8,108 8,108 8,108 8,108 






























VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs OBC     GC vs ST GC vs ST  GC vs SC  SC vs GC 
       
GC 10.877*** 10.877*** 10.877*** 10.877*** 10.877*** 10.877*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Others 10.510*** 10.377*** 9.465*** 9.340*** 10.036*** 10.036*** 
 (0.018) (0.132) (0.048) (0.089) (0.027) (0.027) 
Difference 0.367*** 0.500*** 1.412*** 1.537*** 0.841*** 0.841*** 
 (0.035) (0.135) (0.057) (0.094) (0.040) (0.040) 
Explained 0.248*** 0.223*** 1.126*** 1.154*** 0.505*** 0.444*** 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.050) (0.057) (0.033) (0.041) 
Unexplained 0.119*** 0.277** 0.286*** 0.383*** 0.336*** 0.397*** 
 (0.029) (0.135) (0.049) (0.104) (0.037) (0.044) 
       
Observations 27,604 27,604 12,341 12,341 18,210 18,210 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the decomposition of 




































Credit Where Credit's Due: The Enabling Effects of 





We utilise primary data collected from a North Indian village in 2015 to 2016 and examine the 
impact of women’s empowerment on their creditworthiness measured by the total annual loan 
amounts. Our key explanatory variable – an empowerment index – has been constructed using 
four individual-level factors -- economic, social, interpersonal and political. We find that more 
empowered women received greater cumulative loans. We have instrumented empowerment 
by the sex of the borrower’s first child being male. It seems that in the male-dominated 
environment of North India, the ‘luck’ of giving birth to first child as a son helps a woman 
seize opportunities for empowerment.  The village-level finding of empowerment is consistent 
with the result we obtain for the whole of North India using a separate and national dataset. We 
also show that for the rest of India education, but not empowerment, is an important 




















Creditworthiness has been an integral part of the women’s empowerment narrative of 
microfinance since the introduction of the Grameen Bank model in Bangladesh in 1983. 
Millions of poor women have benefitted from microfinance throughout the world and, in the 
process, have also been empowered (Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley, 1996; Kabeer, 2001; Pitt 
and Khandker, 1996), although in some cases disempowerment has also taken place from 
failures to repay, over-indebtedness and loss of control over the loan (Garikipati, 2008; Goetz 
and Gupta, 1996; Guérin, Kumar, and Agier, 2013)  By and large, the microfinance literature 
has viewed empowerment more of an outcome (see for instance, Kabeer, 1999, 2005; Mayoux, 
1998) than a determinant of creditworthiness.  
 
But there is no denying that empowerment is a process. It takes place over time by gaining 
independence and taking control of personal, social and financial decisions (Hashemi, Schuler, 
and Riley, 1996). While borrowing leads to greater empowerment (Mayoux, 1998), 
empowerment could also lead to further loans. So, empowerment is both a cause of and an 
effect on loan behaviours. Here, we focus on the former. We aim to analyse how female 
empowerment affects their volume of loans, by studying a primary field survey data from a 
village in the state of Haryana, Northern India in combination with data from India Human 
Development Survey (IHDS)20.  
 
For the benefit of discussion, we define the volume and sustenance of loans as measures of 
creditworthiness, although in the literature it is the eligibility of getting loans that is commonly 
viewed as creditworthiness. The question of empowerment being a determinant of 
creditworthiness is likely to be of special importance for regions like rural North India where 
women have been historically disadvantaged. The region systematically lags in every gender 
development metric (Government of India, 2015). Even the microfinance institutions (MFIs), 
which have proliferated in the rest of India, have struggled to build a female clientele in 
Northern India. 
                                                 
20 India Human Development Survey (IHDS) is a nationally representative survey produced by the National 




In such an environment, a key consideration for lenders is likely to be woman’s 
independence, mobility, and control over their own resources. Local money-lenders and village 
credit co-operatives (called co-operative societies) have the necessary background information 
on the borrowers - but MFIs do not. However, group lending (as in the Grameen model) ensures 
that the borrowers select their peers wisely considering their risk attitudes and financial 
independence.  
   
We study female borrowers of three MFIs, a co-operative society and several local lenders 
in a randomly selected village of Haryana over two years (2015 and 2016). All loans were for 
production purposes. The village had no MFI before 2014. All three MFIs follow the Grameen 
model consisting of five-member groups. Upon completing 50 per cent of the repayment, a 
borrower becomes eligible to apply for a second loan, which is typically a bigger amount 
(Section 2 gives more details). We consider the total annual borrowing for each borrower. The 
MFIs vary in terms of the loan amount and the repayment cycle.  
 
The borrowers are low-income women, all having children. They are engaged in activities 
like livestock rearing, pottery, candle making and other small informal businesses. We have 
collected data on their economic status, purchasing power, mobility, political awareness, 
attitude to domestic violence, and control over assets and income. These data are then used to 
construct an empowerment index using the principal component analysis (PCA) methodology 
(Sharaunga,  Mudhara, and Bogale, 2016). We then regress the log of loan on the empowerment 
index, along with a set of controls. We find that the loan amount is positively and significantly 
related to the empowerment index.  
 
However, the empowerment variable might be affected by the loans taken in the past or 
might be correlated with some of the control variables. We therefore instrument the 
empowerment variable. Our choice of instrument is the borrower’s first child being a boy, 
which is entirely a random event. The child’s sex should not directly affect the loan amounts 
that the mother would get in future. But in an environment where son preference is culturally 
ingrained, giving birth to a son can elevate a young woman’s status within the household and 




Our first stage regression of the two stage least square (2SLS) model shows that the first 
child’s sex (male) is a strong determinant of mother’s empowerment. The second stage 
instrument variable (IV) estimate shows that an exogenous increase in empowerment increases 
the loan amount. It also shows that the husband’s income does not affect the loan outcomes of 
the women. Therefore, we argue that empowerment has a positive causal effect on 
creditworthiness. 
 
As said above, a child’s sex can affect the mother’s present social status. Indian households 
are known to exhibit son preference (Das Gupta et al., 2003; Dyson and Moore, 1983), and this 
preference is stronger in rural areas for reasons of bequest, religious traditions and marriage 
dowry (Bardhan, 1988; Das Gupta et al., 2003; Mutharayappa, 1997).21 Women who have 
given birth to a girl may be ill-treated by their in-laws families (Jejeebhoy, 1997). Therefore, 
it is reasonable to expect that mothers of boys may be given some independence and control 
over their own lives.22  
 
It is noteworthy that for our IV we have used the sex of the first child, but not the second 
or the third child, or even the total number of sons. The reason is to avoid possible gender 
manipulation. Sex selective abortion is believed to be widespread in India, but researchers show 
that this occurs predominantly with the second pregnancy onward, conditional on the first child 
being a girl (Das Gupta et al. 2003; Rosenblum, 2013). Aborting the first child is very rare and 
unlikely (Arnold, Choe, and Roy, 1998; Jha et al. 2011).23 
 
Is our empowerment model too specific to be applicable elsewhere? We test the robustness 
of our methodology using the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) data of 2011-12, for 
North India24 and the rest of India. Although the households covered by the IHDS survey are 
                                                 
21 The sons also maintain family names and inherit family wealth (Das Gupta et al., 2003, Mutharayappa et al., 
1997), and by the Hindu religious rules, males are responsible for performing various family rites, for instance in 
the event of death (Mutharayappa et al., 1997). Most importantly, by the Hindu social custom, at the time of 
marriage the groom’s family receives dowry - a substantial transfer in the form of wealth (like gold, land, durable 
goods and cash) - from the bride’s family. Therefore, having a male child strengthens the social status of the 
household (Dyson and Moore 1983). Anecdotes of respite from domestic abuse or forfeiting dowry claims after 
giving birth to a boy are quite common.    
22 There is no evidence to suggest that grown up boys could have been used as an implicit collateral.  
23 Abortions are generally expensive and dangerous (15 to 20 percent deaths are caused due to unsafe abortions) 
(Duggal, 2004, Jha et al. 2011) and could negatively affect the reproductive health of women. First child is also 
seen as god's gift in the region. So, abortion is deemed as an act against god wishes.  
24 North India consist of the following ten states: Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal 
Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Chandigarh and Jammu and Kashmir 
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not comparable to the ones in our village survey, the dataset is very helpful for our purpose of 
studying empowerment because it contains both loan information and women’s empowerment 
related information. However, it also has two major limitations. First, the loan information 
pertains to the household level, but not individual members of the household. Second, the data 
give the total number of boys and girls in the family, but not their birth order, which means we 
cannot use the same IV. To address these limitations, we separate those households that are 
listed as female-headed, relying on the assumption that the head of the household is responsible 
for the loans. We then construct the empowerment index for this subsample using the same 
PCA method, as done from our village survey data. Since the first child’s sex cannot be used 
as IV from this dataset, we use widowhood as the IV for empowerment, and we find that 
empowerment does have a causal effect on the amount of loans in North India, but not in the 
rest of India.  
 
Widowhood as an IV can be explained as follows. First, it is a random occurrence. Second, 
the absence of husband allows (and necessitates) a woman to be independent and to make 
strategic life choices25. That said, it is also true that widows in India are amongst the most 
vulnerable sections of society. Dreze and Srinivasan (1997) have shown that widows in India 
face severe intra-household discrimination. Therefore, expecting widowhood to contribute to 
empowerment is self-contradictory. Our argument is that when a widow suffers economic 
misfortune, we would expect them to take on greater consumption loans, but not non-
consumption loans. The IHDS data contain information on consumption loans, as well as 
production, education and medical loans. We see that widows take a slightly larger amount of 
loan on average, but the difference between widows and non-widows is statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, we reconcile empowerment and vulnerability by arguing that probably 
widows are less likely to receive non-consumption loans. But amongst those women who get 
these loans, widows are likely to be more empowered than non-widows26.  
 
Indeed, our IV analysis shows that widowhood enables women to be more empowered and 
loans empowerment has a causal positive effect on non-consumption loans. This argument 
holds true for our North India subsample, which is consistent with our finding from the village 
                                                 
25 In our female-headed household sub-sample of the IHDS data, widows have control over the household 
resources and 96 percent of them reported supports received from their natal and/or in-law families.  
26 In fact, our IHDS data show that widows were more empowered regardless of they took loans or not. 
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data. We also show with the IHDS data that empowerment positively affects the probability of 
getting loans. 
 
But can the same be said about the whole of India? To answer the above question, we run 
the exact same model for the rest of India, and the IV estimates show that empowerment does 
not have a causal effect on the loan amount. In fact, it is education that becomes a strong 
determinant of loan amount. We also check that empowerment does not determine the women’s 
access to loans in the rest of India. Although it seems puzzling, it can be explained in terms of 
the much higher status of women in Southern and North Eastern India. Thus, empowerment, 
as measured by our factors, is not critical for creditworthiness in the rest of India; instead, 
human capital is, as it should also be for a male borrower.  
 
    In sum, our paper makes the following contributions. First, we construct an empowerment 
index taking an array of factors into account both at a village level and regional levels. The 
index allows us to study empowerment as a determinant of creditworthiness. Second, while 
studying the individual contributions of the underlying factors of empowerment, we find that 
some factors like the women’s control over assets, income and savings, their political 
awareness, and their attitude to domestic violence seem to be extremely important. Third, the 
empowerment process may be triggered by good luck (like giving birth to a son) or by personal 
tragedy (like widowhood). In the highly male-dominated environment of North India, either 
factor can help empower a woman and advance her creditworthiness. Elsewhere in India, 
human capital is much more critical for creditworthiness. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and study area. Section 3 
describes the construction of the empowerment index. Section 4 sets out the methodology for 
the paper. Section 5 reports the econometric results and Section 6 tests the robustness of the 
results. The concluding section discusses some limitations. 
 
2. The study area and the data 
 
The study covered a random sample of 211 women who were clients of three MFIs, a co-
operative society, and several professional money lenders. The data were collected through two 
household surveys taken in 2015 and 2016 (see the timeline of the survey in Figure 1 in 
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Appendix), in a village in the state of Haryana, North India (see the map in Figure 2 in 
Appendix). We collected information regarding income, loans, investment, health, household 
composition, education, employment, assets, and other variables. In addition, we held informal 
discussions27 and semi-structured interviews28 to select the variables that constituted the 
empowerment index.  
 
The village is 90 km away from the state capital, with 1143 households and a population of 
6466, of whom 3420 are males while 3046 are females as per the Population Census 2011. 
Haryana is a relatively prosperous state with only 11% of the population living below the 
poverty line, but the state has the worst gender ratio in India - 879 girls for 1,000 males as 
compared to the national average of 917 girls for 1,000 males. The average literacy rate of 
Haryana is 76 %; male literacy stands at 84 % while female literacy is at 66 %, not far off from 
the national average. Hinduism is the main religion of the state with 87.46 % classified as 
Hindu. The state is also very agricultural with 65.12 % of of people living in rural areas. The 
village is in a fast-growing area with good transportation links and is endowed with a good 
irrigation system. The area is a low risk for natural disasters such as earthquake or floods. 
 
The credit market of the village is served by three MFIs since 2014, named SKS (now 
known as Bharat Financial Inclusion Limited), Utkarsh, and Janlaxmi. Additionally, there are 
several moneylenders and a government supported co-operative society. The moneylenders, 
locally called aadthis, also double as traders in crops and agricultural inputs.  
 
Most women in our sample are self-employed earning less than two dollars a day from their 
household businesses which are livestock farming, growing vegetables, garment making and 
other small businesses29 (see Table 1).  None of the businesses are registered with the 
government or have any permanent employees. 
 
 
                                                 
27 We attended weekly and monthly meetings of microfinance institutions and used them to discuss 
empowerment with the women participants.  
28 The interviews were done with 15 women representing various age groups at their houses in the presence of a 
local social worker who helped with translation and conversations. The permission to interview women was 
obtained from them as well as from the head of the village (sarpanch). Consent was taken in verbal form. The 
interviews followed a semi-structured approach, giving participants the flexibility to discuss issues important to 
them. All the clients approached agreed to be interviewed for this study. 
29 Our sample consist of self-employed women who have taken loans for productive purposes. Most businesses 
are home-based. We admit this may not be representative of the whole country. This is a limitation of our study. 
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Garment making 11.37 
Shops 17.54 
Small informal businesses (pottery, candle, 




All three MFIs use a version of the Grameen model. Borrowers are asked to form a group 
of five, and then the group members are expected to monitor each other’s repayment as well as 
coordinate some activities (such as collection of repayment) to reduce the operational costs of 
the MFI. However, they all can receive, as well as repay, the loan at the same time (instead of 
taking turns). Eligibility to receive a second loan depends on both the individual and the group 
repayment record. As already noted, repayment of 50 percent dues makes one eligible for a 
second loan. The group is expected to meet every week or month (depending on their 
repayment cycle) for a short meeting when the members pay their dues and pledge honesty and 
timely repayment. We did not see any default or expulsion of a member from any group. 
 
There is some difference between the MFIs in terms of the repayment cycle. The repayment 
cycle of SKS is weekly, which starts within a week of the loan disbursement. Janlaxmi and 
Utkarsh use a monthly cycle of repayment, which starts after a month of the loan disbursement. 
SKS and Utkarsh have similar loan products where a new borrower starts with a loan limit of 
Rs 15,000, which is then increased by an additional Rs 15,000 in the second loan cycle, and 
then by Rs 20,000 in the third loan cycle, and finally by Rs 30,000 in the fourth until to reach 
the overall cap of Rs 80,00031. For Janlaxmi, the first loan starts at Rs 30,000 and the second 
loan can go up to Rs 50,000. The repayment is collected by a loan officer during the 
weekly/monthly meeting of the group and a record is kept in individual borrower’s passbooks. 
 
                                                 
30 Including joint investments with husbands, trading of pulses, utensils, chemicals etc. 
31 1$= Rs 70 (September 2018) 
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The co-operative society and traders are very flexible with their loan amount and repayment 
cycle. Usually, a co-operative loan is to be paid back within six months with agreed instalments 
subject to some adjustments in difficult times, but failure to repay the loan on time invites 
higher interest charges on the outstanding amount and/or being barred from future loans. Loans 
from traders are highly flexible and their interest rates are usually the same as the MFIs. All 
loans are for productive purposes; some are predictably seasonal.  
 
Table 2: Loan products offered by various lenders: 
Lender Repayment Schedule Interest rate 
per annum 
Repayment Initial loan 
SKS   Weekly and fixed repayment 
amount of Rs 335 over the 
course of 54 weeks/one year 
18-22 % Weekly  Rs 15000 
Utkarsh  Monthly and fixed repayment 
amount of Rs 1480 over the 
course of 12 months /one year 
18-22 % Monthly  Rs 15000 
Janlaxmi Monthly and fixed repayment 
amount of Rs 1930 over the 
course of 12 months /one year 
18-22 % Monthly  Rs 30000 
Co-operative 
Society 
Flexible repayment amount paid 
within six months 
15-22 % Flexible  Varies 
Traders/local 
lenders 
Depends on the relationship and 
negotiation with the lender  
20-50 % Flexible  Varies 
 
The study focuses on the creditworthiness of the women borrowers which is measured by the 
cumulative amount of loan taken each year. Therefore, the main dependent variable is the log 
of total loan taken at the time of the survey. The descriptive statistics of the participants at 
baseline are provided in Table 3. The average borrower in our sample is 31.77 years old who 
has completed 5.5 years of education and lived in the village for 12 years. In 2015, she had a 
total loan (from all sources) of Rs 30,540, earned an annual income of Rs 35,810, and saved 
Rs 690 in the last month. They also owned assets worth of Rs 101,560. In 2016, the average 
loan size fell to Rs 21,350, and the annual income increased to Rs 42,280 leading to a 
significant increase in the last month saving to Rs 1,209. The decline in the loan could be due 
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to the possibility that some borrowers were reaching their MFI loan cap, and/or their optimal 
scale of business was reached and hence no further loan was needed. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 2015 2016 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD 
Income and expenditure (‘000 Rs)     
Loan taken in the year  30.54 13.77 21.35 9.591 
Assets worth  101.6 51.42 110.8 44.99 
Income of the respondent 35.81 12.38 42.28 10.03 
Income of the household 124.4 29.24 134.7 25.09 
Level of investment in business activities 39.21 30.71 24.08 8.766 
Borrower’s savings per month  0.692 0.474 1.209 0.831 
Household consumption on food per month32 3.404 1.049 3.919 0.918 
Average working hours per week 31.98 12.52 35.29 10.53 
Expenditure on children education 0.695 2.433 0.725 2.426 
Expenditure on health 16.38 12.41 15.20 7.611 
Expenditure on entertainment in the last month33 1.012 0.356 1.000 0.292 
 
Borrower’s characteristics 
    
Age (years) 31.77 4.913   
Age at marriage 19.60 1.686   
Years in the village 12.14 4.968   
Education years 5.526 3.129   
No of sons 1.294 0.585   
No of daughters 1.147 0.571   
First child son 0.672 0.472   
Size of the household 5.014 0.771   
No of working members 2.28 0.53   
                                                 
32 Consumption expenditure on food calculated by average monthly spending on rice, flour, milk and dairy 
products, pulses, vegetables, oil and spices. 
33 Expenditure on entertainment includes spending on cable TV, mobile, fairs, festivals, and picnics 
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House Quality34 0.578 0.495   
  
Share of the lending institutions in loans      
Cooperative 0.0758 0.265   
Traders/local lenders 0.137 0.345   
Janlaxmi 0.0711 0.258   
SKS 0.474 0.501   
Utkarsh 0.242 0.429   
     
Borrower’s caste     
Other Backward Castes (OBC) 0.308 0.463   
General Caste 0.251 0.435   
Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribes (SC/ST) 0.441 0.498   
     
 
3. Empowerment index 
 
Although women's empowerment is a much-researched topic in development economics, 
there is no universally agreed definition of the term (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005)35. For 
example, Sen (1993, as cited in Malhotra and Schuler, 2005) viewed empowerment as “altering 
relations of power which constrain women’s options and autonomy and adversely affect health 
and well-being”. Keller and Mbwewe (1991, as cited in Rowlands, 1995) defined it as “a 
process whereby women become able to organize themselves to increase their own self-
reliance, to assert their independent right to make choices and to control resources which will 
assist in challenging and eliminating their own subordination”.  
 
We take the definition adopted by Kabeer (1999:437). According to her, “empowerment is 
the expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability 
was previously denied to them”. The ability needs to improve on three inter-related dimensions: 
resources (access to and claims over material, human and social resources), agency (processes 
                                                 
34 A binary variable distinguishing between dwellings that are designed to be solid and include cemented 
flooring and strong roof compare to houses without a strong floor or roof. (Good = 1, Bad = 0) 
 
35 The literature has used several concepts like autonomy, power status and agency interchangeably (Malhotra 
and Schuler, 2005). 
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of decision making), and achievements (well-being outcomes). Following this 
conceptualisation, we consider the following four dimensions: economic, social, interpersonal 
and political.   
 
Economic empowerment: Economic empowerment alters the economic relationship 
between a woman and her immediate environment.  Within the family unit, it reduces the extent 
to which women are financially dependent on other family members, and consequently may 
improve her status in the family along with increased inter-spousal consultations in household 
matters (Kabeer, 2001). Women’s control over economic resources such as loans, income and 
savings contribute to the process of economic empowerment. 
 
To assess women’s agency vis-à-vis income, savings and loans we asked them about how 
much control they have over these resources. We also asked them about the freedom to 
participate in the labour market, and freedom to buy certain things such as cooking utensils 
(costing below Rs 5,000) and furniture or jewellery (costing above Rs 5,000)36.   
 
Clearly, economic empowerment is important in enlarging the set of economic options, 
but it alone may not necessarily improve a woman’s life. A woman also needs confidence and 
social skills to translate the options into practical actions. Malhotra and Schuler (2005) argue 
that it takes at least three-pronged empowerment - social, political and economic - to enable 
real change in women's welfares.  
 
Social empowerment: Mobility is a widely used indicator of women’s empowerment. It is 
especially important in the highly male-controlled environments of North India. To assess 
women’s mobility in the public domain, we asked whether the respondent was free to move 
within the village to visit temple or friends without her husband’s permission. We also asked 
if she could travel alone outside the village for family-related matters or medical needs.  
 
The concept of social empowerment is crucially linked to women's access to public spaces 
and mobility in the community and beyond.  To develop and maintain their position within a 
community, women must be able to engage socially - for example by attending meetings and 
                                                 
36 The rupee limits were imposed after consulting with women to identify which level of asset ownership was 
sufficient for sustainable economic empowerment.   
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community events, and by forming their own network. This will improve their social trust, 
access to public information and abilities to influence the social norms, which ultimately yield 
strategic benefit for the society (Kabeer, 2001).  
 
Interpersonal empowerment: Empowerment is a process of internal change, that focuses 
on a woman's sense of belief in her own decision-making abilities. Attitudes and perceptions 
reflect internal transformation and empower women from ‘within’ (Kabeer, Mahmud, and 
Tasneem, 2011). We asked questions on their attitude towards domestic violence and their 
ability to decide on family planning and children’s (especially daughters’) schooling, and to 
decide on sales/purchases of livestock. We asked a question regarding women’s health to 
account for the physical condition needed for them to act upon the available opportunity. We 
also accounted for media exposure through access to TV and radio. 
 
Political empowerment: Since there was an election held around the time of our first 
survey, we included some questions relating to political awareness. We asked them about their 
knowledge of the elected representative and if they had voted independently of their husband’s 
preference. Political awareness is a proxy for women’s understanding of their rights to fair 
wages and prices, social justice, and lawful treatments by the police or government officials.  
 
Table 4 enlists the variables and corresponding data that will be used in our PCA to construct 
the empowerment index. 
 
Table 4: Indicators of empowerment 
Economic 
status/security 
• Owns assets above Rs 10000 (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Free to choose between staying home or participating in employment 
activities (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Control over loan 
 
• Full control (1) 
• Share loan with husband (0.5) 
• No control (0) 
Control over income 
and savings 





• Control over small purchases > Rs 5000 such as food, children 
products, cooking utensils and own clothes (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Control over big purchases < Rs 10000 such as furniture/Jewellery 
(Yes =1, No = 0) 
Decision making: • Have a say in sale and purchase of livestock/ /housing equipment (Yes 
=1, No = 0) 
• Independent or have the majority control in taking decisions regarding 
child/daughter schooling, clothing, and food (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Mobility 
 
• Free to move around the village such as visit the temple or friends 
without husband’s objection (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Free to move outside village to doctors, relative or market, without 
husband’s objection to going alone (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Participation in public 
life 
• Free to participate in the microfinance project/ attending meetings/ 
forming a group/ public life (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Political awareness 
 
• Know the name of their Sarpanch (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Know the name of their MLA/MP (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Voted in the election/will vote in the election (Yes =1, No = 0) 
• Independent of husband interference in the voting (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Attitude towards 
domestic violence 
• Is it wrong for a husband to beat his wife in any situation? (Agree =1, 
Neither Agree or Disagree = 0.5, Disagree = 0) 
Family Planning • Independent to take fertility and parenting decisions (Yes=1, Joint 
decision making = 0.5, No = 0) 
Media exposure • Access to radio, TV, and other sources of media (Yes =1, No = 0) 
Health self-evaluation 
 
• Generally healthy (1) 
• Occasionally sick (0.5) 
• Poor Health (0) 
 
Before we proceed to the PCA model of the index construction, we need to accept certain 
limitations of our methodology. First, admittedly empowerment is a latent construct and at best 
we can only get an approximate estimate relying on some key, but not all, aspects of 
empowerment. For example, a woman may have the freedom to work, but will still not be able 
to work if she lacks confidence or necessary skills. Economic empowerment, in this instance, 
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does not translate into economic agency. Second, women’s empowerment in certain context 
could also lead to disempowerment. For instance, social empowerment demands that women 
have greater visibility, mobility and engagement in their communities. Depending on the 
strength of cultural and religious norms in those communities, this could expose women to 
social hostility or even violence. Similarly, greater participation in economic activities by 
women could discourage other family members - especially men - from working and burden 
the women with more economic responsibility as well as household responsibility. Therefore, 
an additional care is needed to construct an empowerment index or scale due to its multi-
dimensionality since combining inappropriate variables to measure empowerment could lead 
to its incorrect and inefficient estimation. Third, cultural and behavioural norms are likely to 
vary across space and time. A measure that signifies empowerment in one region or culture 
may have little relevance or different meaning in another. This is particularly evident in the 
case of measuring freedom of mobility which is more relevant in a patriarchal religious context 
where women are expected to remain at home than in a western context. Thus, consistency and 
comparability remain an issue. This is not unique to empowerment, but common to all 
qualitative variables.    
 
Developing a universal measure of empowerment is beyond the scope of this paper. We 
accept the limitations mentioned above. We have taken utmost care to develop an 
empowerment index based on a series of factors that are relevant to the region, which were 
uncovered through one-to-one conversations with women and our own knowledge of the North 
Indian reality. For example, our informal discussions also suggested that good health of a 
woman is also important for empowerment because she would otherwise be regarded as a 
family burden. We therefore included a separate question on health.  
 
Principal Component Analysis. We use the statistical procedure of principal components to 
determine the weights for an index of the variables mentioned above. PCA is a multivariate 
statistical procedure used to reduce the number of variables in a data set into a smaller number 
of components so that variations in the data can be accounted with the greatest accuracy (Vyas 
and Kumaranayake, 2006). PCA transforms original variables into uncorrelated indices, where 
each component is a linear weighted combination of the original variables.  
 




PC1 = a11X1 + a12X2 +…… + a1nXn 
PC2 = a21X1 + a22X2 +…… + a2nXn 
…… 
PCm = am1X1 + am2X2 +…… + amnXn 
 
where aij represents the weight for the i-th principal component and the j-th variable. 
 
The variance for each principal component is measured by the eigenvalue of the 
corresponding eigenvector. All components are uncorrelated, and they are ordered in 
accordance with their additional information content, starting from the largest. The first 
principal component captures the largest amount of information that is common to all of the 
variables, subject to the constraint that the sum of the squared weights is equal to one (Filmer 
and Pritchett, 1998; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). The second component explains 
additional but less variation in the original variables than the first component subject to the 
same constraint. The last component will account for the least amount of variations in the 
original variables. PCA works in such a way that variables with low standard deviation would 
carry a low weight. For instance, if every woman in our sample has a TV in her house; 
exhibiting no variation between household, then the variable would be zero weighted and 
would be of little use in estimating the index. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of variables used in computing empowerment index 




Small purchases 0.991 0.050 0.995 0.065  
 (0.097)  (0.068)  
Big purchases 0.692 0.238 0.834 0.220 
 (0.097)  (0.068)  
Mobility in the village 0.924 0.151 0.962 0.157 
 (0.265)  (0.191)  
Mobility outside the village 0.275 0.122 0.374 0.143 
 (0.448)  (0.485)  
Know the name of the village head 0.991 0.192 0.991 0.194 
 (0.097)  (0.097)  
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Note: Factor scores are based on the first principal component. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
The first principal component explains 17% of the variation in the variables used; this 
percentage is substantial but not overwhelming37. Table 5 presents the factor score from the 
                                                 
37 Although the first principal component may well serve as a reasonable overall index, the question remains 
whether this component has all the relevant information (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998). 
Voted in the recent election 0.919 0.466 0.924 0.449 
 (0.273)  (0.265)  
Know the name of the MLA/MP 0.858 0.455 0.858 0.442 
 (0.350)  (0.350)  
Independent of husband interference in the 
voting 
0.0711 0.142 0.0806 0.134 
(0.258)  (0.273)  
Self-employed or participate in the labour 
market 
0.995 0.173 0.995 0.196 
(0.068)  (0.06 8)  
Owns asset above INR 10000 0.858 0.310 0.858 0.322 
 (0.350)  (0.350)  
Control over savings and income 0.976 0.365 0.976 0.388 
 (0.152)  (0.152)  
Independent in taking household decision 
regarding food, children’s education etc 
0.883 0.123 0.967 0.112 
(0.323)  (0.180)  
Have a say in purchasing livestock and 
household equipment 
0.708 0.254 0.664 0.226 
(0.455)  (0.474)  
Free to participate in the microfinance project/ 






Control over loan 0.614 0.038 0.654 0.0166 
 (0.373)  (0.373)  
Media exposure 1  1  
 (0)  (0)  
Is wife beating justified in any situation? 0.566 0.244 0.573 0.243 
(0.339)  (0.339)  
Independent to take fertility and parenting 
decisions 
 
0.0806 0.135 0.0806 0.146 
(0.225)  (0.225)  
Cronbach’s α 0.67  0.64  
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first principal component which shows that our index gives more weight to economic status, 
control over savings, political awareness, attitude towards domestic violence and purchasing 
capacity regarding expensive items. Since every woman in our sample has access to TV/radio, 
the variable of media exposure would have no effect on our index. We will now examine how 




To estimate the relationship between women’s empowerment and their creditworthiness, a 
model in the following form is employed. 
 
ln (𝐿𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼 +  𝛿1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡  ……………. (1) 
where i = 1,2,…, 211, t =1,2.  
 
Here, ln (𝐿𝑖𝑡) is the log of volume of loans for the i-th women in the sample at year t. 
EMPOWERMENT is the total empowerment score; Yij is a vector of the borrower’s individual 
and household characteristics, such as age, education years, caste, and months with the lender, 
household size and source of the loan.  𝜇𝑖  is an individual specific unobservable effect, 𝜃𝑡 is 
year fixed effect and 𝑖𝑡 is an iid error term.  
 
To identify which empirical methodology - pooling, fixed effects or random effects model 
- is most appropriate, we perform two statistical tests: the first is the Hausman specification 
test (Hausman, 1978) to compare the fixed effect and the random effect models; the second is 
the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) of the random effect model (see 
Table 15 in the Appendix for fixed effects and random effects estimates). A rejection of null 
hypothesis in the Hausman test statistic would imply that the random effects estimators are 
inconsistent and that fixed effects estimates are more appropriate. In our case, the Hausman 
specification test failed to reject null hypothesis (χ2(5) = 10.21) and suggests support for the 
random effects model. A LM test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals can 
be used to assess whether the Panel GLS model is appropriate than the strict OLS model. The 
Lagrange multiplier failed to reject the null hypothesis allowing us to conclude that the random 




However, EMPOWERMENT can be dependent on the loan as well as other omitted 
variables. We address this potential endogeneity bias by adopting the IV approach and using 
sex of the first child as an instrument for empowerment. In the 2SLS IV approach, our first 
stage treats empowerment index as a dependent variable and use dummy variables for the first 
child being son as an independent variable. In the second stage, we regress log of loan amount 
on the predicted value of empowerment index obtained from the first stage regression.  
 
Indeed, our first stage regression shows that our instrument is a strong determinant of 
mother’s empowerment. The second stage regression shows that (instrumented) empowerment 
increases the loan amount. Therefore, we can argue that empowerment has a positive causal 
effect on creditworthiness.   
 
Now we need to explain our choice of the instrument. Whether the first child is a boy or a 
girl is purely a random event and could not directly affect the loan amounts the mother would 
get many years later. Can the first child’s sex be manipulated through sex-selective abortion, 
given that India, and North India particularly, show strong son preference? The answer to this 
question, based on overwhelming evidence, is ‘no’. Das Gupta et al. (2003) and Rosenblum 
(2013) show that the chance of sex-selective abortion arises predominantly with the second 
pregnancy onward, when the first child was a girl. Aborting the first pregnancy is very rare and 
unlikely (Arnold, Choe, and Roy, 1998; Jha et al. 2011), not to mention the health 
consequences associated with it. Moreover, in rural Haryana first child is also seen as God’s 
gift and terminating pregnancy would be regarded as a sin. But the second or third child’s 
gender selection is not uncommon. Because of this risk of non-randomness arising with later 
children, we took only the first child (being boy) as our instrument, and not total number of 
sons. In fact, when we tried total number of sons as an alternative instrument, we saw no 
relationship between the instrument and empowerment. 
 
Now what would be the economic explanation for the significantly positive relationship 
between giving birth to a boy (as first child) and empowerment? We argue that in the male-
dominated culture of North India, where women are ill-treated for giving birth to a girl for the 
costly future implications of dowry (among other reasons), the luck of giving birth to a son 
would elevate a young woman’s status within the household (Jejeebhoy, 1997). She might be 
granted significant freedom in decision making and control over basic resources in her life. 




We may also argue that the luck of giving birth to two or three sons does not improve things 
dramatically, because the pathway to empowerment already opened due to the first son; gaining 
further empowerment has nothing to do with having additional sons. That is the reason the total 
number of boys does not work as an instrument. Similarly, giving birth to a boy after a girl 
does not also help much either, because it can only prevent deterioration of the woman’s status. 
Likewise, giving birth to a girl after a boy may not be a great misfortune, given that the family 
already got a son they value so much. Thus, the first child being a boy is crucial.    
  
Is it possible that a boy could be an implicit collateral or loan guarantor and thus can directly 
influence the loans? This is not plausible on several grounds. First, the loans are also very short 
term, which cannot be renegotiated for delayed repayment from a son’s future income. In any 
case, MFIs or cooperative societies, who are the dominant sources of loan in our sample, do 
not follow such exploitative policies. Second, the average woman’s age is about 32 years and 
the age at which she had her first child was 21. So, having an eleven years old son cannot help 




Our OLS and IV estimates are reported in Table 6. We see that both models show significant 
positive effects of empowerment on the loan amount. The underlying first stage regression of 
the IV model, presented in Table 11 in Appendix, show that the first-born son leads to 1.33 unit 
increase in women’s empowerment and the relationship is significant at 1% level. Therefore, 
it is seen that having a first-born son contributes directly to women’s experiences of 
empowerment. The number of education years completed also have a positive and significant 
relationship with empowerment.  
 
The IV estimates show that for a unit increase in empowerment score, the loan amount is 
expected to increase by 12.8 percent (Column 2, Table 6)39. The number of education years 
completed has a negative impact on the amount of loan - probably because microfinance is 
                                                 
38 To test the validity of this argument, we have regressed the loan amount on the interaction of the first-child 
dummy and mother’s age. The interaction term is insignificant. 
39 We found no evidence of reverse causality with loan amount having no effect on the level of empowerment.  
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usually taken by less educated women and higher educated women are more likely to work in 
regular salaried jobs. The positive and significant coefficient of upper caste suggests that caste 
phenomena are strong in the region and upper caste women are expected to get a higher loan 
amount. Husband’s income does not appear to have any effect on the loan amount which 
suggests women own status determines their loan outcomes40. We find that the number of 
working members, house quality (as a proxy for income), average hours worked per week and 
years in the village do not affect the amount of loan. The coefficients of the loan sources other 
than SKS MFI (which is the base category) are negative. Women involved in livestock and 
other business activities such as joint investments with husbands, trading of pulses, utensils, 
and chemicals have a higher loan amount compared to the women engaged in agriculture 
activities. 
 
Table 6: Pooled OLS and IV estimation model  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS IV 
   
Empowerment 0.035* 0.128*** 
 (0.021) (0.045) 
Education years -0.008 -0.033** 
 (0.013) (0.015) 
Months with the lender 0.122*** 0.119*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) 
Months with the lender square -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the village -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
No. of working members 0.068 0.056 
 (0.056) (0.059) 
Upper Caste 0.115 0.160** 
 (0.073) (0.078) 
House quality -0.010 -0.018 
                                                 
40 We found that wife’s income is a strong determinant of the loan amount without changing our main results, 
but for endogeneity reasons, we have not included it in our final regression. 
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 (0.063) (0.061) 
Average hours worked per week 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Log of husband’s income 0.199 0.099 
 (0.125) (0.112) 
Source of the loan   
Utkarash -0.077 -0.122* 
 (0.051) (0.064) 
Janlaxmi 0.206*** 0.132 
 (0.075) (0.096) 
Moneylenders -0.123 -0.151 
 (0.127) (0.112) 
Co-operative Society 0.141 0.113 
 (0.181) (0.175) 
Income generating activities   
Livestock 0.094 0.167 
 (0.094) (0.105) 
Making cloths 0.018 0.077 
 (0.143) (0.139) 
Shops 0.017 0.066 
 (0.129) (0.124) 
Small informal business -0.043 0.023 
 (0.118) (0.135) 
Other activities 0.188 0.250** 
 (0.120) (0.126) 
Year -1.325*** -1.311*** 
 (0.228) (0.236) 
Constant 1.459*** 2.107*** 
 (0.550) (0.614) 
   
R square  0.292 0.283 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  86.94 
Observations 422 422 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Column 1 presents the pooled OLS estimates and Column 2 presents the IV estimates of regression using log of loan amount 
as a dependent variable. We use agriculture as a base group for income generating activity dummies and SKS microfinance as 
the base group for the loan source dummies. 
 
Column (1) of Table 6 presents the pooled OLS estimates that shows a positive impact of 
empowerment on the loan amount. In Column (2), after instrumenting for empowerment, the 
estimates show a similar pattern, with IV estimates bigger than the pooled OLS estimates. 
These results, together with the good performance of our instrument in general, suggest that 
more empowered women sustain bigger loans. The IV estimates are considerably larger than 
the pooled OLS estimates, suggesting that the uncorrected OLS model would have 
underestimated the true effect of empowerment on women’s creditworthiness. 
 
We also test for the relevance of the instrument in the first-stage regression. Staiger and 
Stock (1997) proposed a rule of thumb declaring the instruments weak when the first stage F 
statistic is less than 10. The F-statistic from the first-stage is sufficiently large, suggesting that 
our IV is powerful. Another approach, by Stock and Yogo (2005) is to reject the null hypothesis 
of weak instruments when the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic exceeds a given threshold. 
In our case, we reject the null hypotheses of the weak instrument since Cragg-Donald F statistic 
(86.94) exceeds the threshold of 16.38 at 10%. By these criteria, we have a good instrument in 
the first-born son.  
 
 As an aside issue, we wanted to check which component of the empowerment index 
has bigger effect on the loan amount. For this purpose, as a separate exercised we have 
regressed the loan amounts on the individual components of empowerment, instead of the 
empowerment index (see Table 12 in the Appendix). We find that economic, political and 
interpersonal factors have a positive and significant relationship with loan amount, whereas 
social factors have no effect.  
 
6. North Indian data: Robustness checks and supporting evidence 
 
An important question is: How robust is our empowerment methodology? Can this be 
applied to a larger dataset, and check that the insight we got from our village data tally with 
North India as a whole? To answer these questions, we examine the IHDS data for 2011-12 for 
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North India and the rest of India (see Table 9 in the Appendix for summary statistics). The 
IHDS data contain very similar empowerment related information on adult women. Therefore, 
it presents a clear scope for testing our model.  
 
 However, there are two issues. First, the IHDS data contain the credit information at the 
household level, which does not help to identify the female borrowers. Therefore, we create a 
subsample of only female-headed households. Using this subsample, we then create a similar 
empowerment index using PCA (see Table 10 in the Appendix). Since the data also has 
information on women who did not take any loans, we can also estimate the probability of 
getting a loan. Second, IHDS data do not report the birth order of the child. Hence, we cannot 
use the first child’s sex as an IV for empowerment. Instead, we use widowhood as an 
instrument.41 We also use the Heckman two-step procedure to correct for self-selection bias 
(discussed in Appendix B).  
 
Admittedly, the IHDS households are not prima facie comparable with our village survey 
households because IHDS borrowers are head of the household unlike the borrowers in our 
survey data. However, as Table 6 shows, the husband’s income does not affect the wives’ loans. 
Therefore, we can say that there is some similarity between the borrowers of the two datasets 
regarding the responsibility of the loan.  Above all, both samples provide rich information on 
underlying factors of empowerment.   
 
We now need to justify our choice of widowhood as an IV. First, it is a random and 
exogenous event, and it could not possibly have a direct effect on the amount of loans. One 
may argue that a widow would be in greater need of loans than a non-widow female. Based on 
Dreze and Srinivasan (1997) we also know that widows are amongst the most vulnerable 
women in India. However, vulnerability would lead to greater consumption loans, but not non-
consumption loans. But amongst those women who get non-consumption loans, widows are 
likely to be more empowered. Second, the absence of husband allows a woman to be 
independent and to make strategic life choices. For this reason, women who do get bigger loans 
are likely to be more independent and empowered.  
 
In other words, the process of empowerment may be triggered by misfortune and tragedies, 
                                                 
41 We find widowhood has a positive association with empowerment (see Table 13 and 14 in the Appendix). 
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as it may be with good luck, like giving birth to a son. There is no unique pathway to 
empowerment. Both good and bad lucks can help a woman take the road to empowerment. 
 
The IHDS data contain information on the largest loan which could be of several types of 
needs – consumption, production, education, medical, home building/improvement and 
marriage.  From these, we exclude consumption and marriage. Production loans are typically 
short-term working capital credit. Education, home improvement and medical loans are 
somewhat related to production as well, because human capital is an important input for self-
employment and home is also commonly used as a production base. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to include all these loans into a single non-consumption loan.  
   
Table 7 below presents the IV results on the probability of taking any loan. Empowerment 
has a positive effect on the probability only in North India; the rest of India shows no effect. 
The results also suggest that households with better house quality (a proxy for income) are less 
likely to participate in the credit market. Upper caste female-headed households are less likely 
to participate in the credit market in the rest of India while caste does not have any effect in 
North India. Similarly, ration card only affects the probability of participation in the credit 
market in the rest of India. On the other hand, larger (female-headed) households and those 
keeping livestock are more likely to take loans in North India while no effect in the rest of the 
country. The Wald test confirms that the use of IV is justified for North India. However, in the 
rest of India sample, a probit model would have sufficed, although the results did not change.  
 
Table 7: IV estimates for the probability of loan taken based on the IHDS data 
 
 (1) (5) 
VARIABLES NORTH REST 
   
Empowerment 0.125* 0.019 
 (0.076) (0.073) 
Education years -0.017 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.009) 
Age -0.004 -0.010** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
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Urban area -0.009 0.014 
 (0.140) (0.093) 
Upper Caste -0.186 -0.228*** 
 (0.115) (0.079) 
Remittance receive from  0.213 -0.021 
non-resident (0.167) (0.126) 
Livestock 0.265** 0.132 
 (0.119) (0.090) 
Size of the household 0.110*** 0.006 
 (0.037) (0.031) 
Land ownership -0.061 0.132 
 (0.124) (0.106) 
Ration Card -0.098 0.346*** 
 (0.147) (0.118) 
House Quality -0.278** 0.443*** 
 (0.114) (0.084) 
Occupations   
Cultivation 0.426 -0.040 
 (0.513) (0.259) 
Allied Agriculture 0.488 -0.595 
 (0.813) (0.540) 
Agriculture wage labour 0.403 0.020 
 (0.527) (0.256) 
Non-agriculture wage  0.361 -0.020 
Labour (0.508) (0.243) 
Petty shop 0.780 -0.074 
 (0.528) (0.266) 
Salaried job 0.295 -0.163 
 (0.506) (0.234) 
Pension or rent 0.275 -0.416 
 (0.515) (0.258) 
Others 0.199 -0.177 




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All the variables here are described 
in Table 10 in the Appendix. The result from the first stage is in Table 13 in the Appendix. We use professional 
and organised business occupational group as the base group for the occupations dummy. The test of equality 
rejects the equality of coefficients across equations. 
 
To address a potential selection bias in the loan amount model, we use the Heckman 
(1979) two-step model that conditions the second stage estimates on the first stage participation 
in the loan market. Table 8 below presents the IV results of the (second stage) effect of 
empowerment on the amount of the loan taken. We find that for one unit increase in the 
empowerment score, the loan amount is expected to increase by 33 percent in North India while 
having no effect in the rest of India. The coefficient of education is positive and significant for 
the rest of India while it shows no effect in North India. Larger households and those which 
receive remittances from a non-resident have a higher loan amount in North India. Loans taken 
from a formal source such as a bank or credit group increases the loan amount in the North and 
the rest of India. Caste does not seem to have any effect on the loan amount.  
 
That empowerment has positive and significant effects in North India directly support our 
village level finding. Empowerment matters for businesses in environments where males are 
in a controlling position42. For the rest of India, where women enjoy much better status, our 
indicators of empowerment (which we identified through our in-person surveys in the North) 
do not capture enough variations in women’s creditworthiness. It is more likely that in the rest 
of India female borrowers may be seen similarly creditworthy as male borrowers. 
Empowerment is of a lesser concern there, instead the borrower’s human capital is much more 
important.  
 
                                                 
42 In Northern India, conservative culture and social norms may discourage women to become economically self-
sufficient (as showed by Ahmed & Sen (2018) in Bangladesh). In this environment, highly empowered women 
who have the capacity to challenge the societal norms are more likely to start businesses, absorb higher credit and 
have a greater control over the business decisions. 
Constant -0.490 -0.402 
 (0.597) (0.341) 
   
Observations 736 1478 
   
Wald test of exogeneity 4.37** 0.01 
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Table 8: IV estimates of loan based on IHDS data 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES NORTH REST 
   
Empowerment 0.337** -0.252 
 (0.146) (0.163) 
Education years -0.00382 0.0745*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0145) 
Age -0.00585 0.0324*** 
 (0.0147) (0.00815) 
Urban -0.212 0.193 
 (0.217) (0.159) 
Upper Caste -0.270 0.181 
 (0.276) (0.194) 
Remittance Received 0.730** 0.141 
 (0.312) (0.222) 
Livestock 0.452 -0.497*** 
 (0.297) (0.158) 
Size of Household 0.202*** -0.0348 
 (0.0589) (0.0557) 
Land Ownership 0.124 -0.0342 
 (0.185) (0.231) 
Ration Card 0.0581 -0.485 
 (0.243) (0.284) 
Source of Loan   
Formal Loan 0.907*** 0.475** 
 (0.330) (0.192) 
Family Loan -0.229 -0.560*** 
 (0.172) (0.146) 
Purpose of Loan   
House Loan 0.258 0.766*** 
 (0.262) (0.167) 
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Medical Loan -1.015*** 0.126 
 (0.303) (0.230) 
Education Loan -0.515 0.0654 
 (0.438) (0.238) 
Occupations   
Cultivation 2.378*** 0.163 
 (0.474) (0.456) 
Allied Agriculture 1.964*** 1.152 
 (0.564) (1.195) 
Agriculture wage labour 2.182*** -0.144 
 (0.559) (0.432) 
Non-agriculture wage labour 1.963*** -0.441 
 (0.474) (0.431) 
Petty shop 3.238*** 0.00622 
 (0.692) (0.426) 
Salaried job 1.365*** -0.0263 
 (0.374) (0.428) 
Pension or rent 1.647*** 0.905* 
 (0.412) (0.508) 
Others 1.581*** -0.0968 
 (0.406) (0.457) 
Mills 3.800*** -2.947*** 
 (1.221) (0.755) 
Constant 3.540*** 11.74*** 
 (1.358) (1.164) 
   
Observations 302 544 
   
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic              132.17 33.691 
R-squared 0.319 0.267 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the variables here are described 
in Table 10 in the Appendix. The results from the first-stage are in Table 14 in the Appendix. We use professional 
and organised business occupational group as the base group for the occupations, dummy for informal loan as the 
base group for the source of loan and dummy for productive loan as the base group of purpose of loan. The F-
statistic from the first-stage and Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic shows that we have a good instrument as 





We have also constructed women’s empowerment index using the principal component 
analysis based on the tetrachoric correlations coefficients taking only the variables with higher 
variance (see Table 16). The results are similar to our previous analysis (see Table 17). We 




7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Using primary data collected from a village in North India over two periods, and the IHDS 
data for all India this paper examines the impact of women’s empowerment on their 
creditworthiness measured in terms of cumulative loan amount taken over time. An index for 
empowerment was created using four dimensions of empowerment: economic, social, 
interpersonal and political. Although empowerment is an elusive concept and an ideal index is 
beyond the scope of the paper, we took great care (through a detailed questionnaire and in-
person interviews) to capture the critical observable factors underlying empowerment.  
 
Our findings have some policy implications. First, one critical view of microcredit is that 
it does not reach the women who need it most. Our analysis shows that a more empowered 
woman gets more loans, regardless of her family wealth. Therefore, we argue that there is a 
need to decouple empowerment from microcredit either by policies focusing on empowering 
more women or by increasing the access of microcredit to lowly empowered women. 
 
Second, our empowerment index shows that some variables such as women’s economic 
status, their control over savings, political awareness, attitude towards domestic violence and 
purchasing capacity regarding expensive items are more important than other variables in 
determining women’s empowerment. Hence, diverting resources to improve the outcome of 
these variables would increase the empowerment of women. 
 
Third, although we see that giving birth to a son helps a woman to be on track for 
empowerment, by no means we advocate son preference. Instead, we recommend investing in 
resources for promoting gender equality and reducing gender discrimination in jobs, education, 
politics, and sports. Recent progress in education for girls and the government sponsored social 
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campaign for promoting gender equity (Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao -- Save a girl child, Educate 
a girl child) are showing good results (Government of India, 2018).  
 
8. Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure  1: Timeline of the surveys 
 
Jan 2015                                                                                          
|_________|__________|_________________________________________|__________| 
                  Oct 2015-Dec 2015                                                                                  Dec 2016-Feb 2017                          
                     
                 Collection of the                                                                               Second round 
                   first round 
 
Figure  2: Location of the village 
 





Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of variables used in IHDS 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
Log of loan Log of the amount of loan 888 10.231 1.437 
Loan taken Dummy if taken any loan 2273 .394 .489 
Loan Amount Loan amount in rupees 2273 30988 167775 
Empowerment Empowerment score 2269 .006 2.254 
Education years Number of education years 
completed 
2273 3.832 4.447 
Age Age 2273 42.864 8.501 
Urban area Dummy if living in urban area 2273 .328 .47 
Upper Caste Dummy if belong to upper caste 2273 .285 .451 
Land owner Dummy if own any land 2273 .317 .465 
Ration Card Dummy if have ration card 2273 .888 .315 
Remittance receive from 
non-resident 
Dummy if any remittance 
received from a non-resident 
2273 .422 .494 
House Quality Dummy for the quality of the 
house (good or bad) 
2273 .650 .477 
Size of the household Number of people living in the 
house 
2273 3.769 1.816 
Livestock Dummy if own any form of 
livestock 
2273 .36 .48 
Widow Dummy if the client is a widow 2273 .577 .494 
Productive loans Dummy if loan taken for 
productive purposes such as 
business or agriculture 
896 .249 .433 
Education Loans Dummy if loan for educational 
purpose 
896 .100 .301 
House Loans Dummy if loan for improving 
the house 
896 .295 .456 
Medical Loans Dummy if loan for medical 
purpose 
896 .345 .476 
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Formal loans Dummy if the loan is taken 
from formal source such as 
banks 
896 .405 491 
Informal Loans Dummy if loan from Informal 
sources such as money lenders 
896 .198 .398 
Family Loans Dummy if loan from family and 
friends 
896 .397 .49 
Occupations     
Cultivation  2269 .163 .369 
Allied Agriculture  2269 .005 .073 
Agriculture wage labour  2269 .113 .316 
Non-agriculture wage 
labour 
 2269 .193 .394 
Petty shop  2269 .061 .24 
Salaried job  2269 .246 .431 
Pension or Rent  2269 .094 .292 
Others  2269 .107 .309 
Independent/organized 
business 
 2947 0.02 0.13 
    
    
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of variables used in computing empowerment index for 
IHDS 




Have the most say in cooking 0.891 0.311  0.1271 
Have the most say in purchasing expensive items 0.596 0.491 0.3266 
Have the most say in decision regarding child sickness 0.743 0.437 0.2839 
Have the most say in decision regarding marriage of the 
child 
0.591 0.492 0.3241 




An empowerment index (similar to the original index) was constructed using the data from 
IHDS as part of robustness check. This index consists of variable capturing various dimensions 
of empowerment such as mobility, participation level in public and political life, purchasing 
capacity, media exposure, family planning and economic status. The first principal component 
explains 33% of the variation in the variables used. 
 





Dummy of first-born son 1.333*** 
Have the most say in decision when fall sick 0.726 0.446 0.2852 
Have the most say in decision regarding buying land 0.550 0.498 0.3406 
Have the most say in decision regarding wedding 
expensive 
0.646 0.478 0.3285 
Can visit health centre without permission 0.362 0.481 0.2751 
Can visit friends without permission 0.384 0.486 0.2614 
Can visit shops without permission 0.417 0.493 0.2395 
Can go short distance without permission 0.308 0.462 0.2857 
Have the most say in number of children to have 0.516 0.500 0.2248 
Have access to media 0.602 0.490 0.0174 
Economic Status (currently working) 0.405 0.491 0.1404 
Member of Mahila Mandal (women group) .0708 0.256 0.0386 
Member of self-help group 0.152 0.359 0.0430 
Member of credit/saving group 0.082 0.274 0.0265 
Member of political organisation 0.009 0.095 0.0319 




Education years 0.249*** 
 (0.029) 
Months with the lender -0.018 
 (0.061) 
Months with the lender square 0.000 
 (0.002) 
Years in the village 0.048*** 
 (0.016) 
No. of working members -0.058 
 (0.221) 
Upper Caste -0.235 
 (0.202) 
House quality 0.317** 
 (0.135) 
Average hours worked per week 0.009 
 (0.006) 
Log of husband’s income 0.368 
 (0.177) 







Co-operative Society 0.255 
 (0.227) 
Income generating activities  
Livestock -0.483*** 
 (0.182) 






Small informal business -0.339 
 (0.260) 









Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 12: Impact of various empowerment components on the loan amount 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Empowerment (Economics, Social,  0.335** 0.957 0.413*** 0.273*** 
Political and Interpersonal) (0.134) (0.676) (0.157) (0.105) 
Education years -0.016 -0.024 -0.049** -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.020) (0.013) 
Months with the lender 0.119*** 0.142*** 0.127*** 0.110*** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.035) (0.033) 
Months with the lender square -0.001 -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the village -0.005 -0.032 -0.014* -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.007) 
No. of working members 0.020 0.024 0.114** 0.070 
 (0.069) (0.111) (0.057) (0.062) 
Upper Caste 0.149* -0.025 0.157* 0.119 
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 (0.084) (0.137) (0.085) (0.073) 
House quality -0.079 -0.098 0.023 -0.024 
 (0.073) (0.100) (0.071) (0.063) 
Average hours worked per week -0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log of husband’s income 0.060 0.142 0.162 0.128 
 (0.126) (0.158) (0.115) (0.120) 
Source of the loan     
Utkarash -0.058 -0.149 -0.111 -0.080 
 (0.066) (0.138) (0.077) (0.063) 
Janlaxmi 0.091 0.406* 0.136 0.221** 
 (0.111) (0.232) (0.104) (0.106) 
Traders -0.167 0.241 -0.197 -0.120 
 (0.124) (0.262) (0.129) (0.111) 
Co-operative Society 0.109 0.407 0.020 0.165 
 (0.187) (0.277) (0.193) (0.180) 
Income generating activities     
Livestock 0.082 0.108 0.170 0.165 
 (0.104) (0.165) (0.109) (0.109) 
Making cloths -0.089 0.040 0.013 0.152 
 (0.144) (0.225) (0.144) (0.157) 
Shops -0.045 -0.112 0.107 0.014 
 (0.144) (0.233) (0.132) (0.127) 
Small informal business -0.087 -0.056 0.040 -0.050 
 (0.140) (0.235) (0.146) (0.126) 
Other occupations 0.123 0.084 0.240* 0.278** 
 (0.139) (0.237) (0.127) (0.135) 
Year -1.403*** -1.494*** -1.348*** -1.232*** 
 (0.252) (0.341) (0.244) (0.244) 
Constant 0.624 0.028 0.559 0.809 
 (0.661) (1.182) (0.667) (0.580) 
R-squared 0.277 0.182 0.278 0.274 
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Observations 422 422 422 422 
          
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Column 1 of Row 1 shows the effect of economic empowerment on loan amount. Column 2 of Row 1 shows the 
effect of social empowerment on loan amount. Column 3 of Row 1 shows the effect of political empowerment on 
loan amount. Column 4 of Row 1 shows the effect of interpersonal empowerment on loan amount. We use 
agriculture as a base group for income generating activity dummies and SKS microfinance as the base group for 
the loan source dummies. 
 
Table 13: Result from the first-stage regression using empowerment as a dependent 
variable in the loan amount model. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Empowerment North India Rest of India 
   
Education years 0.0963*** 0.0239 
 (0.0184) (0.0235) 
Years in place 0.0512*** -0.0163 
 (0.00879) (0.0133) 
Urban area 0.187 0.00977 
 (0.184) (0.245) 
Upper Caste 0.835*** 0.380 
 (0.166) (0.253) 
Remittance receive from -1.235*** -0.752*** 
non-resident (0.172) (0.242) 
Livestock -1.511*** -0.0800 
 (0.173) (0.232) 
Size of HH -0.284*** -0.264*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0536) 
Landowner 0.341** -0.693*** 
 (0.163) (0.264) 
Ration Card 0.272 -0.490 
 (0.198) (0.404) 
Source of loan   
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Formal loan -0.331 -0.445* 
 (0.211) (0.265) 
Family loan -0.257 -0.342 
 (0.165) (0.268) 
Purpose of loan   
House Loan 0.171 0.278 
 (0.202) (0.246) 
Medical Loan -0.386** 0.414 
 (0.191) (0.275) 
Education Loan -0.0111 0.523 
 (0.330) (0.319) 
Occupations   
Cultivation -0.0162 0.941 
 (0.667) (0.627) 
Allied Agriculture -0.0672 1.411 
 (1.030) (1.607) 
Agriculture wage labour -0.455 0.768 
 (0.693) (0.615) 
Non-agriculture wage labour 0.130 0.806 
 (0.666) (0.595) 
Petty shop -2.069*** 0.426 
 (0.678) (0.666) 
Salaried job 0.617 0.471 
 (0.655) (0.593) 
Pension or rent 1.017 0.462 
 (0.681) (0.696) 
Others 1.000 0.366 
 (0.681) (0.655) 
Mills -7.698*** -2.275*** 
 (0.373) (0.682) 
Widow 1.244*** 1.035*** 
 (0.187) (0.240) 
Constant 5.787*** 3.743*** 
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 (0.858) (1.057) 
   
Observations 312 564 
R-squared 0.751 0.221 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 shows the estimate from North 
India, Column 2 shows the estimate from rest of India. The results shows that widowhood has a positive 
association with empowerment. We use professional and organised business occupational group as the base group 
for the occupations, dummy for informal loan as the base group for the source of loan and dummy for productive 
loan as the base group of purpose of loan. 
 
 
Table 14: Result from the first-stage regression using empowerment as a dependent 
variable from the selection model. 
 
 (2) (6) 
VARIABLES NORTH REST 
   
WIDOW 1.793*** 1.261*** 
 (0.197) (0.141) 
Education years 0.004 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.014) 
Age -0.001 -0.019** 
 (0.009) (0.007) 
Urban area 0.263 0.138 
 (0.188) (0.141) 
Upper Caste -0.078 0.051 
 (0.155) (0.119) 
Remittance receive from  -0.643*** -0.734*** 
non-resident (0.187) (0.142) 
Livestock -0.132 -0.233* 
 (0.164) (0.135) 
Size of the household -0.193*** -0.132*** 
 (0.046) (0.045) 
Land ownership 0.002 -0.451*** 
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 (0.170) (0.155) 
Ration Card 0.079 0.104 
 (0.201) (0.173) 
House Quality 0.348** -0.122 
 (0.153) (0.127) 
Occupations   
Cultivation 0.172 0.881** 
 (0.686) (0.384) 
Allied Agriculture 0.149 0.030 
 (1.098) (0.786) 
Agriculture wage labour 0.295 0.943** 
 (0.709) (0.379) 
Non-agriculture wage  0.556 0.766** 
Labour (0.677) (0.364) 
Petty shop 0.094 0.710* 
 (0.707) (0.403) 
Salaried job 0.269 0.468 
 (0.677) (0.358) 
Pension or rent 0.057 0.346 
 (0.690) (0.391) 
Others 0.041 0.089 
 (0.689) (0.387) 
Constant -0.966 0.284 
 (0.803) (0.514) 
R-squared   
Observations 736 1,478 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 shows the estimate from North India, and 
Column 2 shows the estimate from rest of India. We use professional and organised business occupational group as the base 
group for the occupations dummy. 
 
Table 15: Fixed effects and random effects model 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE RE 
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Empowerment 0.262 0.040* 
 (0.164) (0.020) 
Months with the lender 0.203*** 0.120*** 
 (0.041) (0.027) 
Months with the lender square -0.002** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the village 0.137 -0.007 
 (0.359) (0.007) 
Average hours worked per  -0.007 0.000 
week (0.008) (0.003) 
Education years  -0.009 
  (0.011) 
No. of working members  0.088 
  (0.067) 
Upper caste  0.107 
  (0.071) 
Utkarash  -0.076 
  (0.074) 
Janlaxmi  0.205* 
  (0.121) 
Traders  -0.142 
  (0.104) 
Co-operative Society  0.165 
  (0.126) 
House quality  -0.002 
  (0.061) 
Income generating activities   
Livestock  0.095 
  (0.099) 
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Making cloths  0.008 
  (0.122) 
Shops  0.001 
  (0.112) 
Small informal business  -0.051 
  (0.127) 
Other occupations  0.187 
  (0.121) 
year -2.241*** -1.309*** 
 (0.439) (0.144) 
Constant 4,515.143*** 2,639.582*** 
 (881.018) (290.067) 
Breusch and Pagan Test 
 
 1 
Hausman Test 10.21 10.21 
Observations 422 422 
R-squared 0.308  
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is log of loan 




Table 16: Variables used in computing the empowerment index based on tetrachoric 
correlation coefficients 
 
Variables Factor Score 
Big purchases 0.46 
Mobility outside the village 0.34 
Know the name of the MLA/MP 0.29 
Owns asset above INR 10000 0.35 
Independent in taking household decision re food, children’s education etc 0.49 









Table 17: IV estimates of loan amount using the empowerment index based on tetrachoric 
correlation coefficients 
 




Education years -0.005 
 (0.011) 
Months with the lender 0.118*** 
 (0.027) 
Months with the lender square -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Years in the village -0.006 
 (0.007) 
No. of working members 0.040 
 (0.069) 
Upper Caste 0.042 
 (0.060) 
House quality -0.053 
 (0.060) 
Average hours worked per week -0.000 
 (0.003) 
















Small informal business -0.035 
 (0.128) 
Other activities 0.196 
 (0.123) 
Year -1.316*** 









Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
2.9 Appendix B: Identification Strategy for IHDS data 
 
The model consists of the following equations: 
 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖 = 1 (𝑥3𝑖𝑏3 + 𝑖3 > 0)….. Selection equation (1) 
E𝑀𝑃𝑖 =   𝑥2𝑖𝑏2 +  𝑎2𝑊𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑖 + 𝑖2 …… Empowerment equation (2) 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐿𝐴𝑖) =  𝑥1𝑖𝑏1  
+  𝑎1𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 𝑖1 ….. Loan amount equation (3) 
 
Loan amount equation is the equation of interest where 𝑙𝑛 (𝐿𝐴𝑖) is the log of the loan amount 
borrowed by women i. 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 is a potentially endogenous variable, 𝑥𝑖
 represents the vector of 
other control variables, and 𝑖  is the error term. The second equation is a projection for the 
endogenous variable 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖 using 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑖 as an instrument variable. Selection equation 
estimates the probability of participating in the credit market where 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖 equals one if the 
women has taken a loan and zero otherwise.  
 
The estimation strategy of this model can be summarized as follows. In Step 1, we estimate the 
likelihood of participating the credit market. In Step 2, we compute the Inverse Mills Ratios 
(IMR) and plug it in the loan amount equation to be estimated by 2SLS along with WIDOW 
as an instrument. The coefficient of IMR is significant for North India and the whole of India 
implying that selection bias is prevalent in the model while, the insignificant coefficient of IMR 
















































































The Impact of Business Training on Female Microfinance Clients: 




Business training is a broadly implemented tool for development to build the human capital of 
microentrepreneurs by teaching basic business practices in order to improve the income and 
end the cycle of low investment in their businesses. However, the impacts of such programmes 
are unclear. Both the need for business training, and the lack of clarity regarding its impact, are 
particularly notable in relation to women. Women in the developing world are increasingly 
self-employed out of necessity - but with low productivity. Poverty alleviation and gender 
equity are highly contingent on the success of women’s businesses. This study evaluates the 
impacts of a business training programme to women clients of a microfinance institution in a 
village in North India using a mixed-method approach where the women were assigned to 
training exogenously. The treatment group from one microfinance institution received thirty-
to-sixty-minute business training sessions during their regular weekly meetings for ten weeks, 
while clients in the control group remained as they were, not subject to any training or other 
development programmes. We examine the impacts of the treatment over two years and 
conduct follow-up interviews to understand the results in greater detail. The results show that 
treatment increased the income of the clients whilst reducing the level of investment. The 
qualitative evidence suggests that these women had aspirations to grow after acquiring capital 
but realised after training that their original investment plans were unnecessarily large in 














A host of research in development economics and entrepreneurship is focused on 
financial constraints, but very little attention has been given to the effects of increasing the 
skills of micro-entrepreneurs - especially women. For instance, empirical studies have 
examined financial constraints with lending experiments (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015; 
Burgess and Pande, 2005), with cash grant experiments, (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 
2008; Karlan, Knight, and Udry, 2015; McKenzie, 2015), and with insurance (Giné, Townsend, 
and Vickery, 2008). Although liberalisation of the financial industry and technological progress 
in the financial sector have increased the availability of financial products to the poor in rural 
India, much of the population, and especially women, are ill-equipped to make informed 
business decisions. It is well established that capital alone cannot guarantee the success of 
microenterprises and that entrepreneurial skills are needed to make efficient use of limited 
capital (Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar, 2010).  
 
Recent years have seen a series of interventions offering business and financial training 
to micro-entrepreneurs. Microfinance institutions (MFIs), governments, NGOs and donors 
often support policies to promote entrepreneurship in order to improve the livelihood of poor 
people and to mitigate poverty. According to MIX Market database, one-third of microfinance 
institutions claim to offer enterprise skills and development training to their clients. However, 
the impact of these business training programmes is often unclear, and more research is 
required to understand the way poor entrepreneurs make their investment decisions (de Mel et 
al. 2008). 
 
Both the need for business training, and the lack of clarity regarding its impact, are 
particularly notable in relation to women. This is due to the fact that gender differences in 
education and/or business networks tend to make women relatively uninformed about 
investment opportunities and untrained in basic cost-benefit analysis (Karlan and Valdivia, 
2011). A patriarchal society (in countries like India) contributes to the low bargaining power 
of women in marriage, which limits their control over finances (Field, Jayachandran and Pande, 
2010). These societies continue to fix rigid gender roles and prescribe behavioural norms that 
are often discriminatory against women in ways which affect commercial outcomes. Local 
traditions - such as forbidding interaction with men outside a woman's family; religious 
practices such as wearing a veil or purdah in Islam (Roomi and Harrison, 2010), and division 
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of labour according to the caste system in Hinduism; and cultural factors such as social 
rejection of women as entrepreneurs; gender discrimination, and family responsibilities - can 
also inhibit the acquisition of entrepreneurial competence (Field et al. 2010; Vinnicombe and 
Singh, 2002). Moreover, less educated women in rural areas lack skills in, and understanding 
of, basic business concepts such as costs, profits, price setting, sales, negotiation, marketing; 
which are needed to run a small business efficiently.  
 
Substantial capital, risk, and effort are needed to start and run a business (Hisrich and 
Peters, 1998). These needs are magnified for women entrepreneurs, who are not only 
competing in a male-dominated domain but are subject to deep-seated discrimination as a result 
of patriarchal socio-cultural values and traditions (Bates, 2002). Women entrepreneurs have 
reported facing more significant and more systemic barriers to accessing formal financial 
services in the developing countries (Rose, 1992; Diagne, Zeller and Sharma, 2000; Narain, 
2009; Mel et al. 2009). Despite the many programmes designed to motivate women’s 
entrepreneurship, relatively few women start and develop their own businesses (Carter, 2000; 
Carter and Rosa, 1998). 
 
One key motivation for providing business training to poor clients in the developing 
world is that it could help them to make better-informed choices regarding their business and 
household finances which in turn could increase their well-being. A strong association has been 
found between financial literacy, business understanding and household well-being (Cole, 
Sampson and Zia, 2009). Good money management is essential for the poor in dealing with 
life-cycle events, meeting day-to-day finances, and reducing vulnerability to income shocks 
(Karmakar, 2011). Without basic levels of business literacy, it is challenging for the uneducated 
poor to use financial services appropriately and with confidence. Furthermore, empirical 
evidence suggests that a lack of access to business education and limited knowledge of money 
management contribute to over-indebtedness (Gathergood, 2012), which perpetuates the cycle 
of poverty and makes the efforts of microfinance lenders redundant. 
 
Past literature has established that women’s entrepreneurial activities make a significant 
contribution to the development of communities, regions and countries (see Brush et al. 2002; 
Dionco-Adetayo, 2005). The establishment and development of women-owned enterprises not 
only contributes to a thriving society - benefiting economic, political and social development; 
but also creates a powerful effect on how women view themselves (Roomi and Harrison, 2010). 
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This leadership of women encourages the dismantling of existing social barriers and 
perceptions of weakness and inferiority which play a pivotal role in women’s liberation, and 
empowers them to realise their respective goals and ambitions. Given the importance of 
entrepreneurship in the development process, it is important to understand how poor business 
decisions are caused by a lack of women’s business skills and hamper the growth of women’s 
micro-enterprises. 
 
Entrepreneurial talent is inherent in all people; but for the potential to be realised, 
awareness, motivation and management abilities must be acquired to address problems and 
take calculated business risks in running day-to-day business operations (Allen and Truman, 
1993). Many of the barriers to developing entrepreneurial capacity which women face could 
be overcome by business training and individual capacity development programmes. 
Knowledge transfer through training could help women to more-efficiently allocate capital and 
labour; to make better business decisions to improve marketing; and, to negotiate help in 
choosing the best financial products according to their needs - and hence enhance their ability 
to perform. In addition to the positive impact on the client´s business and her household, the 
training could also offer benefits for the lending institution. If clients’ businesses improve, they 
are in a better situation to repay their loans, demand more financial capital and expand their 
businesses. Microfinance was introduced as a mechanism to provide credit facilities to the 
poor; however, provision of credit alone - without business and financial knowledge - will not 
be sufficient for enterprises owned by poor borrowers to perform at an optimal level (Kessy 
and Temu, 2010).  
 
Much debate exists in the development finance community regarding whether lenders 
should focus on being sustainable and increasing their outreach before adding the component 
of entrepreneurial training for their clients (MkNelly, Watetip, Lassen, and Dunford, 1996). 
Swain and Varghese (2011) pointed out that microfinance membership is itself a training in 
three ways. First, self-discipline is taught through the structured cycle of working, saving and 
repaying. Second, the project-based approach to microfinance membership increases 
productivity through practice, helping members to self-evaluate, improve and optimise their 
work independent of further investment in human capital. Third, regular meetings create an 
environment where members can share learnings about work-related issues, to improve their 
own activities. Although training may be an extra cost for a microfinance agency in the short 
term (which may well be passed on to clients), it is likely to have a positive long-term impact 
 
 112 
on loan size, repayment and retention. Giné and Mansuri (2014) found training to be profitable 
to the lenders as the number of larger loans demanded by the clients increased without an 
increase in default rates or lending officers' workload. Karlan and Valdivia (2011) found 
similar results in their research, although the benefits came from default reduction and an 
increase in client retention as opposed to demand for larger loans. 
 
In this paper, we investigate one typical training programme to assess the effectiveness 
of integrating business training with microfinance services given to women clients of an MFI 
in a village in Northern India. A randomly chosen group received 30-60 minutes training after 
every weekly meeting for 10 weeks. We conducted a baseline survey before the intervention, 
a follow-up survey one year later and in-depth interviews two years later. We find that the 
treatment significantly reduced the amount of funds invested by the borrower in their 
commercial activity and increased the income of the clients. We found no impact from training 
on most outcomes such as the size of loans or change in value of assets of the borrower and the 
number of working hours per week. We found a mixed impact of training on the level of 
savings.  
 
Almost all of the research regarding the economic impacts of business training on women 
in rural settings are quantitative studies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
that uses a mixed-method approach combining qualitative and quantitative data to evaluate the 
role of business training in women microentrepreneurs. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the related 
literature, and Section 3 details the intervention and its intended effect. Section 4 describes the 
data, Section 5 describes the methodological approach used to establish causal effects of the 
training on a wide variety of outcomes, Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 closes with 
a discussion of results and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
A growing literature has investigated the low level of entrepreneurial skills in the general 
population and how business training can improve business outcomes and household welfare. 
Using a randomised control trial, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) examined the impact of adding 
business training to a group lending program for female microentrepreneurs in Peru. They 
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found that training improved business knowledge, business practices and revenues but the 
results were more mixed regarding real outcomes, such as sales or profit. They observed larger 
effects for the participant that expressed less interest in training in the baseline survey. The 
microfinance institution also benefited from the training through higher repayment and client 
retention rates. Field et al. (2010) studied the constraints to women’s entrepreneurial choices 
and found that training increased business income for upper caste Hindu women who were 
more likely to borrow and engage in labour market activities, whereas the training had no effect 
on lower caste Hindu women or Muslim women. They argued that business training helped 
women whose businesses had been held down by social restrictions, but women subject to 
extreme restrictions could not respond to training as they had little agency to change their 
aspirations. Calderon, Cunha, and Giorgi (2013) offered a 48-hour business skills course to 
female entrepreneurs in rural Mexico and found that training significantly increased profits. 
This was driven by a combination of higher revenues, reduction in costs, greater number of 
clients served and increased use of formal accounting methods. 
 
Several methods of providing training have also been researched. Using a randomised 
controlled trial in Togo, West Africa, Campos et al. (2017) found that a psychology-based 
personal initiative training approach - which teaches and promotes a proactive mindset that 
focuses on entrepreneurial behaviours – increased firms’ profit compared to traditional 
business training. It also boosted innovation helping treated recipients to come up with more 
new products and business ideas than the control group. Mel et al. (2014) tracked the impact 
of two treatments – training only and training plus a cash grant - to women clients over two 
years in Sri Lanka. They found that training improved business practices, but it did not have 
any impact on business profits, sales or capital stock. The grant plus training combination 
increased business profitability in the first year, but the effect was temporary and dissipated in 
the second year. 
 
A few researchers have also studied the impact of training on business start-up and survival. 
Klinger and Schundeln (2011) examined the impact of a training and business development 
programme using data from three Central American countries and found that business training 
was successful in encouraging the creation of new businesses and the expansion of the existing 
ones. Bruhn and Zia (2011) found that business and financial training did not influence business 
survival, but it significantly improved business practices, investments, and loan terms for 
surviving businesses among young entrepreneurs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They observed 
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that businesses in the treatment group were more likely to implement new production processes 
and separate personal and business accounts. 
 
Gender differences in the outcomes of training have also been researched. In their study in 
Pakistan, Giné and Mansuri (2014) found that business training reduced business failure, 
improved business practices, financial and labour allocation decisions among men. Women 
improved their business knowledge but showed no improvement in other outcomes. They 
reported that business training was not cost-effective for the microfinance institution, despite 
having some positive impact on clients. Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2012) evaluated the 
effect of financial grants and a business training program for clients of a microfinance 
institution in Tanzania. Business training substantially improved men’s business practices and 
outcomes, while little effect was found on female entrepreneurs. Roomi and Harrison (2010) 
argue that the women-only training that helps participants to develop capital and competence 
could remove the barriers perceived by women entrepreneur in certain social contexts where 
women are discriminated against, have rare opportunities to learn skills and are subjugated due 
to socio-cultural values and traditions in the name of religion. 
 
Field et al. (2015) used a behavioural approach to training to address social norms. They 
show evidence that the lack of a professional network or peer support are found to affect 
women’s entrepreneurial success negatively. They found women who attained business 
training with a friend, as opposed to those who attended alone, were more likely to have taken 
out a business loan, significantly expanded their businesses, or increased household income 
and expenditure. Those who belonged to more restrictive social groups showed greater 
improvements to peer involvement. 
 
Some studies have focused on increasing financial literacy to improve business outcomes. 
Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2010) conducted a randomised evaluation with a bank in the 
Dominican Republic to track the impact of two treatments - standard accounting training versus 
rule-of-thumb training - that taught basic financial skills to micro-entrepreneurs. They found 
that the rule-of-thumb training had a significantly larger impact than the standard accounting 
training and was more successful in improving firms’ financial practices, reporting quality, and 
revenues. Using a randomised experiment Carpena, Cole, Shapiro, and Zia (2011) examined 
the impact of a five-week comprehensive video-based financial education program with 
modules on savings, credit, insurance and budgeting given to poor households in India. They 
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concluded that treatment significantly improved basic awareness of financial choices and 
attitudes toward financial decisions. However, it did not increase financial numeracy and 
participants struggled to calculate and compare interest returns, insurance costs, or household 
income and expenses. 
 
The issue of building managerial capital through consulting and mentoring has attracted 
increasing attention of late. Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2010) conducted a randomised 
evaluation of consulting services in which small businesses were paired with a local 
management consultant for one year and found that access to management consulting led to 
improvements in firm’s performance in terms of return-on-assets and total factor productivity. 
They found a significant increase in “entrepreneurial spirit” among owners complemented by 
an increase in the number of employees and total wage bill several years after the program. 
Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) examined the impact of consulting 
services on the business practices of large Indian textile firms. The intervention raised the 
average productivity through improved quality, efficiency and reduced inventory; increased 
decentralisation of decision making; and encouraged the use of modern management tools. 
 
In summary, the impact of training is unclear overall, and especially unclear in relation to 
poor women clients receiving microcredit. This paper attempts to extend this line of research 
by investigating the impact of training on women clients on business outcomes and household 
outcomes using data gathered through household surveys and in-depth interviews.  
 
3. The intervention and its intended effect 
 
The intervention: 
The business training course under discussion was developed by a local NGO working in 
the region focused on women issues. The training programme was designed to meet the needs 
of women with a focus on improving financial literacy, business skills, women's rights, and 
health. The training sessions lasted thirty-to-sixty-minutes after every meeting and were 
compulsory. The attendance rate was high, and most women attended all ten sessions 
demonstrating a willingness to learn business management practices.  
 
Although most of the training was related to business and financial literacy, two sessions 
were focused on women’s rights, the legal rights of business owners, health and other social 
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aspects. The business training focused on marketing, identifying customers, investment, record 
keeping, purchasing of equipment, costing, stock control, and financial planning. Financial 
literacy covered aspects of budgeting, saving, profit, separating business expenses from 
household expenses, meeting financial goals, debt management, understanding costs and the 
risks associated with borrowing money, comparing loan terms and conditions to get the best 
loan products, calculating rate of interests and instalments, and understanding the consequences 
of delinquency and default. All of the sessions were taught by qualified local instructors.  
 
The intended effect: 
The main aim of the business training is to improve the business outcomes and welfare of 
the clients, with a secondary goal of benefit to the microfinance institution. These 
improvements should lead to more investment in the client’s business and increased demand 
for capital. In addition, there may be improvements in household outcomes: increases in 
savings, personal income and the value of assets. Some common business indicators such as 
profit, or sales were considered but discarded. In very small – especially agricultural - 
businesses, levels of profit and sales volume tended to vary dramatically with season and 
weather; while less financially-literate respondents could not provide reliable periodic 
accounting data. 
 
Better performing businesses may demand more services and may be less likely to default 
if they are satisfied due to better loan terms, higher cash flow, or a stronger feeling of 
reciprocity (Karlan and Valdivia, 2011). On the other hand, well-informed clients could better 
allocate their capital and labour efficiently. However, stronger businesses may graduate to 
larger formal sector banks beyond the need for MFI services, and thus the business training 




This evaluation uses three key data sources: a baseline survey, an endline survey one year later 
and in-depth interviews with 18 participants two years later.  
 
The quantitative study covered a random sample of 211 women who were clients of three 
MFIs, a co-operative society, and a small number of professional money lenders, collected 
through two household surveys taken in 2015 and 2016 (see timeline in the appendix), in the 
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village Thol (and its surrounding area) in the state of Haryana. The survey collected information 
regarding income, loans, investment, health, household composition, education, employment, 
assets, and other variables43.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of occupations of the participants 
Occupation % of whole 
sample 
% Treatment  % Control 
Agriculture (Crops) 13 18 13 
Livestock 34 40 34 
Cloth-making 11 10 11 
Shops 18 22 16 
Business Investment 10 4 12 
Other small businesses such as pottery, basket 
making etc. 
12 6 14 
 
All three MFIs use a version of the Grameen group lending model. Like the Grameen model, 
borrowers are asked to form a group of five, and subsequently, the group members are expected 
to monitor each other’s repayment as well as coordinate some activities (such as collection of 
repayment) to reduce the operational cost of the MFI. The repayment is collected by a loan 
officer during the weekly/monthly meeting of the group and a record is kept in individual 
passbooks. SKS MFI clients meet in a group of 50 to repay their instalments two times 
(Tuesday and Satuday) every week. The group that meets on Tuesday every week was 
randomly selected by the microfinance institution and a local NGO for the purpose of providing 
business training. We compare this chosen group with a similar SKS MFI group that meets on 
Saturday every week as well as clients from other MFIs (Utkarsh and Janlaxmi), a cooperative 
society, and professional money lenders working in the area. Hence, we have three control 
groups. Control I which consists of clients from SKS microfinance only who did not receive 
the training. Control II consists of all the clients from Control I and clients from other MFIs 
(Utkarsh and Janlaxmi) who did not get the training. Control III which consists of everyone in 
our sample who did not receive the training. 
 
 
                                                 
43 See chapter 2 for more details on the village, women and lenders and their loan structures 
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 Table 2: Various treatment and control group 
 
Treatment SKS MFI clients who received the training 
Control I SKS MFI clients who did not receive the training 
Control II  Control I + Utkarsh and Janlaksmi clients 
Control III Control II + borrowers from Co-operative society and other 
informal sources 
 
We also check if the probability of receiving training was ex-ante same for all borrowers 
using a probit model for the data collected at the baseline. We find that individual and 
household characteristics have no effect on the probability of receiving a training confirming 
that randomisation was successful (see table 7 in the appendix). 
 
From Table 3 below, we can see that treatment and control groups are not significantly 
different from each other. The average woman in our sample is 31.77 years old who have 
completed 5.5 years of education and lived in the village for 12 years. At the baseline, the 
average client had a total loan (from all sources) of Rs 30,540, have invested Rs 39,210, earned 
an annual income of Rs 35,810, saved Rs 690 in the last month and spent Rs 3,400 on food per 
month44.  
 
Table 3 below shows the means, standard deviation and p-values of key financial, 
household, and individual characteristics of the control and various treatment group.  The p-
value suggests that control and treatment groups are not significantly different from each other 
for most variables. 
                                                 
44 Consumption expenditure on food calculated by average monthly spending on rice, flour, milk and dairy products, pulses, 
vegetables, oil and spices. 
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Table 3: Baseline Summary Statistics (Year 2015)  
 
p-values for differences of means against the treatment. 
Amount of loan, consumption, investment, savings, income, and assets value are described in terms of Rs 1000s.
VARIABLES All  Training (Only SKS)  Control I (Only SKS)  Control II (All MFIs)  Control III (All) 
 Mean Mean SD Mean SD p-value Mean SD p-value Mean SD p-value 
Loan Amount 30.54 32.52 10.38 37.17 14.51 0.07 30.95 13.20 0.45 29.92 14.64 0.24 
Months with Lender 8.58 9.12 2.00 10.52 2.35 0.00 9.29 2.06 0.62 8.41 2.69 0.09 
Assets Value 101.56 101.60 41.86 104.20 44.62 0.76 94.57 45.93 0.35 101.55 54.16 1.00 
Income (client) 35.81 33.92 11.61 36.26 11.71 0.32 36.64 11.90 0.18 36.39 12.59 0.22 
Income (Household) 124.36 122.84 30.30 127.46 31.14 0.45 125.09 28.99 0.65 124.84 28.98 0.67 
Savings last month 0.69 0.70 0.42 0.78 0.55 0.42 0.72 0.49 0.83 0.69 0.49 0.89 
Consumption on food 
per month 
3.40 3.30 1.18 3.44 0.92 0.51 3.43 1.06 0.48 3.44 1.01 0.41 
Level of Investment  39.21 43.40 18.28 38.10 16.43 0.13 38.16 23.72 0.17 37.91 33.59 0.27 
Age 31.77 32.40 6.39 31.80 4.32 0.58 31.69 4.27 0.40 31.57 4.36 0.30 
Education years 5.53 5.10 3.38 5.36 2.74 0.67 5.21 3.01 0.84 5.66 3.05 0.27 
Hours worked/week 31.98 29.66 11.58 31.60 12.07 0.41 33.36 12.59 0.08 32.70 12.75 0.13 
Years in village 12.14 13.04 6.56 12.22 4.31 0.46 11.99 4.27 0.22 11.86 4.35 0.14 
Size of the HH 5.01 4.98 0.87 5.12 0.66 0.37 5.09 0.74 0.42 5.02 0.74 0.72 
 Observations  211  50   50     111    161    
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Qualitative data was collected from a sub-sample of 18 participants from the treatment group 
randomly chosen for interviews to examine the perceived impact of training. The interviews were 
conducted at the clients' house in the presence of a local social worker who helped with translation 
and conversation. The interviews lasted around an hour. Permission to interview clients was 
obtained from them and their family as well as from the head of the village (sarpanch). Consent 
was taken in witnessed verbal rather than written form. The interviews followed a semi-structured 
approach, giving participants the flexibility to discuss issues important to them. All the client 




In order to meet the study objectives, we used an embedded design approach (Creswell and 
Clark, 2017) where we embedded qualitative data within a quantitative methodology. Here, the 
qualitative data plays a supplemental role within the overall design. By interviewing the 
participants from the treatment group, we aim to better interpret the findings of the intervention 











Figure 1: Embedded design for mixed-method evaluation 
 
In our research, quantitative methods were used to assess causality through econometric 
analysis. To isolate the causal impact of the training, we estimated a series of difference-in-







 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾(𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝑖𝑡 ……………….. (1) 
 
Where Yit denotes an outcome variable for client i at the time t, T is a dummy for getting training, 
POST is an indicator for the post-intervention period, and ε denotes an error term. The average 
treatment effect is given by 𝛾 in the above equation. Differences-in-differences (DiD) allow us to 
compare the change before and after this intervention against the same change in the other 
untreated group. In addition, the DiD estimator requires that in the absence of treatment, the 
difference between control and treatment groups would be constant over time (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008). This is the key identification assumption of DiD and is known as the common (or 
parallel) trend assumption. It is not possible to test this assumption – since we cannot observe the 
treated group in the absence of treatment. However, since randomisation has assured that there are 
no significant differences between control and treatment, we can argue that any differences in post-
treatment can be causally attributed to the treatment and our estimator provides an unbiased 
estimate of the impact of business training.  
 
Quantitative studies sometimes overlook a lot of personal information: for example, 
information about sensitive issues such as discrimination, cultural and traditional practices. 
Sometimes the information collected is inaccurate or incomplete because the participant is illiterate 
and cannot recall the figures for important variables. Quantitative surveys also lack information 
on contextual factors to explain variations in behaviour between households with similar economic 
and demographic characteristics (Bamberger, 2000). Moreover, a method which relies solely on 
quantitative data is inflexible as it is hard to modify instruments once the study begins.  
 
The underlying assumption of a mixed-methods approach is that the integration of qualitative 
and quantitative methods can address some research questions more comprehensively and may 
generate deeper insights than by using either of the two methods independently (Moffatt et al. 
2006, Rao and Woolcock, 2003). By only using quantitative study, development economists may 
constrain their ability to understand critical economic issues embedded in the social, cultural and 
political landscape. For instance, an analysis of an informal economy may fail to notice marginal 
work crucial for policy-making – such as the market for drugs, sex, and political favours which 
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requires a strong rapport with the respondent – rapport that a short visit to field a questionnaire 
will not provide (Bamberger, Rao and Woolcock, 2010). 
 
Given some of the weaknesses of a quantitative study, there is a need in the field of 
development studies to incorporate qualitative study along with quantitative analysis. To 
complement the quantitative results, qualitative data was collected using semi-structured 
interviews to explore participants views about the intervention and its outcome, to understand the 




We divided the analysis into various categories of business and household outcomes. Our 
primary focus was on the level of investment, income, size of the loan and return on investment. 
The richness of our survey also allows us to measure the treatment effect on other secondary 
business outcomes such as hours worked per week; and household outcomes such as income, 
assets, and savings.  
Level of investment 
Table 4: Impact of training on level of Investment: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of 
Investment 
CONTROL I CONTROL I CONTROL II CONTROL II CONTROL III CONTROL 
III 
       
Business 
Training  
-0.087 -0.215 -0.277** -0.344*** -0.314** -0.392*** 
(0.176) (0.166) (0.132) (0.123) (0.129) (0.121) 
      
Covariates  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Observations 200 200 332 332 422 422 
R-squared 0.200 0.356 0.161 0.322 0.132 0.287 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Covariates include age, education years, size of the household, quality of house, loan source dummy, months 




The results in Table 4 shows that the treatment decreased the level of investment by 31 % (without 
covariates, Column 5) and 39 % (with covariates, Column 6) for Control III sample and 27 % 
(without covariates, Column 3) and 34 % (with covariates, Column 4) for the Control II sample. 
The coefficient is negative but not significant for the Control I sample.  
 
It is important to stress that these results do not necessarily negate the value of the training. 
One possible cause for this result could be that clients realise that they have limited knowledge 
and are ill-suited to run larger businesses - and hence cut down their investment and shed 
unproductive assets. The qualitative evidence confirms this result that the business training made 
clients more aware of negative factors like risk, competition, consequences of default etc., resulting 
in a more cautious approach. 
 
One of the respondents to our interview said: 
 
“After getting the classes (training), I realised how much resources would be needed to scale up 
my business. There is also huge competition in my business, not just from women but from other 
men (with better attributes) as well. I am not experienced or qualified to deal with the risk of 
investing a large sum of money in the business at this stage. Now I am focused on better utilisation 
of the resources I have.” 
 
Another respondent said: 
 
“Training motivated me but also helped me to understand my customer and the market. I realised 
I cannot just increase my sales with more investment.” 
 
This is an important result which might have long-run implications as the clients may 
otherwise fall into a debt trap if their entrepreneurial project fails after heavy investment. So, by 
understanding their ability and risks involved in running a business, clients are in a better position 
to manage their finances and investments. It might be possible that these women had unrealistic 
aspirations to grow after acquiring capital but realised after training that they did not have the 
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capacity to expand the business in a small market. Our findings are opposite to the one by Bruhn 
and Zia (2011) who found that training increased the level of investment among young 
entrepreneurs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Level of income 
Table 5: Impact of training on level of Income: 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Income CONTROL I CONTROL I CONTROL II CONTROL II CONTROL III CONTROL III 
       
Business 
Training 
0.226* 0.243** 0.223** 0.280*** 0.233*** 0.293*** 
(0.125) (0.114) (0.115) (0.112) (0.116) (0.112) 
       
Covariates  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Observations 200 200 332 332 422 422 
R-squared 0.105 0.353 0.103 0.349 0.090 0.359 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Covariates include age, education years, size of the household, log of level of investment, quality of house, and 
caste dummies. 
 
Table 5 shows that the training increased the level of income for all the treatment group. Despite 
reducing investment, an increase in income could be due to an increase in efficiency and cost 
cutting through improved business practices learned through training.  
 
Our results were echoed by one recipient of training: 
 
“The programme taught me how to manage my costs and inventory. I understood the risks and 
costs associated with borrowing. Syncing borrowing during peak season in line with buying stock 




A number of women in our interviews linked training with diversifying their income through 
experimentation with new business opportunities. Two respondents said: 
 
“Training helped me to understand the market and encouraged me to make use of the existing 
resources. The case study in training gave me an idea to put my savings in something unfamiliar 
but profitable business. Since I noticed the price of chicken always increase in the winters, I 
invested some of my loans in setting up a small chicken poultry farm in our allotment which does 
not require much attention. I sold the chicken when the price was high.” 
 
 “Business training informed me of various investment schemes with greater returns. The 
implementation support given in the training helped me reduce the costs and wastage of resources. 
I learned how to make the most of my resources such as converting my backyard into a small 
vegetable garden.” 
 
Another respondent linked training to a reduction in business operating costs and increase in 
efficiency:  
 
“Training provided me with the confidence for negotiating prices, earlier I would accept any 
price given by the seller. I also learned how to price my products with changes in demand. Keeping 
an account of expenses helped me to understand my business spending. By putting what I learned 
in the training into practice, I greatly reduced my costs and achieved the financial goals I set.” 
 
This is similar to the study by Field et al. (2010) who evaluated a two-day training program for 
clients of an Indian microfinance institution found that training program increased the personal 
labour income of the clients.  
 
Size of loans  
Table 6: Impact of training on the amount of loan: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Loan CONTROL I CONTROL I CONTROL II CONTROL II CONTROL III CONTROL III 
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Business 
Training 
0.006 0.023 -0.156 -0.122 -0.081 -0.118 
(0.125) (0.122) (0.097) (0.093) (0.141) (0.129) 
       
Covariates  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Observations 200 200 332 332 422 422 
R-squared 0.229 0.348 0.167 0.303 0.102 0.305 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Covariates include age, education years, size of the household, quality of house, loan source dummy, months 
with lenders, and caste dummies. 
 
The results in Table 6 shows that the training did not have any effect on the loan size. This 
raises the question of why - if training reduces investment - the loan size has not reduced. It is 
possible that trainees gained a better understanding of concepts like cash-flow, reserves of working 
capital, and risk avoidance – and hence borrowed contingency funds which were not directly 
invested in the business. Several women indicated that they felt a sense of security in having 
additional capital available, even when their business plans did not demand it. Further research 
would be needed to determine if this need for a financial comfort blanket was gender-linked or 
associated with the poor background of the borrowers, who saw unequivocal value in having funds 
in reserve, regardless of the costs incurred in interest. This also suggests that size of loan is 
influenced by combination of factors and not simply dependent on the investment needs of the 
business.  
 
These results are similar to previous studies where Karlan and Valdivia (2011), Drexler et 
al. (2012) and Bruhn and Zia (2012) found no significant impacts of training on the likelihood of 
taking loans or loan size. However, Giné and Mansuri (2014) found that training leads to a 16 % 
increase in loan size for male clients but a reduction in loan size for females.  Our results are 
opposed to the findings of Valdivia (2012) in Peru, which found that training led to an increased 





Return on Investment 
An alternative measure of business profitability is return on investment (income -investment), 
which evaluates the efficiency of investment. Table 7 shows that the training significantly 
increased the return on investment for all the treatment groups. This suggests that the borrowers 
who got training benefitted from it greatly.  
 
Table 7: Impact of training on return on investment: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Loan CONTROL I CONTROL I CONTROL II CONTROL II CONTROL III CONTROL III 
       
Business 
Training 
10.76*** 10.73** 13.06*** 13.04*** 13.73*** 13.71*** 
(4.12) (4.14) (3.84) (3.86) (4.06) (4.10) 
       
Covariates  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Observations 200 200 332 332 422 422 
R-squared 0.47 0.49 0.32 0.34 0.20 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  




We do not see a corresponding shift downward in average hours per week worked by women 
where the coefficient is positive but not significant (see Table 9 in the appendix), which indicates 
that treated clients may be spending more hours on their business per unit of investment. Since 
income has increased for the treated clients, it may have increased their working hours as well. 
Our interviews suggest that it may be because it takes more time to adapt to better business 
practices whose benefits we may see in the long run. 
 




I am doing things like the way madam (the trainer) suggested. I go to various suppliers to match 
the price and negotiate to get the best deal for myself. At the end of the day, I record all the sales, 
expenses and profits to see if I am better staying at my shop or working as an agricultural labour. 
 
These findings are similar to Karlan and Valdivia (2011) who found no change in the number 
of workers, family or hired, employed at the family business. Calderon et al. (2013) also found no 
differential in terms of hours worked per week by the treated entrepreneur. 
 
We find no impact of training on the value of assets (non-land) or on the savings (similar to 
Karlan and Valdivia 2011) except with the Control I sample significant only at 10 % (see Table 9 
in the appendix). We did not measure the impact of training on business practices and financial 
literacy since existing research has already strongly demonstrated a positive relationship between 
them and additional evidence would offer little value. 
 
It was generally assumed that this kind of training provides the knowledge that would help 
clients develop skills to run their businesses in a way which would help them to grow and have a 
positive impact on the household and business outcomes. If growth was supposed to be achieved 
by expansion of business through investment, our results suggest the opposite. Though there may 
be a positive side to the findings. Training may have helped the clients to avoid misallocation of 
capital and labour through over-investment by learning about their limited skills. Loans represent 
a cost as well as a benefit, and if clients learn how to manage their cash flows better, they perhaps 
will need less debt.  
 
Spillover: 
The simple comparison of outcomes of participants and non-participants only gives a consistent 
estimate of the programme’s effectiveness when there are no spillovers between participants and 
non-participants. Spillover problems arise whenever one individual is affected by the treatment 





In our research spillovers can occur in two ways. Firstly, treated clients could pass on the 
knowledge to the borrowers in the control group or those who did not get the training could copy 
some of the techniques or new products introduced by clients that have participated in the training. 
Secondly, if the gains from the treatments are mainly due to taking business from the control group 
borrowers, then the assumption that outcomes of each firm are not affected by the treatment 
statuses of other firms is violated. As a result, the experimental estimate no longer provides the 
average impact of training for the sample population.  
 
Our interviews with the clients suggest that spillover effects will be low in our research since 
the women who got the training were selected to be in a group of five of the people they knew and 
trusted the most. Interactions with other women in most cases were very unlikely; hence, the 
probability of passing the training knowledge to other borrowers is very low. However, our 
experimental design does not allow us to examine if the treatment borrowers are taking business 
from the control group. To investigate this issue, more information is needed. Experimental 
variation in the intensity of the treatment within different geographical areas could be used to test 
for and measure these spillovers (McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008). A first attempt in this direction 
for business training is found in Calderon et al. (2013), who randomly assigned 17 villages into 7 
treatment villages and 10 control villages, with half the individuals in the treated villages assigned 
to training. They did not find any spillover effects on business knowledge despite the small size of 
the village where firms mostly make or sell goods for local consumption. However, a large impact 
on the use of formal accounting methods was discovered for the control group.  
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Business training programmes like the one described in this paper aim to improve clients' 
income and to end the cycle of low investment by the owners of microenterprises by teaching basic 
financial and marketing practices, yet the impact of such programmes is mixed. In this paper, we 
investigate whether a training and business development programme can improve business 
outcomes such as the level of investment, income and loan size; and improve household outcomes 
such as the level of savings, hours worked, and assets. For this, we examine the impact of business 




A general view is that capital alone cannot overcome the barriers to increase in business 
investment; and that micro-entrepreneurs need basic business skills to make efficient use of limited 
capital. We find that business training reduced the level of investment in the business. Our 
interviews suggest that women may have realised through training that their original investment 
plans were unnecessarily large in relation to their business goals; and they understood more clearly 
the risks of growing their business too quickly. If this is true, then the treatment group will benefit 
in the long run. The women in the control group with higher investments may quit their businesses 
after suffering losses realising that they are not equipped to manage such level of investments. 
This is an important result which might have long run implications in terms of market dynamics 
as well; for example, the disappearance of control group businesses might allow treated businesses 
to grow to a more efficient scale. Calderon et al. (2013) found that training induced the low-ability 
entrepreneurs to quit their businesses whereas the most significant effects are recorded amongst 
the high ability entrepreneurs. However, we cannot be sure that the decrease in the level of 
investment accompanied by an increase in income is a positive thing. It could also be true that an 
increase in income today comes from a decrease in the income of the future.  
 
The increase in income for the treatment group, despite reducing investment, is likely to 
come from an increase in efficiency - through cost-cutting brought about by improved business 
practices learned from training. Surprisingly, training did not reduce the amount of loan for the 
treated group, even though it reduced the level of investment. One possible reason that treated 
clients gained a better understanding of concepts like cash-flow, reserves of working capital, and 
risk avoidance – and hence borrowed contingency funds which were not directly invested in the 
business. Regarding other outcomes, we found no impact of treatment on assets worth, and the 
average hours worked per week.  
 
In similar studies to ours, the question generally asked is whether we can improve the 
likelihood of business success by improving entrepreneurial skills through training. Some of these 
studies go further by asking if entrepreneurship can be taught or if it is a personal trait that 
entrepreneurs are born with (Klinger and Schundeln, 2011). The evidence suggests that lack of 
entrepreneurship hinders economic growth. Business success here is measured by the expansion 
of a business through an increase in investment. If this argument is to be considered, our results 
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suggest that in this case business training failed to help these micro-entrepreneurs ‘grow’. 
However, the income of the treated clients has significantly increased without increasing 
investment. It may be because treated clients are perhaps more efficient and productive after 
getting the training. Alternatively, training may have made businesses more robust, and better able 
to deal with market disruptions – this is supported by the fact that loan size remained constant 
while investment decreased. 
 
We also acknowledge that we need to be patient with these complex interventions to allow 
them the time they need for their full impacts to materialise. Results can differ in the long term. 
De Mel et al. (2012) found that the impact of training differs in the short and medium term in their 
study. They found that business training for women out of the labour force led to significant 
increases in business entry in the first year, whereas, control group caught up in terms of business 
ownership rate after 16 and 25 months. Hence, a long-term study is needed to check this 
assumption. 
 
Another concern relates to the unexpected failure to find improvements in some key 
outcomes. This may arise through a variety of causes. Firstly, it simply may not be possible to 
transfer the necessary practical skills through training alone. Secondly, it may reflect failures in 
this specific intervention: possibly weaknesses in the training content or quality of delivery. 
Thirdly, the failures may have arisen due to client attitudes: possibly undervaluing the training 
because it was offered free of charge.  As there was no mechanism in place to check how much 
knowledge the clients absorbed – no formal assessment of learning – it was not possible to directly 
evaluate whether the training itself was successful. More research is needed on this aspect.  
 
Despite the results put forward in this research, the question regarding the impact of business 
training remains critical for further studies. Future research needs to focus on the following aspects 
to get a precise assessment of the value of training - some measure of knowledge transfers at the 
completion of training, some measure of spillover from treatment to control groups (an assessment 
of changes in knowledge in the control group); additional interviews across the treatment and 
control group over time to identify the rationale and causation behind the changes in outcomes. 
Future studies should also explore different type of training mechanism and delivery methods 
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according to the education and knowledge level of the participants. This need was echoed in our 
interviews where some of the women found some of the training material to be very elementary. 
Hence, designing a training approach suited to the ability of the participants to absorb the training 
content would be beneficial in understanding the entrepreneurial behaviour of the clients. Since 
our findings are based on the sample of women in Haryana, North India, we do not recommend 
generalising the results beyond this selected group of women. 
 
We argue that the methodological strategy advocated by a mixed-method approach involving 
qualitative and quantitative data collection, analysis and verifying econometric impact survey 
findings through in-depth interviews have enhanced the overall quality of the evidence base. For 
policy purposes, large econometric impact assessment continues to be important, but they are too 
complicated, time-consuming, inflexible and expensive. To understand how and why some 
interventions work, and what can be done to improve the situation, the addition of qualitative 
analysis to quantitative approach is certainly helpful and possible necessary. Hence, we make a 
case for a mixed-method approach which can generate a deeper analytical and interpretative 
framework than could be obtained by using either quantitative or qualitative methods alone.  
 
8. Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Jan15             Training                                     Follow up                               Qualitative Survey 
|_______|__________|_________________|________|_______________|___________| 
                  Oct15-Dec15                               Dec16-Feb17                         Dec17-Jan 18 
                     
                 Collection of the 
                   baseline data 












Education years -0.036 
 (0.039) 
Age at marriage 0.629 
 (33.836) 
House quality -0.198 
 (0.254) 
General caste -0.198 
 (0.334) 
SC or ST -0.082 
 (0.270) 
Months with the lender 0.075 
 (0.050) 
Years in the village 0.680 
 (33.836) 
House worked per week 0.006 
 (0.010) 
Number of sons 0.434 
 (0.273) 






Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Table 9: Impact of Business Training 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




       
Log Savings       
Training 0.130* 0.117* 0.037 0.013 0.016 -0.018 
(0.072) (0.068) (0.063) (0.058) (0.062) (0.055) 
R-squared 0.174 0.348 0.198 0.389 0.207 0.424 
 
Log Assets 
      
Training 0.086 0.048 0.022 -0.011 0.043 0.005 
(0.111) (0.086) (0.103) (0.089) (0.100) (0.086) 




      
Training 2.760 2.817 1.717 1.990 1.897 2.185 
 (2.999) (2.955) (2.680) (2.500) (2.646) (2.487) 
R-squared 0.030 0.103 0.039 0.113 0.027 0.108 
       
Covariates  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 200 200 332 332 422 422 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Covariates include age, education years, size of the household, quality of house, loan source dummy, months 











Make Microfinance Great Again: Does Flexibility in Repayments 




Microfinance has been traditionally intended to benefit borrowers – especially poor borrowers; 
however, recent evaluations of microfinance products have found limited evidence of the 
transformative effects claimed by its proponents. Anecdotally, many borrowers typically blame 
the contract models used to manage the loans. Most microfinance institutions follow a rigid non-
negotiable contract model where every client must repay in fixed weekly instalments starting 
immediately after disbursement of the loan. These offer no flexibility to borrowers who are poor 
and have seasonal income. Previous research has also shown that such contracts can affect the 
economic well-being of poor borrowers leading to underinvestment of capital, selling of 
productive assets, over-indebtedness through cross-financing from informal sources, reduction in 
consumption, income, and in some cases, a deterioration in the borrowers' mental health arising 
from stress and worry. If lenders offered more flexibility in loan repayment schedules, would it 
help to overcome some of these problems? To explore this, we tested whether clients' business and 
household outcomes were sensitive to various repayment schedules using a mixed-method 
approach collecting quantitative and qualitative data from the clients of three microfinance 
institutions, a cooperative society and a few local traders specialised in business lending in a village 
in North India. We analysed alternatives to the rigid contract model, focussing on the degree of 
flexibility and the length of gap between repayments in the loan schedule. This study finds that 
flexible and monthly repayment schedules increased the level of business investment compared to 
a weekly repayment schedule; however, this did not translate into an increase in income for the 
borrower. The study also finds that clients on a monthly repayment schedule tended to borrow 
more and save more than clients on a weekly repayment reschedule. Based on the results, this 






Microfinance, an innovative provision of financial services for those without access to traditional 
formal banking, is often hailed as one of the most promising tools for fighting against global 
poverty. It has generated global attention over the last two decades, especially since the UN 
declared 2005 the 'Year of Microcredit' and the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank. It is frequently claimed that by providing the poor with 
cheap credit for self-employment, microfinance can improve the economic and social conditions 
of borrowers (see Nobel Peace Prize 2006 citation). This has led to a significant expansion of this 
sector in the last decade. According to the World Bank (2015), several thousand microfinance 
organisations globally were lending between $60-100 million to around 200 million clients.  There 
are 32.5 million of these clients in India, and 90 percent of them are women (MFIN Micrometer, 
2016).  
 
Despite the popularity of microfinance, empirical evidence suggests that access to microcredit 
programmes has a limited impact on clients' lives (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; Banerjee, 
Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan, 2015; Karlan and Zinman, 2009). This is particularly surprising 
given the substantial evidence that credit constraints limit the expansions of small businesses 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2012) and that borrowers’ returns to capital in microenterprises are high (De 
Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2008). A growing body of evidence suggests that the participation 
rate in many microfinance programs remains low (Banerjee et al., 2015), dropout rates are high, 
and the demand for larger loan sizes is less (Meyer, 2002). There is clearly a paradox here: if the 
borrowers need the loans, and the loans appear to benefit the borrowers, why are the borrowers 
still reluctant to engage? 
 
One of the reasons is that the rigid weekly repayment structures generally offered by 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) have failed to meet the investment needs of poor borrowers - 
especially those who have seasonal and irregular income and cash flow. The use of a classic 
microcredit contract with immediate and frequent (weekly) repayment obligations - in order to 
reduce defaults and instil fiscal discipline (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; Jain and Mansuri, 
2003; Meyer, 2002) - may actually inhibit investment and reduce the ability of poor clients to 
extricate themselves from poverty.  
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A standard microfinance contract includes a small initial loan, fixed and regular repayments 
usually starting within a week of first disbursement, progressively larger lending and zero 
tolerance toward default (Labie, Laureti, and Szafarz, 2013). However, MFI clients are almost 
always poor with irregular income throughout the year. This frequently results in a cash flow 
disconnect when a repayment is due. Sometimes clients resort to selling productive assets, labour 
or crops in advance (Khandker, 2012), underinvesting (Field, Pande, and Papp, 2010), skipping 
meals and reducing consumption (Shoji, 2010) only to then borrow from local money lenders at a 
very high interest rate (Jain and Mansuri, 2003) in order to repay loan instalments to the MFI. 
Considering this, there are clear potential benefits for clients in having a loan contract that either 
lets them align their repayments with their income; or have a longer gap between repayments.  
 
This paper analyses the effect of various repayment structures on borrowers entrepreneurial and 
household outcomes45. More specifically, we compare the rigid weekly repayment schedules with 
two alternatives – first, a monthly repayment schedule instead of weekly one; and second, a 
flexible repayment structure tailored to borrowers’ needs. The study utilises a mixed-method 
approach collecting quantitative and qualitative data from the clients of three microfinance 
institutions, a cooperative society and a few local traders specialised in business lending in a village 
in North India.  
 
For the sake of clarity, we should establish some of the key loan characteristics under 
consideration. Microfinance loans in India are generally intended for poor borrowers with 
negligible credit history and little financial literacy (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2011). It has 
therefore been usual for MFIs to design and implement their lending in such a way that helps 
borrowers to learn financial discipline and prudence. In practice, this means that the schedule of 
repayment must be frequent, and the terms of repayment must be rigid: hence the default 
repayment scheme for micro-loans is invariably weekly and non-negotiable. The schedule 
typically requires a borrower to start their repayments immediately after receiving the loan.  In this 
paper, this is what we mean by a 'traditional' repayment scheme, and we contrast this approach 
                                                 
45 We measure outcomes such as level of investment, loan amount, average annual income, savings in the last 
month, consumption expenditure on food in the last month, change in the value of non-land assets of the borrower 




with other more 'flexible' schedules. There is clearly a difficulty in comparing traditional loans 
with flexible loans, as 'flexible' loans may by definition vary widely in their terms, schedules, 
conditions and rigour. There is no such thing as a single 'flexible' loan.  We will, therefore, consider 
two alternatives to the traditional approach - at opposite ends of the flexibility spectrum. The first 
direct comparison is with monthly (infrequent) repayment schemes - offered by some MFIs - but 
we also draw less-direct comparisons with the highly flexible credit which is often available from 
local lenders such as cooperative societies and traders - with access to local information and insight 
- can tailor both their products and their repayment terms to individual borrowers' needs and 
circumstances over time.  
 
The results from this study provide rigorous evidence that clients’ investment and other 
business and household outcomes are sensitive to the repayment obligations. Borrowers with 
monthly and flexible repayments have a higher level of investment and savings compared to those 
with fixed weekly schedules. Monthly repaying clients have a higher loan amount and are less 
likely to take an additional loan from external sources compared to weekly repaying clients. 
 
The rest of the study is organised as follows.  Section 2 gives some background on various 
repayment structures; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 presents the methodology, Section 5 




Collins et al. (2009, p. 181) describe product flexibility as the “ease with which transactions 
can be reconciled with cash-flows”. Labie et al., (2013) emphasises that flexibility can take 
different forms and distinguishes three types of flexibility: ex-ante, ex-post, and full flexibility. 
With ex-ante flexibility, financial terms are adapted to a client's expected cash-flow in advance 
seeking to remove uncertainty in repayment expectations. With ex-post flexibility, alterations to a 
pre-established transaction plan are allowed in response to an unfavourable outcome. With full 
flexibility, there is no predetermined repayments plan and repayments can be authorised at any 




In designing microcredit products, MFIs do not usually seek to provide flexibility as they are 
afraid that flexibility might break the repayment discipline of borrowers, resulting in higher default 
rates. However, the evidence is mixed regarding default rates. Using a field experiment in West 
Bengal, India, Field et al. (2010) found that flexibility in microfinance contracts in terms of 
introducing a grace period of two months significantly increased borrower defaults.  On the other 
hand, in their study in Madgascar, Weber and Musshoff (2017) found that loan delinquencies of 
farmers with flexible loans and repayment grace periods are not much different from those of 
farmers with standard loans. In a randomised experiment with microfinance borrowers in Uttar 
Pradesh, India, Barboni and Agarwal (2018) offered borrowers of treated branches the opportunity 
to self-select between the standard, rigid contract and a more expensive flexible contract compared 
to the control branches who were offered the standard rigid contract. They found that the clients 
in treated branches had higher repayment rates and higher business sales. 
 
It is worth stressing that the high repayment rates proclaimed by the microfinance industry do 
not necessarily mean that their customers are doing better, nor does it reflect the struggles clients 
face while repaying debt obligation through rigid instalments. Often, MFIs resort to coercion and 
high-pressure tactics for loan recovery (Karim, 2011) which have in some instances resulted in 
suicide by borrowers in India (Biswas, 2010). Borrowers who default on repayments also face 
being barred from any future access to loans, as well as a range of further social penalties including 
humiliation, social pressure, verbal hostility, harassment, shame, and loss of face among 
community members (Sett, 2015).  When potential borrowers have a high level of fear about 
defaulting, this affects the level of participation: potential borrowers either do not borrow, borrow 
less, or drop out of the scheme early (Boucher and Guirkinger, 2007; de Janvry, Sadoulet, 
Coulibaly, and Abordonado, 2013). Even when clients manage to repay weekly instalments on 
time, the lack of autonomy or loss of control over their actions due to the lack of flexibility in the 
repayment schedule could lead to sub-optimal task performance, lower motivational levels and 
lower experienced of well-being (Chakravarti, 2006; Moller, Ryan, and Deci, 2006). 
 
The use of rigid frequent repayments in microfinance is also related to over-indebtedness by 
cross-financing of repayments from informal sources and discouraging credible borrowers from 
taking out further loans. Jain and Mansuri (2003) found that the use of frequent repayments 
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expanded the volume of informal lending and raised interest rates in the informal sector. Pearlman 
(2010) argues that a lack of flexibility in microfinance contracts could be the reason for borrowers 
avoiding using formal credit providers, and instead continue to rely on informal moneylenders. 
Karlan and Mullainathan (2006) observed that rigid contract schedules constrain loan size and 
deter some solvent borrowers from taking out loans. Rahman (1999) found that many households 
in his study village in Bangladesh used income from agriculture or wage labour, sold assets and 
reduced household consumption in order to finance their weekly instalments. 
 
Early initiation of repayment may also lead to entrepreneurs underinvesting in their businesses 
since they are often obliged to set aside a portion of the loan at the outset for immediate repayment. 
A rigid repayment structure demanding frequent instalment payments causes an additional 
difficulty for the borrower. It limits the type of project that can be financed with the microcredit 
loan. Rigidity and frequent repayments in microcredit could certainly deter clients from making 
an illiquid investment with potentially higher returns. For instance, Field et al. (2010) showed that 
clients with a grace period of two months were more likely to start businesses and invest in less 
liquid assets with higher returns if there were a relaxation of liquidity demands in the early phase 
of the loan cycle. Flexibility in repayments could also improve a client's ability to deal with short-
term shocks to household income. In an experiment in India on microfinance clients working in 
dairy farming, Czura (2015) found that flexible repayment schedules significantly improved the 
ability of the borrower to absorb shocks and resulted in higher income due to increase in investment 
and productivity.  
 
In addition, there are clear operational benefits for lenders in adopting less rigid, less frequent 
repayment schedules. MFIs can lower costs by reducing the frequency of repayments in terms of 
fewer meetings, fewer collections, and fewer transactions. Field and Pande (2008) suggest that 
MFIs can reach up to four times as many clients without hiring additional collection officers by 
changing the repayment schedule from weekly to monthly and thereby significantly expanding 
operations without incurring any loss.  In line with the argument that microfinance is seen as a 
powerful tool for poverty alleviation (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2011). Khandker, Khalily, and 
Samad, (2012) show that flexible microcredit helps in reaching the ultra-poor and seasonally poor 
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in Bangladesh. The reduction in cost could also lower interest rates and enhance the ability to 
service more clients.  
 
An easing of rigid repayment schedules could also contribute to broader goals. Since poverty is 
a multidimensional construct involving both economic deprivation and psychological well-being 
(Chakravarti, 2006; Narayan-Parker and Patel, 2000), it is logical that if policymakers and MFIs 
really wish to tackle ‘poverty’, they take a holistic view in designing financial products which 
address the poor clients’ fundamental needs of economic prosperity and psychological well-being 
(Sett, 2015).  Repayment flexibility can reduce financial stress as noted by Field et al. (2012), 
where they found that the clients with monthly repayment obligations were less likely to report 
feeling “worried, tense, or anxious” about repaying; were more likely to report feeling confident 
about repaying; and reported spending less time thinking negatively about their loan compared to 
the weekly clients.  
 
Despite the clear potential to better meet the needs of MFIs and their clients, there is limited 
evidence on the effects of deviating from the traditional weekly repayment contract's design and 
most of it is focused on delinquency and default rates. Not much attention has been given to other 
important business and household outcomes.  This research aims to narrow this knowledge gap. 
 
3. The study area and the data  
 
The quantitative study covered a random sample of 161 women who were clients of three MFIs, 
a co-operative society, and a few local traders or village financiers collected through two 
household surveys taken in 2015 and 2016 (see timeline in the appendix of Chapter 3), in the 
village Thol46 and its surrounding area in the state of Haryana. The survey collected information 
regarding income, loans, investment, health, household composition, education, employment, 
assets, and other variables. The qualitative research involved semi-structured interviews with 28 
clients 47in 2018. 
                                                 
46 See Section 2 of Chapter 2 for more details on the village, women, and lenders.  





The credit market of the village is being served by three microfinance organisations: SKS (now 
known as Bharat Financial Inclusion Limited), Utkarsh, and Janlaxmi since 2014. Additionally, 
there is a government supported Cooperative Society and several traders (specialised in productive 
loans). Most women in the sample are self-employed in household businesses such as livestock, 
agriculture, small shops, and garment making (see Table 1). None of the businesses are registered 
with the government or have any permanent employees. 
 
 Table  1: Primary income generating activities of the borrowers 






Cultivation 12.80 13 12.12 15.33 
Livestock 36.97 40 36.36 33.11 
Cloth-making 11.37 11 12.12 13.11 
Shops 17.54 17 19.70 17.56 
Business Investment 9.00 12 7.58 6.56 
Other small businesses such as 
pottery, basket making etc. 
9.95 7 12.12 14.33 
 
All three MFIs use a version of the Grameen group lending model. Like a Grameen model, 
borrowers are asked to form a group of five and, subsequently, the group members are expected 
to monitor each other’s repayment as well as share some coordination activities (such as collection 
of repayments) to reduce the operational costs of the MFI. However, they all can receive as well 
as repay the loan at the same time (instead of taking turns to do the same). Eligibility to receive a 
second loan depends on both the individual and the group repayment record. Repayment of 50% 
dues makes one eligible for a second loan. The group is expected to meet every week/month for a 
short meeting during which the members pay their dues and repeat their pledge to the group to 
maintain honesty and continue to repay on time. Thus, the group offers both a screening device 
and partial monitoring, but the liability remains individual. During the study period, there was no 




There is some difference between the MFIs in terms of the repayment cycle. The repayment 
cycle of SKS is weekly (control group) which starts within a week of the loan disbursement, 
whereas Janlaxmi and Utkarsh use a monthly cycle of repayment (treatment 1), which starts after 
a month of the loan disbursement. SKS and Utkarsh have similar loan products where a new 
borrower starts with a loan limit of Rs 15,000 ($215), which is then increased by an additional Rs 
15,000 ($215) in the second loan cycle, and then by Rs 20,000 ($285) in the third loan cycle, and 
finally by Rs 30,000 ($430) in the fourth until to reach the overall cap of Rs 80,000 ($1145) is 
reached. For Janlaxmi, the first loan starts at Rs 30,000 ($430) and the second loan can be up to 
Rs 50,000. The repayment is collected by a loan officer during the weekly/monthly meeting of the 
group, and a record is kept in individual passbooks. Hence, the clients of SKS meets 54 times a 
year for paying their instalment compared to only 12 times a year for Utkarsh and Janlaxmi clients. 
 
The Cooperative society and traders are very flexible both with their loan amount and 
repayment cycle. Usually, a Cooperative loan is to be paid back within six months with agreed 
monthly instalments of variable amount. Instalments can be adjusted in difficult times, but failure 
to pay the loan on time can invite penalties in the form of higher interest charges on the outstanding 
amount and/or being barred from future loans. The ‘flexibility’ in lending from traders varies 
depending on the borrower’s relationship with them. These lenders in the samples, also known as 
aadthis, are a special category of professional money lenders in the village who are grain traders 
but also serve the function of lending in the absence of concrete formal financial infrastructure. 
They provide facilities for both credit and savings, and act as a village bank. Due to heavy 
competition in the village lending sector, their interest rates are usually the same as the MFIs. The 
loans are usually seasonal and for productive purposes, and lenders preferred to be paid just after 
the profits from the investment is realised. One of the clear benefits of borrowing from these two 
groups is that the repayment schedule can be harmonised with the occurrence of investment 
returns. 
 
Table 2: Loan products offered by various lenders: 




SKS MFI  Weekly and fixed repayment 18-22 % Weekly Rs 15000 
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amount of Rs 335 over the course of 
54 weeks/one year 
(Control) 
Utkarsh  Monthly and fixed repayment 
amount of Rs 1480 over the course 
of 12 months /one year 
18-22 % Monthly 
(Treatment 1) 
Rs 15000 
Janlaxmi Monthly and fixed repayment 
amount of Rs 1930 over the course 
of 12 months /one year 
18-22 % Monthly 
(Treatment 1) 
Rs 30000 
Cooperative Flexible and repayment amount paid 
within six months. 
15-21 % Flexible 
(Treatment 2) 
Varies 
Traders  Flexible and harmonised with the 
investment return of the borrowers 




The descriptive statistics of the participants at baseline are provided in Table 3. The average 
woman in our sample is 31.77 years old and has completed 5.5 years of education and lived in the 
village for 12 years. The average client has a total loan size of Rs 29920 ($430), an income of Rs 
36200 ($515), saves Rs 700 ($10) every month, consumes food worth Rs 3400 ($48.64) every 
month and own Rs 101550 ($1452) worth of non-land assets. On average, clients have invested 
(business spending on items such as inventory, raw material, labour, and land) Rs 37910 ($542) 
while working 32 hours per week. Information regarding expenditure on health, children’s 
education, house quality48, and other personal characteristics was also collected in the survey. The 
p-value suggests that control and treatment groups are not significantly different from each other 
for most variables. 
                                                 
48 A binary variable distinguishing between dwellings that are designed to be solid and include cemented flooring 
and strong roof compare to houses without a strong floor or roof. (Good = 1, Weak = 0)  
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Table 3: Baseline Summary Statistics 
Variable ALL Weekly (SKS) Monthly (Utkarsh and 
Janlaxmi) 
Flexible (Cooperative and 
traders) 
  Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev. p-value  Mean Std.Dev. p-value 
Income, loan and expenditure (‘000 Rs)           
Loan taken in the year 29.92 14.64 37.17 14.51 26.23 9.86 0.00 27.28 17.72 0.00 
Investment in business activities 37.91 33.59 38.10 16.43 38.21 28.14 0.98 37.27 51.30 0.91 
Income of the respondent 36.39 12.59 36.26 11.71 36.92 12.13 0.77 35.76 14.33 0.85 
Income of the household 124.84 28.98 127.46 31.14 123.29 27.36 0.45 124.20 29.27 0.60 
Borrower’s savings per month  0.69 0.49 0.78 0.55 0.67 0.43 0.23 0.62 0.50 0.14 
Household consumption per month 3.44 1.01 3.44 0.92 3.42 1.17 0.95 3.46 0.85 0.90 
Non-land asset worth  101.55 54.17 104.20 44.62 87.27 45.89 0.05 119.56 68.52 0.19 
Monthly expenditure on education 0.73 2.76 0.56 0.53 0.46 0.48 0.26 1.32 5.16 0.30 
Yearly expenditure on health 15.54 11.64 17.78 14.62 13.85 8.67 0.07 15.53 11.55 0.41 
           
Household and Clients characteristics           
Education years 5.66 3.05 5.36 2.74 5.09 3.21 0.63 6.82 2.86 0.01 
Age  31.57 4.36 31.80 4.32 31.61 4.26 0.81 31.27 4.62 0.56 
Years in the Village 11.86 4.35 12.22 4.31 11.82 4.26 0.62 11.53 4.58 0.45 
Size of the Household 5.03 0.74 5.12 0.66 5.06 0.80 0.67 4.87 0.73 0.07 
Average hours worked per week 32.70 12.75 31.60 12.07 34.70 12.90 0.19 30.98 13.15 0.92 
Months with lenders 8.41 2.69 10.52 2.35 8.36 1.16 0.00 6.13 2.80 0.00 
House quality 0.60 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.57 0.49 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.85 
General Caste 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.64 0.42 0.49 0.01 
Schedule Castes and Tribes 0.44 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.10 
Other Backward Castes 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.22 0.42 0.52 
Observation 161   50   66     45     
p-values for differences of means against weekly. 1$ = Rs 70 (September 2018)
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The choice of repayment structure was exogenous for both the lenders and the borrowers. 
All three MFIs offer the same repayment structure and loan products regardless of the region 
they operate in, implying that the repayment scheme has no relationship with the location or 
the borrowers’ characteristics. The borrowers are indifferent to the repayment structure which 
is verified using a probit model (see Table 4 in the appendix) on the probability of participation 
in any of the repayment structures. We find borrowers' characteristics have no influence on the 
participation in a specific repayment structure (except education and belonging to upper caste 
has a positive and significant relationship with the participation in flexible lending). Hence, it 
can be argued that neither the borrowers nor the MFIs chose this scheme considering the 
borrowers’ characteristics in the area. 
 
Our qualitative enquiries suggest that the clients felt indifferent to the credit repayment 
structure, and simply getting a loan was the most important factor in joining the MFI or other 
lenders. Most of the clients of MFIs were introduced by their friends or joined because their 
friends were already members. 
 
One respondent confirmed this: 
 
“One of my neighbours was a member of SKS Microfinance. She suggested that the rest of 
us should form a group and sign up for a loan. Within two weeks, we were given a loan of Rs 
15000 with no assets to give as collateral.” 
 
Prospective clients first express their interest in getting a loan, then a loan officer goes to 
the client's house and evaluates if the client fulfils all the criteria for the loan. If the client agrees 




The study uses a mixed-method approach, which includes a questionnaire survey for 
quantitative data and semi-structured interviews with randomly selected borrowers. The 
mixed-method is considered to be very efficient in answering research questions compared to 
the quantitative and qualitative approached when used in isolation49 (Creswell, 2002). The 
                                                 
49 See Chapter 3 for more details on the mixed-method approach. 
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quantitative data was complemented with qualitative questions that asked respondents to 
explain the reasons for changes in the outcomes of their businesses over the time-period 
considered.  
 
We divided the analysis into various categories of business and household outcomes. Our 
primary focus is on the level of investment, income and loan amount. The survey allows us to 
measure the impact of various repayment structures on other business outcomes such as hours 
worked per week; household outcomes such as the amount of non-land assets, savings in the 
last month, and consumption on food in the last month. Due to the relatively small sample size, 
it was not feasible to compare rates of default – in fact, during the course of the study, the 
default rate was zero in both control and treatment groups. 
 
For the quantitative analysis, this study uses difference-in-differences (DID), which allows 
us to compare the change before and after this intervention against the same change in another 
untreated group. Any difference in post-treatment characteristics can then be causally attributed 
to the treatment. To isolate the causal impact of the various repayment structures, a series of 
DID models were estimated in the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝑦1(𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝑦2(𝐹𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 …. (1) 
 
Where Yit denotes an outcome variable for client i at the time t, M is a dummy for Monthly 
repayment schedule and F is the dummy for flexible repayment schedule, POST is an indicator 
for the post-intervention period, X is a vector for individual and household characteristics and 





By reducing the liquidity needs in the early phase of a client's loan cycle, flexible repayment 
should increase the client's investment in business and their ability to take on illiquid 
investments with higher return and risk. The impact of risky investment can have a varied effect 
on the business and household outcomes as they depend on the variability of returns. Illiquid 
investments carry higher risk; for instance, in case of emergency, clients may have to sell their 
investment at a loss. In this case, clients may have to cut down their consumption, use their 




In contrast, rigid weekly repayment may require the client to keep some money from the 
loan amount to pay for the instalment due to start immediately after the loan disbursement. In 
this case, clients are more likely to (under)invest in a less risky and liquid asset with low returns 




The results show that the client’s investment behaviour is sensitive to the design of the debt 
contracts. The study found a significant increase in business investment for the treatment 
clients (see Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 in the appendix). The average client with monthly and 
flexible repayments invests roughly 33 percent and 35 percent more respectively on business 
items compared to weekly clients. These results are consistent with the predictions that a 
flexible and infrequent repayment schedule increases the business investments. Qualitative 
enquiry suggested that clients with weekly repayment schedules kept a portion of their loan to 
allow repayment of their first few instalments, reducing the funds available to the business. 
 
One of the clients who has a sweet shop in the survey confirmed underinvesting in their 
business. She said:  
“I got a second loan for stocking up sweets to sell during Diwali. A part of that loan went for 
advance payment to the supplier to confirm my bulk order. The rest of it was set aside to pay 
for the weekly instalments since it will take weeks to sell enough sweets to make a profit - weeks 
in which I still have to make regular repayments on the loan. This adds to the cost of 
borrowing”  
 
However, the increase in investment has not translated into an increase in income. We do 
not find significant differences between the income of the groups belonging to various 
repayment schedules (see Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 in the appendix). This suggests that 
monthly and flexible repayment clients invest their loans in riskier though presumably higher 
expected return business ventures and some of these investments did not pay off. It may also 
be that some of the investment takes a longer time to realise, and hence, it does not show in the 
survey yet. For instance, some crops (vegetables like potatoes) with low return takes only a 
few weeks to harvest whereas the return from cash crops (like sugarcane) takes around 12 -16 
months and usually have a very high return.  
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The average client with monthly and flexible repayments had roughly 16 percent and 20 
percent more savings in the last month respectively compared to the weekly repaying clients 
(see Column 5 and 6 of Table 5 in the appendix). The study did not find any significant 
difference between the level of food consumption for various repayment schedules. This is a 
similar result to Czura (2015), however, opposite to the research by Shoji (2010)50.   
 
The study also finds that a monthly repayment schedule increases the amount of loan taken 
by 27.5 percent; however, no effect was found with flexible repayment (see Column 7 and 8 
of Table 5 in the appendix). The use of monthly schedule repayments also reduces the 
probability of taking an additional loan. We find that monthly repayment clients are 38.5 
percent less likely to take an additional loan (see Table 6 in the appendix). The qualitative 
enquiries suggest that these additional loans are usually taken from small moneylenders who 
charge a very high interest rate and sometimes to pay for repayments of the initial MFI loan. 
These findings are comparable to Jain and Mansuri (2003), who show that the use of regularly 
scheduled repayments in microfinance loans may be a reason why informal lenders still thrive 
in regions where microcredit has been firmly established.  
 
The interviews suggest that some women who are struggling to pay their instalments turn 
to the informal sector for help. This phenomenon was echoed by one respondent who pays their 
instalment weekly:   
 
“Our business (agriculture) is seasonal, and we are poor with no savings. It is hard to pay 
every week when there is no source of income during the low season. We have to borrow from 
neighbours, friends or informal lenders (quick loans at a very high interest rate) in order to 
pay the weekly instalments. Borrowing from some people could be very humiliating and 
stressful since they will keep reminding you about the money. It also adds to the amount you 
already owe.” 
 
Microfinance is seen as a tool to protect the poor from village moneylenders (loan sharks) 
who usually charge a very high-interest rate. However, rigid and inflexible microcredit 
                                                 
50 Shoji (2010) worked with very poor people in Bangladesh during the natural disaster, a very different setting 
compared to ours. 
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contracts may have helped them survive by taking advantage of the information symmetry 
between microfinance institutions and clients (Jain and Mansuri, 2003). 
 
One woman did not increase her loan size after given a choice and linked weekly instalments 
with stress: 
“Finding money for the repayment every week causes me real worry and stress. Until I have 
money for the instalment, I feel anxious and agitated all the time. Taking a bigger loan and 
paying even higher instalments will make it worse.”  
 
The study did not find any significant differences between average hours worked per week 
between the control and treatment groups. This shows that the increase in investment is not 
complemented by an increase in the hours worked. One explanation could be that by an 
increase in investment in raw materials, labour, land etc, some clients may be able to increase 
the output as well as hours worked. However, this increase could be offset when some clients 
invests in better resources (like machinery) to increase productivity and hence, reduce the hours 
spent on work. Selling of assets to repay loans or in case of loss were rare in the sample. We 
do not find significant differences in the asset worth of the clients belonging to various 
repayment schedules.  
 
The qualitative enquiry suggested that women with weekly repayment schedules have a 
lower satisfaction with the loan product compared to monthly and flexible repayment 
borrowers. Lack of time to attend weekly meetings was also given as the reason for somewhat 
less satisfaction. Women with weekly repayment schedules reported higher incidences of being 
stressed on the day before an instalment was due. On the other hand, monthly group members 
reported making business purchases in bulk more frequently compared to the women in the 
weekly group. Incidents of delaying expenditure on healthcare reported were also higher in the 
weekly group.  
 
Weekly repaying women also emphasised the importance of the social interactions in the 
regular weekly meetings: particularly valuable experience given the traditional norms of 
female isolation in the region. Social interaction for the women with a monthly repayment was 
rare outside their group. Research by Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2013) shows that more 
frequent meetings can increase social capital. Past literature has discussed the benefits of social 
capital in a wide variety of fields including its potential to enhance livelihood stability, 
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employment generation, poverty reduction and improvement in quality of essential services 
(Krishna, 2003), economic development (Feigenberg, Field, Pande, Rigol, and Sarkar, 2014); 
community development (Blair and Carroll, 2008); women's collective empowerment (Sanyal, 
2009); and health outcomes (Pronyk et al., 2008). Understanding the benefit of social capital 
generated through weekly meetings is beyond the scope of this research. However, the 
qualitative inquiries suggest that more women from the weekly group reported asking for help 
to pay instalments from friends and relatives. This might be due to an increase in social capital 
and economic co-operation among women. Although, regularly asking for help from husbands 
for repaying instalments also led to conflict in the homes for some individuals in the weekly 
group. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Classic microfinance loan contracts characterised by rigid weekly repayment schedules 
offer little flexibility – and little benefit - to borrowers who are poor and have seasonal income. 
Such contracts can also negatively affect the economic well-being of poor borrowers leading 
to underinvestment of capital (Field et al., 2010), selling of productive assets (Khandker, 2012), 
over-indebtedness through cross-financing from informal sources at a higher interest rate (Jain 
and Mansuri, 2003), reduction in consumption (Shoji 2010), income (Czura, 2015), and in 
some cases, increase in financial stress (Field, Pande, Papp, and Park, 2012). Flexibility in the 
microloan repayment schedule can overcome some of these problems. Based on the results, 
this study makes a case in favour of flexible and infrequent loan repayment contracts.  
 
The findings suggest that a flexible and infrequent repayment structure can break the series 
of low investment in microenterprises by the borrowers. Although these results are promising, 
the study finds that an increase in the level of investment has not translated into an increase in 
income for the borrower. We also find that the monthly and flexible repaying clients had a 
higher loan amount driven by an increase in investment. Our research shows that weekly 
paying clients are more likely to take an additional loan – this could imply that they are 
struggling to pay their weekly instalments.  
 
The qualitative research done in this study supports a shift away from classic microfinance 
weekly repayment to monthly and flexible repayment structure. The qualitative enquiry 
suggested that weekly repaying clients invested less of their loan amount, had less satisfaction 
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with loan products, reported more frequent incidences of being stressed before an instalment 
was due, higher incidences of asking for help in paying instalments from friends and relative 
and delayed expenditure on healthcare. 
 
Considering this, microfinance institutions have an opportunity - arguably a responsibility - 
to build financial products aligned with the needs of their consumers without moving away 
from the core objective of reducing poverty in a profitable and sustainable manner. Such a 
model may require MFIs to work more closely with their consumer to understand their 
requirements and build customised products depending on the consumers’ cash flows. It is 
certain that to overcome the barrier which the current microfinance model presents, there is a 
need to shun the "one size fits all" approach to rigid microfinance contracts. Flexibility may 
deteriorate payment incentives; however, MFIs can use sanctions (such as barring from future 
loans) and rewards (such as an increased loan size and reducing interest rates) and collect more 
detailed information on its clients (Labie et al., 2013). MFIs could take advantage of informal 
financial channels to collect information on prospective borrowers (Hamp and Laureti, 2011) 
or hire local payment collectors from the same area to the clients to facilitate screening, and to 
monitor and mitigate moral hazard problems51 (Labie et al., 2013). The optimal combination 
of flexibility and discipline would require lenders to innovate on their product design, lending 
technologies, and risk management strategies and to dramatically improve their information 
base (Sett, 2015). Flexibility may result in higher costs for MFIs through enforcing loan 
contracts, deploying more staff in the field to monitor clients, acquiring information on clients 
to evaluate their preferences and repayment capacity. However, at the same time, MFIs can 
also lower costs by reducing the frequency of repayments and may be able to lower interest 
rates, scale up operations, and reach additional clients in remote or previously under-served 
locations.  
 
Although the present study confirms the general benefits of flexibility in setting repayment 
terms, that approach is not easy for most microfinance organisations to implement.  Not least 
because an MFI needs to maintain repayment discipline among its clients, and an MFI must 
invariably achieve this without the benefit of in-depth information about each client's 
individual circumstances – the kind of local knowledge which is frequently available to 
                                                 
51 
 For instance, Ghana Barclays bank works with susu (deposit) collectors who understand the local 
economy and Safesave in India hires local collectors. 
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informal lenders, who can consequently be flexible in their terms of credit. Nevertheless, the 
benefits are real, and the challenge rests with the microfinance organisations to seek ways of 
transferring these flexibility benefits to the formal sector, by more efficient and effective design 
of loan contracts. The key objective should be to match the terms of repayment with the cash-
flow needs of the client. 
 
Until now, MFIs have largely ignored the demand for flexible financial products, however, 
increasing competition in the microfinance industry may encourage MFIs to rethink their 
product design. For MFIs to continue growing, it is essential to pay attention to their clients’ 
needs, preferences, behaviours and well-being. We hope this study will help MFIs to rethink 
and re-focus their lending approach and help them make the shift towards flexible products. 
 
Although this paper draws a clear conclusion - that a traditional rigid weekly repayment 
structure is not the best option - the scope of this research to date does not allow us to state 
with confidence what the best option actually is. We conclude that flexibility is best, but 
'flexibility' is a broad term, which includes the introduction of grace periods (Field et al., 2010), 
clients' involvement in choosing their preferred repayment structure (Barboni and Agarwal 
2018), as well as simply requiring less frequent repayments (monthly rather than weekly) and 
offering a greater range of loan products to cater for a wider range of client needs. Or, of course, 
any mixture of these.  Both further qualitative and quantitative research is needed to understand 
in detail the cash-flow and other challenges faced by poor clients in repaying debt obligations, 
and so to seek the elusive balance between maximising economic benefit for the client while 
minimising economic risk to the lender. Future studies should also focus on more enhanced 
versions of flexibility, comparing financial products differing in their degree of flexibility, and 
understanding the conditions under which flexibility works well. 
 
Finally, this study recommends qualitative research, along with quantitative analysis, to 
understand the struggles and challenges (economical and psychological) clients face while 
repaying debt obligation through rigid instalments, and how flexibility in the loan contracts can 
improve their business outcomes. In this regard, the qualitative research set this study apart 
from the past literature on the repayment schedule and has been instrumental to our 




7. Appendix A: Tables  
 







Age -0.773 0.893 -0.614 
 (27.502) (48.962) (30.265) 
Education years -0.024 -0.041 0.097*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.038) 
Size of the household 0.048 0.059 -0.198 
 (0.118) (0.123) (0.146) 
House quality -0.088 -0.166 0.337 
 (0.190) (0.200) (0.228) 
General Caste -0.098 -0.476* 0.663** 
 (0.246) (0.265) (0.283) 
SC/ST 0.039 -0.107 0.134 
 (0.210) (0.218) (0.257) 
Years in the village 0.786 -0.913 0.622 
 (27.502) (48.962) (30.265) 
Age at marriage 0.733 -0.855 0.620 
 (27.502) (48.962) (30.265) 
Constant 0.509 -0.830 -1.069 
 (1.257) (1.311) (1.455) 
Observations 211 211 211 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 1 if the client is paying 
weekly (Column 1), monthly (Column 2) and flexible (Column 3).
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Table 5: Impact of repayment schedule 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Investment Income Consumption Loan Amount Savings Asset Worth Hours worked 
               
Monthly  0.334** 0.331** 0.000 0.002 0.025 0.024 0.285** 0.275** 0.163** 0.161** 0.111 0.109 1.833 1.811 
 (0.135) (0.133) (0.07)  (0.070) (0.060)  (0.057)  (0.109) (0.105) (0.071) (0.064) (0.110)  (0.102) (3.032) (2.902) 
               
Flexible 0.322* 0.357** -0.030 0.009 0.021 0.028 -0.106 -0.101 0.168** 0.198** -0.012 0.013 0.400 0.536 
 (0.171) (0.169) (0.09) (0.079) (0.061) (0.056) (0.238) (0.218) (0.081) (0.063) (0.116)  (0.108) (3.476) (3.390) 
               
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.27 0.22 0.36 0.09 0.21 0.04 0.13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
The outcome variables are log of investment (col 1 and 2), log of income (col 3 and 4), log of loan amount (col 7 and 8), log of savings (col 9 and 10), log of asset worth (col 11 and 12), average 




Table 6: Impact of repayment schedule on taking an additional loan 
 (1) 
 Probability of taking an additional loan 






Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
The dependent variable is 1 if the client took an additional loan and 0 otherwise 



























This dissertation examines several topics related to development economics, more 
specifically focusing on credit for poor people. Over four essays, we explore some of the key 
areas where credit is falling short of its promises. These are caste discrimination, women's 
empowerment, borrowers with limited business knowledge, and inflexible repayment structure 
of microloans. The study uses primary data collected from a village in the Indian state of 
Haryana from the clients of three microfinance institutions, cooperative credit societies and 
professional money lenders between 2015 and 2017 over three field visits; and from the India 
Human Development Survey data of 2005 and 2011-12.  
 
The first chapter of the thesis examines the extent of caste discrimination in the Indian credit 
sector and how it has changed over recent time. We find that caste is still a worryingly potent 
determinant of lending outcomes. Of course, there are significant differences between general 
and other lower castes regarding their human and physical assets, household circumstances and 
business characteristics that partly explain the gap in credit extended to them. However, a 
significant portion of the credit differential between the castes cannot be explained by these 
objective factors, suggesting that the evasive hand of discrimination has a role to play 
Recognising that caste-based prejudices have deep roots in Indian society, the nation’s 
government has launched various programmes over time to improve the provision of financial 
services to the lower castes.  One key finding can be drawn from the results of our research: 
these schemes have not been very effective.  
 
The second chapter of the thesis examines the impact of women’s empowerment on their 
creditworthiness measured in terms of the cumulative amount of loan taken by women over 
time. We created an index for empowerment using four dimensions: economic, social, 
interpersonal and political. Since empowerment is an endogenous variable, we use instrumental 
variables regression to examine this relationship using the dummy of the first-born son as our 
instrument. The study concluded that empowerment has a positive impact on the total loan 
amount. This finding is consistent with results obtained for North India from a separate dataset 
that is nationally representative. However, these findings were not reflected nation-wide, 




It is a general view that capital alone cannot overcome the barriers faced by poor clients to 
make efficient use of their loan. Two of the most important barriers are a lack of business 
knowledge, and seasonal or cyclical business income. In the third and fourth chapters, we 
explored how the microfinance industry responds to those barriers.  
 
The third chapter of the thesis studies the impact of business training offered to micro-
entrepreneurs. One positive, though unsurprising finding, was that better training led to better 
business - the borrowers who were trained increased the income from their businesses. Other 
findings, though, were surprising. It might be logical to assume that those with business 
training would invest more in their businesses and seek to grow. Instead, we found that business 
training to micro-entrepreneurs led to a decrease in the level of investment in their business. 
Our interviews suggest that poor businesswomen tended to realise through training that their 
original investment plans were unnecessarily large in relation to their business goals; and they 
understood more clearly the risks of growing their business too quickly. However, the 
reduction in the level of investment did not affect the loan size suggesting the belief among 
treated women that any unused funds would mitigate risk and act as a safety blanket. Business 
training in this regard seems to allow borrowers to be more risk tolerant regarding loan default, 
but more risk-averse regarding their businesses.  
 
The fourth chapter, like the third, focuses on the possible solution rather than the problem. 
For many small businesses, especially in agricultural areas, the problem of seasonal income is 
well-established in relation to credit. The challenge is to discover how to make regular loan 
repayments based on irregular, and unpredictable, income. In rural India, informal and back-
street lenders offer loans of last resort to allow borrowers to deal with this issue - begging the 
question 'if the borrowers are going to turn to informal lenders anyway, what is the point of 
MFIs?'. This, therefore, is an important problem.  The solution that we focus on is repayment 
flexibility. The idea of frequent repayments has long been fundamental in microfinance, 
underpinned by aspirations of developing traits of fiscal prudence and credit discipline in poor 
borrowers.  We tested whether clients' business and household outcomes were sensitive to 
various repayment schedules using a mixed method approach. We analysed alternatives to the 
rigid contract model, focussing on the degree of flexibility and the length of gap between 
repayments in the loan schedule. Our findings strongly challenge the traditional microfinance 
reliance on regular weekly meetings as a standard repayment regime. Borrowers with monthly 
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and flexible repayments had a higher level of investment and savings compared to those with 
fixed weekly schedules. Monthly repaying clients also borrowed a higher loan amount 
compared to weekly repaying clients.  
 
The findings of this thesis should be of interest to both policymakers and academic 
researchers. In the first chapter, contrary to widespread assumptions about the diminishing 
significance of caste in modern India, the scale and consistency of discrimination observed 
over time offers a sobering counterpoint. The large endowments difference between social 
groups indicates that there is a need to promote educational and training opportunities for the 
lower castes. The government should also take more steps to ensure that the disadvantaged 
sections of society get fuller and more consistent participation in schooling, employment, and 
health programmes to reduce pre-market discrimination. Policy-makers need to adopt a broader 
range of strategies to tackle the deep-seated and multi-faceted challenge of systemic 
discrimination. Initiatives need to include the improvement of financial literacy across lower 
castes, encouragement of positive discrimination, active monitoring of caste bias, and more 
focused research into the causes and nature of persistent caste discrimination. In the second 
chapter, our results show that highly-empowered women gain better outcomes from   
microfinance being able to borrow more. This suggests that there is a need to decouple 
empowerment from microcredit either by policies focusing on empowering women or by 
increasing access to microcredit for lowly-empowered women. 
 
In the third and fourth chapters, we endorse both the 'solutions' under consideration: 
business training and flexible repayment schedules. MFIs are moving in the right direction, but 
they need to finetune their trajectory by focusing on factors which threaten to steer them off-
course. In the third chapter, we recommend designing a training approach more suited to the 
ability of poor participants to absorb the training content. In the fourth chapter, we make a 
strong case in favour of flexible and infrequent loan repayment contracts becoming the norm 
in microcredit, rather than the exception. 
 
The thesis opens numerous avenues for further research. To tackle caste discrimination, a 
deeper understanding of the sources and causes of discrimination is needed in order to 
formulate policies to reduce its incidence and effects; however, to do this, it is first necessary 
to identify the nature and scale of discrimination more clearly. Hence, continued research is 
needed to measure discrimination over time. In the second chapter, we acknowledge that some 
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of the variables used for measuring empowerment in past literature might not be very helpful 
in the present since the behaviour and social norms that assess empowerment are constantly 
evolving. Hence, there is a need for more research in understanding new dimensions of 
empowerment. Only with a deeper understanding of the process of empowerment, we can 
reduce gender inequality and formulate policies to reduce its incidence and effect. 
 
In the third chapter, further research needs to focus on the following aspects to get a precise 
assessment of the value of training - some measure of knowledge transfer at the completion of 
training; some measure of spill-over from treatment to control groups (an assessment of 
changes in knowledge in the control group); additional interviews across the treatment and 
control group over time to identify the rationale and causation behind the changes in outcomes. 
It is also crucial that trainers assess and analyse the existing financial beliefs and 
misconceptions of poorer trainees. Future studies should also explore different types of training 
mechanism and delivery methods according to the education and knowledge level of the 
participants. On the work regarding repayment flexibility, further research should focus on 
more enhanced versions of flexibility, comparing financial products differing in their degree 
of flexibility, and understanding the conditions under which that flexibility works well. 
 
Finally, this research benefited hugely from the qualitative fieldwork done in North India 
which was instrumental in understanding the complex topics researched in this thesis. 
Quantitative studies often overlook key personal information: for example, local information 
about sensitive issues such as caste discrimination, cultural beliefs and traditional practices. 
Quantitative surveys also lack information on contextual factors to explain variations in 
behaviour between households with similar economic and demographic characteristics. Given 
some of the weaknesses of the quantitative approach, there is a need in the field of development 
studies to incorporate qualitative study along with quantitative analysis. To understand how 
and why some interventions work, and what can be done to improve matters, the addition of 
qualitative analysis to quantitative approach is certainly helpful and could even be necessary. 
Hence, we make a case for a mixed method approach which can generate a deeper analytical 







Appendix 1: Indian microfinance inclusion index 
 
India, the home to the largest number of poor in the world, has long cherished the dream of 
universal financial inclusion, but traditionally this dream has been pursued through expansion 
of large nationalised banks, which unfortunately exclude the poor due to lack of collaterals. 
Where banks and other formal financial institutions have failed to cater to the needs of poor, 
microfinance providers have made remarkable progress in reaching out to the poorest. 
According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign, the number of poor households with a 
microloan has grown from 58.06 million in 2006-2007 to 90 million in 2013-14. 
 
But the picture of healthy growth in microfinance hides a picture of uneven spread or 
regional inequality in the coverage of microfinance. While India’s largest and poorest state 
Uttar Pradesh is relatively unserved by microfinance, the Southern state of Andhra Pradesh has 
more microfinance clients in the world except for Bangladesh. As a whole, the Southern region 
outperforms the rest of India. One may wonder why the Northern states, which had given birth 
to the Green Revolution and should have had a vibrant market of agricultural and microcredit, 
have the lowest growth of microfinance services in India. If microfinance agencies are able to 
direct loans for agriculture in the southern states, why don’t they do that in other regions? The 
uneven spread of microfinance is an important issue because it has a direct bearing on poverty 
and income inequality.  
 
Considering this, we created an Index of Microfinance Inclusion (IMFI) to assess the degree 
of financial inclusion and distribution of microfinance services for poor across Indian states. 
Although there are several financial inclusion indices are available, but this index focuses on 
the financial inclusion for the poor people and all the variables have adjusted with respect to 
the poor population (and not the entire population). A country financial inclusion index does 
not show the full picture of how the people below the poverty line are included in the finance 
sector given that access to finance is important for economic growth and poverty alleviation.  
 
To measure this index, we have used a multidimensional approach taking three dimensions and 




Penetration of microfinance: This is one of the most important indicators of financial 
inclusion. The number of poor people using (have account or involved) the microfinance 
services is a measure of the penetration of microfinance in the state. Thus, if every adult under 
the poverty line has access to microfinance, then the value of this measure would be equal to 
1. The indicator we used for this dimension is the number of microfinance accounts as a 
proportion of the total poor population. 
 
Availability of the microfinance: Availability of microfinance can be indicated by the number 
of outlets from where finance is provided to the poor population with respect to poverty and 
area of the state.  
 
Usage of the microfinance: Merely having an account with an MFI/bank or involvement with 
an SHG does not ensure the financial inclusion. These facilities should be adequately utilised 
well to reap the benefits they come with. The volume of loan outstanding and savings as a 
proportion of the poor population is used as an indicator for this dimension 
 





No of MFI clients/ Poor Households 
No of SHGs/Poor Households 
Availability of the 
microfinance 
 
No of MFI branches/ Poor Households 
No of SHG federations (NGOs/Govt)/Poor Households 
Bank Branches/Poor Households 
No of MFI branches/ 1000km2 
SHG federations (NGOs/Govt)/ 1000km2 
Bank Branches/1000km2 
Usage of the 
microfinance 
 
Volume of loans outstanding of MFI with banks/Poor 
Households 
Volume of loans outstanding of SHG with banks/Poor 
Households 






We are using the same multidimensional approach used by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) to compute the Human Development Index (HDI), and Gender-related 
Development Index (GDI). 
 
The index is calculated by first calculating a dimension index for each dimension 
(penetration pi, availability ai and usage ui). The dimension of index for the ith dimension, dpi, 
dai, and dui, is computed by: 
 
𝑑𝑝𝑖 , 𝑑𝑎𝑖 , 𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑖  =  𝑤𝑖 
(𝐴𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖)




wi = Weight attached to the dimension i. 
Ai = Actual value of dimension i. 
mi = minimum value of the dimension i. 
Mi = maximum value of the dimension i. 
 
The formula above ensures that higher the value of di, higher the state’s achievement and it 
will be 0 < dpi, dai, dui <1 where 1 is the highest achievement and 0 is the lowest achievement 
in the dimension. 
 
The index of microfinance inclusion (IMFI) for the ith state is measured by the normalised 
inverse Euclidean distance of the point (pi, ai, ui) from the highest point (1, 1, 1). For which the 
formula is: 
IMFIs = 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
1   1   1
1 –  
3
i i idp da du− + − + −
 
where ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
1   1   1i i idp da du− + − + −  is the Euclidean distance from the highest point. 
Dividing the same with 3 normalizes it in the three-dimensional space. Thus, for any state, 





Using data52 on all three dimensions for 32 states including 3 union territories (UT), we 
have computed the value of IMFI. We have categorised into three categories: 
 
(i) 0.4 < IMFI ≤ 1 – high financial inclusion 
(ii) 0.25 ≤ IMFI < 0.4 – medium financial inclusion 
(iii) 0 ≤ IMFI < 0.25 – low financial inclusion 
 
Regions d1 (Penetration) d2 (Availability) d3 (Usage) MF INDEX 
 
High Financial Inclusion 
Andhra Pradesh 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.85 
AandN Islands (UT) 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.79 
Kerala 0.40 1.00 0.36 0.49 
 
Medium Financial Inclusion 
Tamil Nadu 0.69 0.22 0.37 0.39 
Puducherry 0.59 0.08 0.40 0.32 
Tripura 0.78 0.03 0.27 0.29 
Karnataka 0.57 0.09 0.28 0.29 
Goa 0.21 0.37 0.20 0.26 
 
Low Financial Inclusion 
Mizoram 0.36 0.02 0.33 0.22 
West Bengal 0.34 0.19 0.13 0.22 
Sikkim 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.17 
                                                 




New Delhi 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.14 
Uttarakhand 0.25 0.08 0.10 0.14 
Maharashtra 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.12 
Odisha 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.12 
Rajasthan 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.10 
Punjab 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.09 
Assam 0.17 0.02 0.07 0.09 
Meghalaya 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.08 
Himachal Pradesh 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.07 
Haryana 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Gujarat 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Manipur 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.05 
Madhya Pradesh 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Chandigarh 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.04 
Bihar 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Jharkhand 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Uttar Pradesh 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Chhattisgarh 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.03 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 
Nagaland 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Jammu and Kashmir 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
We computed the index for microfinance inclusion for 32 states using the multidimensional 
approach. Andhra Pradesh leads the index with the highest value of 0.85, Andaman and 
Nicobar and Kerala follow with 0.79 and 0.49. These are the only three states which fall under 
high financial inclusion. Andhra Pradesh has the highest value for the penetration and usage 




Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Tripura, Karnataka, and Goa fall under medium financial 
inclusion. All other Indian states fall under low financial inclusion which indicates most of the 
Indian poor do not have access to the formal finance. All the southern states fall under either 
high or medium whereas all other northern, eastern and central states fall under low financial 
inclusion. It is also interesting to note that states like Maharashtra and Odisha which are known 
to have a good microfinance infrastructure have a very low value of 0.12 because of the high 
poverty level. This means the microfinance services here are still not reaching most of its poor.   
 
The index of microfinance inclusion yielding a single numerical value is an excellent 
communication tool to assess the financial inclusion for the poor population. The policymaker 
can also use the index in allocating resources in requirement with each dimension. For example, 
in Tripura, Tamil Nadu and Mizoram, the penetration of microfinance services is quite high, 
but the availability and usage are really low. By allocating more resources to availability and 
usage dimension, policy makers can raise the microfinance profile in these states. Subject to 
availability of the data, the index can be used to compare the extent of financial inclusion for 

















































Age at marriage 
 
20 






Can you read and write? 
 
Yes 
Primary source of income for the respondent 
 
Bee keeping 
Size of the household 
 
6 






Son age and year of education 
 
12 years, 7 years 
6 years, 2 years  
Daughter age and years of education 
 
4 years, 1 years 











Do you rent or own the house? 
 
Own 






Does the household have a ration card? 
 
Yes 
Do you have Aadhar card? Yes 
  


































Income of the respondent 
 
50,000 
Total income of the Household 
 
150,000 
Savings of the borrowers in the last month 
 
1000 
Consumption on food expenditure per month 
(average monthly spending on rice, flour, milk and dairy products, 
pulses, vegetables, oil and spices) 
 
3,500 





Health expenditure in the last month including medicines 
 
1,200 
Expenditure on entertainment (spending on cable TV, mobile, 






Have a bank account? 
 
No 
Expenditure on children education 
 
1 
Keep records of transaction 
 
Yes 
How many sickness days in the family in the last month? 
 
8 
How many employment days missed by client due to sickness? 
 
6 
Do children help in the business? 
 
Yes 
Did she receive any training? No 
 




Average Hours worked 28 
  
Empowerment Status questions - 
 
 
Do you own assets above Rs 10000? 
 
No 
Are you currently working and earning? 
 
Yes 
Level of control over loan 
 
Medium 
Do you have control over your savings? 
 
Yes 
Do you have control over your income? 
 
Yes 
Do you have the majority control over small purchases above Rs 




Do you have the majority control over big purchases above Rs 









Do you have the majority control in taking decisions regarding 
child/daughter schooling, clothing, food, etc. 
 
Yes 
Are you free to move around the village to visit the temple, friends, 
etc. without husband’s objection? 
 
Yes 
Are you free to move outside village to doctors, relative or market, 
without husband’s objection to going alone? 
 
No 
Do you know the name of their Sarpanch? 
 
Yes 
Do you know the name of their MLA/MP? 
 
Yes 
Did you vote in the election/will vote in the election? 
 
Yes 
Are you independent of husband interference in the voting? 
 
No 
Is it wrong for husbands to use physical violence against their 
wives in any situation? 
 
No 
Are you independent to take fertility and parenting decisions? 
 
No 
Do you have access to radio, TV, and other sources of media? 
 
Yes 
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